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ABSTRACT
There have been numerous studies of the debt crisis 
from global, Latin American and even Mexican perspectives. 
However, very few studies have so far addressed the 
political dimension of the crisis and examined the effects 
of the crisis on political stability and democratic 
practice in Mexico. This research focuses on the political 
dimension of the crisis, in order to make good this 
important omission in the existing literature. This thesis 
explores in particular two closely related questions about 
the practice of politics in Mexico. First, it explores the 
role which political debates and political pressures have 
played in shaping the response of the Mexican state to one 
of the gravest crises faced by the country. Second, it 
illuminates the common political practice of the Mexican 
state.
This work analyses the political forces involved in 
the domestic debate surrounding the negotiations between 
the Mexican state and the IMF during this crisis. It 
interprets the various economic and political pressures 
that different Mexican social groups exercised upon the 
Mexican state. The social actors taken into account in this 
study are people involved in the political arena such as 
politicians, bureaucrats and senior members of the state; 
institutions with socio-economic interests inside civil 
society such as workers' unions, chambers of private
organizations, banks, peasants' organizations, the church, 
the press and civil associations.
The thesis demonstrates how public opinion generated 
a new political debate through the media. This political 
debate inside Mexican society was substantially extended 
and intensified, stimulating the formation of new political 
alternatives. The awakening of a political consciousness 
contributed to the generation of an important debate which 
shaped the contest of the presidential political campaign 
in 1988. A new political coalition, the FDN, emerged, 
presenting a serious alternative presidential candidate. In 
the end, the governing PRI won the presidential elections; 
nevertheless, many Mexicans gave their support to both the 
left-wing FDN and the right-wing PAN, instead of to the 
PRI. Thus, the economic debt crisis culminated in a 
political electoral crisis during the 1988 presidential 
elections.
To sum up, the thesis proves that the debt crisis as 
an issue opened up the political debate and led to a 
political crisis. The earlier process of political reform 
initiated in Mexico in 1977 opened the space for 
alternative political parties and views. The debt crisis 
was taken up as an issue by these alternative groups which 
encouraged the debate. The debt crisis itself thus 
reinforced the process of political transformation.
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1Introduction
This thesis attempts to explore the politics of the 
debt crisis that arose in Mexico from August 1982, and 
the political consequences that resulted from this 
crisis. The thesis will argue that the debt issue, which 
became a central matter in Mexican political life from 
August 1982, opened up political debate inside Mexican 
society. As a result of this political debate, various 
parts of society came to exercise new and important 
pressures upon state institutions. These new political 
pressures created cracks that seriously affected the 
Mexican political system, stimulating the creation of an 
official opposition to the ruling party (the PRI which 
had been in power since 1929) and an atmosphere of 
discussion about the future shape of Mexican political 
institutions, and confronting a nationalist view of the 
problem with a internationalist one.
The rhythm of the debt crisis in Mexico was 
determined by the nature of Mexico's insertion into the 
world economy, and by the domestic consequences of that 
insertion. The growing problem of Mexican debt had a 
direct impact on the international financial community. 
This was not the first time Mexico owed money to 
international financial institutions; nevertheless, this
I
2was the first time that Mexico had declared its inability 
to meet its financial responsibilities. Furthermore, 
Mexico was the first major country in the potential list 
of defaulters to make clear that it could not pay all of 
its external debts. The dangers posed by Mexico's 
possible default to American private banks and 
international economic organizations were enormous. The 
amount of money owed by Mexico was not so important; more 
significant was the notion that the rules of the game 
should not be broken, and default should not be allowed. 
Thus, the financial community had a powerful interest in 
resolving Mexico's debt problem, and in urging their own 
solution to that problem on successive Mexican 
governments.
The debt issue became central to Mexican politics. 
The Mexican state was involved in a political crisis in 
at least three senses. First, the Mexican state was 
subject to very tight financial external constraints, 
being forced to negotiate with the IMF and foreign 
bankers in a disadvantageous position. Second, the 
Mexican state was at that time subject to an unexpected 
and very unusual level of popular mobilisation around the 
debt crisis, particularly a mobilization of sectors of 
the Mexican middle class. Third, the dominant party 
(PRI), which had held uninterrupted power for nearly 60 
years, was now subject to a challenge to its hegemony by
3an alliance of different opposition groups within the 
National Democratic Front (Frente Democratico Nacional, 
FDN).
It is clear that the roots of the present political 
crisis lie far back, in more than 20 years of escalating 
foreign loans and declining ruling party popularity. 
Indeed, the present crisis has emerged from much longer- 
term changes in agriculture and industry, in the 
discovery and development of oil, in the arrival of 
multinational capital in large amounts, in a growing food 
crisis, in balance of payments difficulties, and so on. 
In other words, in Mexico in the 1980's there was a 
growing economic crisis underlying an emerging political 
o n e .
The gradual deterioration of living standards and 
continuous inflation produced growing political disquiet 
in Mexico. Initially the new government was widely blamed 
for what was seen in the first instance as simply bad 
administration. Nevertheless, the recognition, encouraged 
by the government, soon grew that the ultimate 
responsibility for the state of the economy lay with the 
burden of external debt. Thus, there was a gradually 
increasing demand for a large scale national repudiation 
of the policy of servicing the external debt. The 
possible repudiation of the external payments awakened
4the political consciousness of many Mexicans, and the 
debt crisis became the subject of conversation in many 
families. The debt issue penetrated all sectors of 
society and soon most Mexicans had something to say on 
the politics of the Mexican debt crisis. This growing 
discontent with the internal economic situation and the 
awakening of a political consciousness culminated in 
major defections from the ruling PRI in the 1988 
presidential elections, and ended the PRl's unchallenged 
domination of Mexico's politics. It also stimulated an 
increasingly autonomous response from the PRI controlled 
Mexican state. It is with the development and 
consequences of these internal political changes that the 
bulk of this thesis is concerned.
The thesis will demonstrate how the 1982-88 debt 
crisis in Mexico generated a growing tension in Mexican 
politics between nationalist and institutionalist forces. 
It stimulated both a greater democratisation of 
political debate and a latent repression in state 
structures unable to cope adequately with these 
democratic pressures. By documenting and analysing both 
the democratic and authoritarian reactions to the debt 
crisis, the thesis hopes to throw light on the ways in 
which single party authoritarian regimes may make (or 
fail to make) a transition to another, democratic, type
5of regime, while keeping the same structure of economic 
relationships.
The thesis will use the phenomenon of the debt 
crisis which developed between 1982-1988 in Mexico as a 
case study from which to establish general propositions 
about the character of the Mexican state, and the 
determinants of its practice. There are also important 
practical concerns that can be illuminated by a thesis of 
this kind, such as the nature of the role of the state in 
Third World societies, and their possibilities for 
political changes and development. These concerns cannot 
be central to what follows here, but each will be 
commented on at an appropriate stage.
The thesis therefore has two main aims:
1. to document the development inside Mexico of the 
political crisis due to the debt repayment issue, and
2. to use the case study so described to develop certain 
general points about the Mexican state, in particular 
about the role of a single dominant party (in Mexico, the 
PRI).
6The 1982-1988 debt crisis became central to the 
totality of Mexican life, and generated responses across 
the whole of the Mexican social, economic and political 
structure. In this wide mobilisation, we are able to see 
the full potential range of social actors and forces 
shaping politics at a national level in Mexico. Through 
the examination of this full political mobilisation, it 
will be possible to uncover the underlying determinants 
of state policy within the debt crisis and beyond.
The thesis will examine the politics of the debt 
crisis in Mexico by following a particular route. First, 
it will provide the historical background to the 
development of the external debt, with particular 
reference to the negotiations made by the Lopez Portillo 
and De la Madrid governments. Then the thesis will 
outline the different political forces in Mexican 
society, and document the pressure they exerted upon the 
state during the debt negotiation process. Here, the 
thesis will attempt to explain why public opinion, and 
the ongoing political debate in society, did not 
significantly influence the negotiations which the 
Mexican state held with its international creditors. This 
in its turn will also assist in revealing the nature of
II
7the Mexican state; the thesis will return to a discussion 
of this in its concluding chapter.
This work has therefore been divided into three 
parts. The first examines the debt crisis and how the 
state responded to it, giving also an account of the 
social forces involved in the crisis. This part will also 
explain the way in which the Mexican political system 
works, emphasising the role that the PRI plays and its 
connections with the state. It will also explain how the 
debt crisis arose, and the negotiations between the 
senior financial members of the state and the 
international banks between 1982 and 1988. Throughout the 
first chapter, it will be seen how the historical 
formation of the contemporary Mexican state has been a 
conflict between a nationalist and an internationalist 
perspective. Both currents of thought will appear divided 
later on when formulating potential solutions to overcome 
the external debt problem.
The second part examines the political debate which 
arose in Mexico concerning the negotiations between the 
state and the IMF. It also describes the reaction of 
Mexican civil society to the debt issue. Three chapters 
analyse the public opinion of leaders of all political 
parties, financial institutions, business organizations, 
workers' and peasants' organizations, and the Church. The
8opinions were collected directly from the national 
newspapers throughout the six-year period. This section 
ends with an account of the 1988 presidential election, 
and an overview of the strengthened political opposition. 
The role that the nationalist group (FDN) played in this 
election is presented in some detail.
The third part attempts to explain the nature of the 
Mexican state, and what the political debate tells us 
about its character. It also offers an explanation of the 
political outcome of the debt crisis. It shows how the 
debt issue provided the space to confront clearly the 
nationalist perspective with the internationalist one. 
When it became a matter of the external debt, everybody 
had something to say. The outcome of all these opinions 
generated the confrontation and opened the space for a 
more democratic political debate, as the more nationalist 
groups were seeking.
As has been seen in the last two years, the 
internationalist perspective finally managed to impose 
itself on a country in which privatisation, fiscal 
reforms, private investment, and the attraction of 
foreign capital have become the norm.
A number of writers whose work will be outlined in 
chapter eight have reached similar conclusions to those
9found in this thesis. However, it is possible to 
distinguish two main positions: on the one hand that of 
the majority, who agree that there is a political crisis 
in Mexico, and some of whom think that this political 
crisis resulted from the debt issue; and on the other 
hand the few who argue that the debt crisis is a new 
experience for Mexico but that the state has been able to 
manage it successfully without allowing it to become a 
political crisis. If indeed there is a political crisis, 
some other writers make a serious attempt at describing 
the nature of the political crisis.
The former position will be argued in this thesis, 
as my original hypothesis was that Mexico was facing not 
only an economic crisis but also a political crisis as 
well. This work will try to argue wether this political 
crisis was solely due to the debt and the financial 
crisis or has deeper roots and causes, trying to include 
the political internal debate between those who sustain a 
nationalist perspective against those who argue for an 
international perspective.
Ill
This thesis has attempted to sustain a specific 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, it needs to be recognised that
10
carrying out research in Mexico is not an easy task due 
to the lack of first-hand documents. It may be difficult 
for the western European mind to understand that in 
Mexico much original research material is not available. 
Archives do not exist. Memoirs are seldom written, as it 
is not a common practice for Mexican statesmen to write 
their own memoirs. Therefore, it is only through 
newspapers, and other ephemeral publications, and mainly 
through oral history that it is possible to reconstruct 
events. The culture is not a written one; it still 
remains very much an oral culture. In this thesis we have 
tried to make the story coherent by recovering the 
events through the main national newspapers; however, it 
has to be said that this work has substantial limitations 
and that to gather the story was indeed very difficult. 
Thus, the conclusions that have been put forward here are 
of a very limited nature and a very provisional type. The 
conclusions reached would have been different if only 
more archive sources were available, and certainly the 
space is still open for more research and deeper 
interpretation of the complex reality of the debt crisis 
in the period 1982-1988.
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CHAPTER ONE
The PRI and the Mexican State
This chapter describes the main characteristics of
the Mexican state and its government, with the object of
identifying those characteristics which were subject of 
change in the period 1982-1988.
I) The 1910-1917 Mexican Revolution
The 1910-1917 Mexican revolution destroyed the bases 
of the old liberal oligarchic state and established the 
bases of the new liberal democratic state. This 
revolution has been characterised as liberal democratic, 
agrarian, popular and anti-imperialist. It was liberal 
democratic in so far as it destroyed the Porfirio Diaz 
dictatorship and established a political regime which 
attempted to guarantee people's political rights of 
freedom and democracy to choose their governments. It was 
an agrarian movement in that peasants and farm workers 
struggled for their right to possess the land they 
worked. It was popular in that the Mexican people and 
workers fought to change the "status quo" of injustice 
which oppressed them. It was anti-imperialist in as much 
as it rescued the country's natural resources from 
foreign hands, after the dictatorship had based the 
country's development on giving away its natural
12
resources to foreign capital. Thus, this revolution was a 
political revolution seeking democracy and the formal 
equality of all citizens. At the same time, and from the 
point of view of economic structure, the Mexican 
revolution destroyed the oligarchic regime, which had 
maintained the old social structure of privileges and 
blocked the development of capital.
The Mexican revolution was, from the beginning, a 
mass phenomenon. It was prepared by the people through 
peasants' uprisings and workers' strikes everywhere in 
the country. Originally, these peasants' uprisings were 
only small, but gradually they spread until they became a 
real threat to private property in the countryside. The 
workers' strikes, at the same time, showed the beginning 
of a mass proletarian movement in Mexico. The Mexican 
revolution thus had a popular revolution.
However, class tensions endemic to a revolution of 
this type were resolved, in the case of Mexico, in a 
conservative way. The popular nature of the revolution 
organised by peasants and workers was suppressed. The 
peasants' movement, commanded by Zapata in the south and 
Villa in the north, was militarily destroyed. The 
workers' movement was subordinated to and integrated into 
a new social regime. The revolution was carried out by 
the popular masses, but it was promoted and guided by
13
members of the rural and urban middle classes. These 
middle class leaders (the "constitucionalistas", the 
group which finally controlled the outcome of the 
revolution) started to proclaim the liberal values of a 
democratic society, and ended up creating a different 
sort of political revolution from the one envisaged by 
the popular movement. What the "constitucionalistas" 
wanted was to create an independent country with 
capitalist development. They soon realised that the 
revolution was not the movement of a small intellectual 
minority; on the contrary, it was the result of a mass 
movement. The "constitucionalistas" realised that if the 
revolution was to fulfil their own aspirations, they had 
to lead the mass movement and satisfy some of its 
demands. An exclusively political programme for the new 
Mexico was not capable of satisfying the demands of the 
poorest, most severely exploited Mexicans. Thus some of 
the demands of the mass movement were reflected in the 
1917 Mexican constitution.
The outcome was that the constitution included 
agrarian reform (article 27) and welfare for the urban 
working class (article 123); but at the same time 
Carranza and the "constitucionalistas" ensured that it 
also included the defence of private property and a 
capitalist development strategy for Mexico. Furthermore, 
they eroded the independence of the popular movements by
14
creating a strong state which could guarantee agrarian 
reform and the welfare of the urban working class, while 
controlling and even suppressing these popular
movements. The "constitucionalista" revolutionary leaders 
created their own brand of populism, not in order to 
struggle against the oligarchic system which by 1914 was 
already dead as a political power, but to keep the 
independent peasants1 movements led by Zapata and Villa 
at bay. The "constitucionalistas" tried to prevent the 
mass movement from entering a further social struggle; 
thus they incorporated into their set of new political 
values some social reforms. This is why Mexican populism 
has a marked anti-revolutionary character. The new social 
regime created by the "constitucionalistas" followed the 
strategy of incorporating the masses, aiming by this 
means to end the social struggle. They manipulated the 
popular classes through the satisfaction of limited 
demands: e.g. land for the peasants and better working 
conditions for the urban workers. Later on, between 1929 
and 1938, the masses of people were organised into three 
large national confederations: CTM, CNC, CNOP, through 
the official party (PRI) and the official union 
organizations. It was through these corporations that 
social problems were channelled and solved.
The new social regime was founded with a paternalist 
and authoritarian government, which became gradually
15
institutional. This government had a very powerful 
executive with permanent powers, which ended up 
regulating property (article 27) and the conflicts 
between union workers and private enterprise (article 
123). From the charismatic authoritarianism originally 
displayed by the revolutionary "caudillos" (military 
leaders of the Revolution) the Mexican state moved to the 
authoritarianism of the presidency as an institution.
The new government was committed to the full 
development of capitalism in Mexico. The society they 
sought to bring into existence was founded on the 
principles of private property, prosperous enterprise and 
a belief in the conciliation of the different social 
classes. The development of the country was based on the 
progress of the new capitalist class, with the support of 
the new state and under its supervision. With this 
development model, Mexico passed from a period of 
political institutionalisation to one of
industrialisation, which became a national priority. At 
the same time, industrialisation developed parallel to 
the promotion of social reforms.
It is important to point out that the process of 
industrialization was not autonomous. From the very 
beginning, economic development in Mexico was heavily 
dependent on foreign investment, particularly by
16
corporations and banks based in the USA. Up to 1938 
foreign investment was mainly concentrated in the oil 
industry. After this time foreign investment penetrated 
all spheres of economic activity, forming partnerships 
with national capital. Mexican nationalism has therefore 
always tried to find harmonious relationships with the 
international economic system, and in particular with the 
private capital institutions based in the USA.
II) The History of the PRI's Formation
The roots of the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) are found in 
the National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional 
Revolucionario, PNR) which was created in March 1929. 
Originally, the official party was not the centralised 
institution that it later came to be. It began by 
attempting to join in a single body the majority of local 
forces scattered around the country. These local 
political forces were headed by local "caudillos'' and 
"caciques". The PNR was created to centralise the 
different political powers, and to discipline the
17
regional military leaders under a national executive 
committee.
In 1938 the PNR reconstituted itself as the Party 
of the Mexican Revolution (Partido de la Revolucio^ 
Mexicana, PRM), incorporating into its ranks the majority 
of workers, peasants and middle sectors. The 
transformation of the PNR into the PRM was a direct 
result of growing militancy by the Mexican working 
classes, their organizations and their coalitions. It 
was also a response by the union's senior members to the 
demands of their rank and file members. Between 1932 and 
1938, large numbers of workers and peasants started to 
pressure the PNR with violent and spontaneous actions, 
demanding land reform and improved working conditions. 
The majority of these protest movements were organized 
outside the party and the state organizations. The union 
leaders started to divide between those who wanted to 
lead the mass movements, and those who wanted to repress 
them. The workers tried to recover their own union 
organizations, and formulated their demands in national 
and popular fronts, as well as in other party 
organizations. The political parties were not able to 
lead the movement. The Mexican Communist Party was 
illegal, underground and practically destroyed. Younger 
leaders inside the unions emerged, advocating a new 
direction and leadership. These people were not part of
18
the state's corrupt unions. Their ideology was labourist 
and socialist; their programme demanded greater 
intervention by the state in the economy, real land 
reform, and the creation of a real union system. Thus, 
the transformation of the PNR into the PRM was due to an 
organized movement of workers and peasants, who were 
originally organized by the workers' organizations. The 
middle classes did not manage to organize themselves in 
any similar way. The history of the PRM is the result of 
the pressure of workers and peasants, controlled by the 
political class during different stages of the success 
and failure of their more progressive leaders.
In 1933 an alliance was made by the leaders who were 
prepared to mobilize the popular movements, to propose 
General Lazzaro Cardenas as a presidential candidate of 
the PNR. Cardenas was one of the peasant generals who 
were most closely identified with the new labour 
organizations, with the demands made by workers and with 
the interest of leaders of these new organizations. 
Cardenas remained loyal to his campaign promises, not 
least because working class and peasant militancy 
continued unabated. Workers continued formulating their 
demands, as did peasants. Together they stirred up the 
population, endorsed by their organizations and their 
leaders, who originally helped Cardenas to become 
president. Against this background, a repressive
19
political strategy would have been unlikely. It was the 
beginning of a new state policy which contemplated 
coalitions as a key political factor. Calrdenas was 
strongly criticized for having far too much tolerance 
towards the workers' movement. In the end, the workers' 
movement proved to be a key source of his power.
In 1935 there was a new struggle to incorporate the 
workers' movement into the PNR. Originally, the workers' 
organizations wanted to create their own political party. 
They even thought about establishing alliances with the 
peasants. Cardenas urged them not to do so, and pushed 
them to join the PNR. Peasants and workers demanded 
higher wages, land reform, and better social welfare 
conditions. For the most part these demands were 
satisfied and in return the peasant generals and the 
political bureaucracy demanded the control of the 
workers' and peasants' organizations.
The control of these organizations, together with 
the nationalist project of expropriating the oil 
industry, formed the base of a populist alliance. The 
expropriation of the American, English, Dutch and French 
oil investments in Mexico, created a national fervour 
that even the Church had to support. This populist 
alliance project culminated in the creation of the PRM in 
1938, only 12 days after the oil expropriation. The PRM
20
incorporated into its ranks the workers and peasants from 
these organizations, and also the middle class sectors. 
These alliances have been described by Mexican historians 
as the "social-populist contract" of 1938. With this 
social-populist contract, the official party became an 
institutionalised body, and at the same time the process 
of consolidating the populist movement was completed.
In 1946 the PRM changed its name to Institutional 
Revolutionary Party, the PRI. The PRI has clearly been 
the institution which has totally incorporated the masses 
of Mexican workers into the state. Its corporativist 
character has conciliated different social classes. The 
transformation of the PRM into the PRI was led directly 
by the President. This time authoritarianism played a 
more relevant role than coalitions. This time too, the 
civil and military institutional hierarchies of the 
president were more important than the old system of 
loyalties and personal clientele. The state had the 
support of the old and new bourgeoisie, and through 
negotiations won the sympathy of foreign capital, in 
particular American capital. There was no need for a 
political alliance between the political class and the 
economically dominant class; there was a sharing of 
common interests between these two sectors. Groups of the 
middle classes joined the ranks of the state. The
21
workers' organizations played a defensive role. The state 
took on an authoritarian and institutional character.
In spite of this new institutional-authoritarian 
character, the Mexican state did not leave the working 
class behind. Rather, senior political figures continued 
to negotiate regularly with trade unions and peasants' 
organizations, thus continuing to lock the official 
structure of the popular movement into a subordinate but 
persistent relationship with the governing party. The 
state did not have to use repressive methods. The 
government used old paternalist forms together with 
religious conciliation, and appealed to civic 
consciousness. Gradually, the revolutionary symbols were 
replaced by the symbols of a democratic and conservative 
state. During the 194 0's the state consolidated the 
revolutionary process, giving importance to the market 
economy and the accumulation and concentration of 
capital. In the political arena, the alliances were 
reshaped, combining repression and paternalism, and 
authoritarianism and negotiation. The state passed 
officially from a socialist project to a democratic one 
in tune with the international context of the Second 
World War. Mexico passed from the popular front to 
national unity. In the economic arena the state was not 
liberal; it preferred state intervention at the same time 
as creating cooperative alliances with the capitalist
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sector. In its international policies, the Mexican state 
was nationalist, wanting to win the recognition of its 
political class and its ability to negotiate with other 
nation-states. The government of 1940-46 also slowed down 
the land reform of the Ca'rdenas years, and contained 
strikes and wage demands, weakening the strength of the 
workers' unions.
These changes in state policies also affected the 
state party and its organization. The correlation of 
socio-economic forces changed in favour of private 
capital groups. The new state party modified itself 
according to the new correlation of socio-economic 
forces. The new name of the party had a particular 
significance: Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional, PRI). The name itself 
claimed the defence of the existing institution. At that 
time it was even said that in Mexico the revolution was 
already an institution under the care of the state and 
the state party. On 31st December 1945, the Union
Congress approved a new electoral law, and this 
formalized the political system that would rule in 
Mexico, and the bases for the new PRI.
On 18th January 1946 members of the PRM held a 
convention in which the PRM disappeared and the PRI was 
formed. In one single day, the convention approved the
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declaration of principles, the action programme, and the 
regulations of the new party. It was an outstanding act 
of bureaucratic-political discipline. The next day, the 
convention nominated Miguel Aleman as candidate for the 
PRI's presidential election. At this moment, the PRI left 
the ideals of the old party which struggled for a 
"democracy for the workers", to adopt the new ideal of 
"democracy and social justice". The values were shifted 
from preparing the people for socialism, to educating the 
people for authentic democracy. The party erased the idea 
of defending "socialist education" in favour of an 
"nationalist and advanced education". The new PRI did not 
talk about the "alliances" of workers, peasants, military 
and popular sectors as the base of the party; instead it 
spoke of the "political association of citizens".
According to the new party's rules, the faculties of 
the general assembly and of its bases were gradually 
taken away one by one. Instead of the four delegates of 
the original sectors (workers, peasants, popular sectors, 
and military), there were seven secretaries. Thus, the 
workers' secretary lost a lot of the power he had 
originally held. The workers stopped having proportional 
representation at all levels. They lost the right to 
choose their party candidates from their workplaces. The 
change from the PRM to the PRI represented a shift in the 
balance of power held by the workers and the popular
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sector. The working class, from being a considerable 
force -even taking into account the degree of control 
that the party had over it- lost the direct influence 
that it had as a organization. Consequently, internal 
political debate disappeared from the workplaces. Workers 
were mixed up with other classes and sectors. Workers 
were treated as individual citizens, no longer a class, 
in line with the liberal-democratic spirit.
The new government was more in favour of the 
development of the capitalist sector. The project of 
stabilizer development ("desarrollo estabilizador") was 
created and remained dominant in Mexico for several 
decades. This was the time when small entrepreneurs 
started their businesses. The government created a 
centralised and authoritarian state. In December 1946, 
following the President's suggestion, the Union Congress 
accepted a reform to constitutional article 27. This 
reform gave exclusive property rights in land, and 
extended the legal definition of "small private 
property". With this modification, the bases of a neo- 
latifundio system were created. It was the beginning of a 
whole set of policies that determined the boom in the 
rural bourgeoisie and agricultural enterprises. In the 
same month of December, there was a series of attacks on 
the workers' union organizations. The leaders of the oil 
workers' union were arrested and accused of having burned
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the Atzcapotzalco refinery. Later on during the same 
month, the Union Congress reformed constitutional article 
3: after twelve years education was no longer 
"socialist".
From then onwards, the government gradually weakened 
its ties to the working class movement. It created the 
offence of "social dissolution", which allowed the 
government to find people guilty solely because of their 
ideas and their intentions. The union leaders were 
accused of having communist ideas and of preparing 
communist subversive movements. The independent leaders 
were co-opted into the CTM. The railway workers' union 
offices were occupied by the army, their leaders sent to 
jail and a repressive leadership installed. The miners' 
union was also severely limited.
On 2nd February 1950, the PRI held a convention to 
approve the new status, the action programme and the 
declaration of principles. The family, the individual and 
his/her rights, and the municipal system was proclaimed. 
All of this derived from an action programme which 
stimulated free enterprise and with its development 
attempted to solve national problems. The structure of 
the party became more functional. The party adopted the 
sector system, as a more educated division of political 
labour, particularly now that the sectors were controlled
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at the top by functionaries (civil servants). The PRI 
became a party of representative functionaries, in which 
the principal bosses nominated the functionaries below 
them. The lower represented the higher ones, in a 
personal and bureaucratic way. The masses were also 
represented as a group.
Thus, the existence of the official party and the 
real control that the state has over organizations and 
individuals have made possible in Mexico the maintenance 
of the appearance of a populist government and state; an 
appearance which is based on a populist party and its 
three sectors: agrarian, labour, and popular. In the end, 
the main roots which have enabled Mexico to have the 
political stability it has enjoyed over the last 62 
years, lie in the cooperation of the different social 
groups; these groups, as has been seen, have been 
integrated into a very rigid political structure, based 
on the institutionalisation of the different groups and 
their conflicts.
The PRI groups peasants, workers and middle classes 
into three sectors, at the same time separating them as 
classes. The workers' sector incorporates organised 
workers. The peasant sector incorporates the majority of 
poor peasants and organised agricultural workers. The 
popular sector includes the public sector bureaucracy,
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citizen associations and organised professional groups. 
Each of these three sectors belongs to one or several 
confederations. The majority of the workers belong to the 
Confederacion de Trabajadores de Me'xico (CTM, Mexican 
Workers’ Confederation), as well as to one of the large 
industrial trade unions (for example, the oil workers’ 
union, electricity workers' union, railway workers' 
union). These large unions are associated to the PRI. The 
peasants, in particular the ejidatarios (peasants working 
"ejidos" or communal land), small and medium landowners, 
and agricultural workers belong to the Confederacion 
Nacional Campesina (CNC, National Peasants' 
Confederation). Civil servants and the military in the 
federal, state and municipal governmental offices, 
managers and functionaries and workers of state 
companies, industrialists and entrepreneurs, and citizens 
in civic associations belong to the Conf ederacio'n 
Nacional de Organizaciones Populares (CNOP, National 
Confederation of Popular Organizations). The owners of 
large enterprises belong both to the CNOP and to business 
confederations and chambers of commerce, which do not 
have direct representation in the PRI.
28
III) Presidentialism
The fundamental role that the state has played in 
the economic development of Mexico has been possible due 
to the strong position that the presidency has held. In 
the Mexican case a different sort of political system 
with a democratic parliament might have caused a 
permanent civil war with constant fighting between the 
different local and military groups. Alternatively, a 
military dictatorship might have caused a popular 
revolution. Instead, the Mexican state was built upon a 
coalition of politically led forces. As pointed out 
earlier, these forces included all the politically 
organized sectors of Mexican society, and reported 
directly to the president. Mexico is thus a state with a 
strong executive, combined with elements of democratic 
representation and some features of a dictatorship.
As has been argued earlier, the post-revolutionary 
regime has created a system of relationships in which 
social classes promote their own interests, with the 
public powers providing the balance. All the groups know 
that social stability depends on the good balance 
maintained by the state. These groups are legally 
recognized by the state, and their leaders have a very 
important role to play. The size of the private 
organisations is smaller than that of the agrarian and
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labour organisations; nevertheless, in both cases they 
are always treated as institutions which negotiate with 
the state through their representative leaders. This 
system allows the practice of favour and privileges, a 
practice which has been institutionalised.
Governmental corruption is a widely accepted and 
understandable practice in this kind of political 
machinery. Negotiations between the government and the 
agrarian, labour, and middle class organisations are 
always made through the leaders and inside the legal 
framework of the particular institution. The alliance is 
understood as a commitment and union between the state 
and the organisations, and it implies that the state has 
to offer some public sector appointments, seats in the 
Union Congress, economic subsidies, allowances for 
workers, land and rural credits for peasants, to these 
organisations. In exchange for these grants, the 
workers', peasants' and middle class organisations give 
support to the state through adherence to it and 
profession of loyalty to the political regime. Throughout 
this process of negotiation, any sort of political 
manoeuvring is permitted, including the extreme of 
bribing the leaders. The 1938 "social-populist contract" 
mentioned earlier has been responsible for the 
consolidation of social and political stability in 
Mexico. The state is the centre around which all the
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social interests revolve, and the PRI is the 
institutionalised party in which all the sectors are 
represented. The Mexican state has adopted the social and 
economic interests of the different social forces and 
created the political space for these forces to exist and 
have representation. Political programmes have been 
modified according to changes in the correlation of the 
social forces involved.
Mexico is characterised by strong government. 
Presidentialism is the present-day manifestation of the 
"caudillismo" of the Revolution. "Caudillismo" and 
presidentialism have played an essential role in their 
respective periods. "Caudillismo" was a feature of 
traditional society, while presidentialism is a 
phenomenon of modernisation. In Mexico, presidentialism 
has existed only since it destroyed "caudillismo" and 
replaced it. The final and physical destruction of all 
the "caudillos", the professionalisation of the army, the 
expansion of the communication system which gave unified 
power to the centre, the transformation of military 
chiefs into business leaders, the incorporation of the 
popular masses into the official party, the 
intensification of the land reform, are all signs of the 
death of the "caudillo" period and its replacement by 
presidentialism. Presidentialism represents the
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modernisation of the country and the beginning of a 
strong government in Mexico.
Generally speaking in Mexico, the government and the 
state form a single constitutional body. To fight for the 
government means to fight for power. The government does 
not constitute a separate unit from the state, and the 
state has relative autonomy from the different social 
classes, although it tends to lose it in its relationship 
with the bourgeoisie. The head of the state is both the 
head of the government and the head of the state party. 
The president holds an enormous degree of juridical, 
political, and economic power. The limitations on him are 
those imposed by the development of a late and peripheral 
economic capitalism, by the pressure of the social 
classes and their class struggle, and by political 
prudence with regard to himself and his party.
All levels of the bureaucracy obey the president. 
The president possesses extensive executive, legislative 
and juridical powers. He faces a government whose 
legislative and juridical powers are very weak. He 
nominates and removes all the members of his cabinet. He 
is the head of all the armed forces. He has the power to 
decide international policy without having to ask the 
legislative power for approval. He determines fiscal 
policy, international borrowing and the public debt
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without having to ask Congress. Since 1951 he has had the 
power to increase, decrease, suspend and prohibit imports 
and exports previously decided by Congress, in order to 
regulate the country's trade and commercial stability. 
The president further exercises wide control over 
industry, communications and the media through state- 
owned companies, mainly in the areas of oil, electricity, 
railways, road and air transport, telecommunications, and 
the food, fertiliser, building and steel industries. He 
also controls social security and health facilities for 
the majority of Mexicans.
The president is also in practice the supreme leader 
of the state party (the PRI); as such, he controls its 
functions and appointments. The party in power is the 
party of the president, government and all sectors 
including the public sector bourgeoisie. The president 
and his aides have the main influence on party policy. 
They rely on the discipline of the different sectors of 
the PRI and the mass organisations, and control these 
through manipulation and mediation, for example, by 
confronting the interests of one with those of another 
using means such as negotiation and sometimes repression.
It is very clearly written in the Constitution that 
the President in Mexico can only stay in power for one 
period of six years. Re-election is forbidden in Mexico.
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In this way the party is not committed to any particular 
set of policies for more than six years. This allows the 
party to be moderately flexible in changing direction 
every six years. Some presidents design a set of policies 
which are more conservative or liberal than those of 
their predecessor. However, the system finds a nice 
balance when the next president in turn may like to 
introduce policies which are more progressive or 
reactionary. This has been a key factor in the political 
life of contemporary Mexico, enabling the balance of 
forces to adapt every six years to new circumstances with 
a new presidential style and able to disown previous 
incumbents' positions.
This chapter has sought to sketch the major 
characteristics of the Mexican state and its system of 
government. It is obviously far from comprehensive, but 
the Mexican system is already quite well analysed in 
English language works (see note 1), and this chapter has 
sought only to identify the characteristics which were 
subject to the possibilities of change in the period 
1982-88.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Debt Crisis and the Mexican Economy
I) Mexico and the International Economic Context
The debt crisis is a global phenomenon that has 
affected most of the w o r l d’s societies. Countries in the 
advanced capitalist world have been affected as well as 
countries of the Third World. There are different ways of 
exploring both the general crisis and Mexico's 
involvement in it, some explanations deriving from 
liberal economics, some from various kinds of dependency 
theory, and some from more conventional forms of Marxism. 
What many of those theoretical frameworks do not explain 
is that the debt crisis is not merely a financial or 
monetary one, but has deep structural roots. One purpose 
of this section will be to establish what these roots 
are.
Dependency theory and the theories of 
underdevelopment focus on the impact of capitalism as a 
global system, holding an externalist perspective. As a 
contrast there are the theories of modernisation and 
underdevelopment, which focus on Third World countries 
themselves, holding a more internalist perspective. These 
are based upon the belief that social forces within Third
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World countries hold back modernisation. Underpinning 
this view there is a liberal conception of development, 
in which it is a normal pre-condition that the middle 
classes gain hegemony (1).
Defining development in a political way very often 
involves the concept of planning, but the political will 
is often directed towards different groups in society. 
Thus, different interpretations of the debt crisis are 
often underpinned by a populist rhetoric of the nation 
and the different class interests within society. 
Therefore, what will be argued here is that directing 
the economy of a nation inevitably involves making 
political choices, which are often not necessarily the 
result of a particular political will but the outcome of 
the political struggle and its results. No person or 
group, even in a presidential system, can determine the 
economic policies of their nation without having to 
confront the pressure exerted by the different political 
actors in a particular society.
For many years, it was thought that the external 
debt problem was a result of the lack of internal savings 
by Third World countries. During the Second World War, 
many economists attempted to explain the lack of 
development in Third World countries as due to a lack of 
internal savings. According to this argument the low
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levels of income and productivity in Third World 
countries were responsible for the lack of savings there, 
and it was difficult to increase these levels without an 
adequate rate of capital formation. From this point of 
view, there appeared to be some justification in inviting 
direct foreign investments and foreign credits as an 
attempt to solve the problem of the domestic scarcity of 
capital investment.
This explanation of the lack of internal savings was 
used in Mexico as an argument to open the doors to 
foreign investment and credits in the past, and took on a 
new emphasis in the eighties. The 1982-1988 economic 
adjustment programme launched by President Miguel de la 
Madrid's government through its National Development 
Plan, was based upon the idea of creating sufficient 
internal savings as a way out of the debt trap. According 
to the government, the origin of Mexico's external debt 
was to be found in the old imbalance between internal 
savings and planned investment; the lack of the former 
pushed the country to find international credits. Hence, 
for the top civil servants concerned with the economy as 
well as for the president himself, the problem of the 
external debt was defined as the incapacity of the 
country to generate enough liquidity to pay for its 
imports and its foreign debt servicing. These economic
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arguments were the basis of the neo-liberal economic 
policies of the 1982-1988 Mexican government.
The 1982-1988 National Development Plan had two 
instruments to guide economic policy: the adjustment of 
domestic interest rates and the foreign exchange rate. It 
was believed that if the rate of interest was maintained 
above the internal rate of inflation (a so-called 
positive interest rate), and a flexible and realistic 
rate of foreign exchange, stimulating exports and 
avoiding capital flight, was maintained, the economy 
would increase its internal savings. This was the neo­
liberal economic practice followed by the then government 
in order to increase its internal savings. It was a 
practice which closely paralleled the economic advice of 
the IMF and the international private banks.
It is important to point out here that the level of 
economic activity in Mexico is high. Although not as high 
as is achieved in fully industrialised countries, it is 
still high enough to maintain steady and regular annual 
economic growth. However, in the case of Mexico, as in 
that of many other Third World countries, the 
productivity of the national economy is not consolidated 
in the form of new investment. Instead, a very important 
part of economic output generated internally is 
transferred abroad through individual remittances of
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capital, and through the repayment of foreign 
investments. In addition to this, rapid and wholly new 
economic development is impaired in Mexico because of the 
inability of national industry to establish a coherent 
productive system. This inability may have its structural 
roots in the high degree of dependence on American 
industry. Therefore, Mexico's external debt was not only 
a consequence of a lack of internal savings. What we are 
seeing is a chronic transference of economic resources 
from a peripheral country to the most developed one.
Among Latin American countries, Mexico was one of 
the very first to accumulate a large post-war external 
debt. At the end of the sixties, Mexico started to borrow 
in the Euro-currency markets. A strong relationship 
developed between the transnational banks, the Mexican 
government and the main Mexican private banks groups 
(BANCOMER, Banco de Comercio Mexicano; BANAMEX, Banco 
Nacional de Mexico; and Banca Serfin). This last group 
acted as intermediary between the first two. In 1970, for 
example, 57.2 per cent of the Mexican foreign debt was 
contracted with private banks, while the whole Latin 
American external debt contracted with private 
institutions was significantly lower at 44.4 per cent.
It is necessary to understand the emergence of the 
Mexican debt as including the long term structural
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relationship between the Mexican economy and the whole 
capitalist world system. But it is also necessary to 
understand the debt crisis as the result of more short­
term factors. For example, in the late 1970s, there were 
large amounts of capital, waiting to be lent, in the 
hands of the transnational banks. This money was the 
result of the increasing internationalisation of capital 
and the particular effects of the rises in oil prices.
From the point of view of Mexico, there was a need 
to overcome the barriers that were stopping the 
development of the productive forces, and the need to 
stimulate the import-substitution industrialisation 
process. Using external capital did this. However, two 
characteristics are important to note in order to 
understand the debt that the Mexican public sector 
acquired. Firstly, the state fiscal deficit, which is the 
result of: a) the participation of the state in the 
process of reproduction of capital in Mexico, b) the 
existence of an inefficient economic infrastructure that 
could not recycle productive surpluses quickly and 
effectively, and c) the subsidies that the state had to 
pay in order to relieve state-owned enterprises from the 
competition that domestic and international private 
groups could represent. The second characteristic is the 
structural tendency towards an external imbalance, due 
to: a) the existence of a potentially unequal
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international trade exchange system, b) the absence of 
the international integration of the productive system, 
and c) the disbursement of national financial resources 
to foreign capital by individuals and organisations.
To sum up, the external debt in Mexico should be 
seen as a device that was used by the government to 
counter the structural difficulties of the economic 
system. Originally, the external debt helped to stimulate 
the economic growth of the country. Later on, when this 
device did not succeed in countering the structural 
contradictions, the external debt ceased to be a factor 
promoting the growth of the productive forces. Mexico's 
external debt was linked to both domestic and 
international structural causes. Mexico's debt crisis was 
linked to the process of widespread industrialisation 
and economic development that the world has experienced 
since the post-war period. This massive process has 
changed the relationship between economies. Through the 
lending of international credits, the interests of 
international financial capital, the interests of 
national oligarchies, and the interests of other states 
have been intertwined.
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II) Strategies of Economic Development in Mexico
This international economic context has shaped the 
two strategies of economic development adopted by the 
Mexican State since the post-war period. These two 
strategies are the expression of a double interaction 
between the Mexican private capital sector and foreign 
capital interests. Both exercise a great deal of economic 
power and pressure the Mexican state to adopt certain 
economic policies: sometimes they act in alliance, while 
at others they compete with each other. These two forces 
have generated two main competitive strategies of 
development: one takes a nationalist form, while the 
other is connected with international interests. The 
nationalist strategy of development aims to expand the 
internal market, protect national industries, generate 
employment, and limit foreign economic penetration. The 
internationalist strategy of development has as its aim 
that Mexican firms should become more competitive in the 
international market, and gain as a result access to 
foreign capital and technology. In the nationalist 
strategy, the state plays an active interventionist role 
in the economy, while the internationalist strategy 
leaves economic forces to act in free market competition.
The nationalist strategy of development has its 
roots in the 1910-17 Mexican revolution; to be more
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precise, the Mexican constitution (1917) established the 
principle of state intervention in the economy. This 
strategy was followed particularly during the 1930's, 
when the 1929 economic depression caused a decrease in 
Mexico's export earnings and led the government to 
import-substitution industrialisation policies. This 
period of temporary decline in the foreign economy was 
characterised internally by a stronger state which 
directed the economy at the need of a coalition of 
forces: the state itself, industrialists, and the 
emerging working class. Peasants and rural and urban 
workers were mobilized to support the state's policies, 
through the incorporation of major peasant (CNC, 
Confederacies Nacional Campesina) and labour (CTM, 
Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos) confederations 
into sectors of the government party (now the PRI) in 
1929. The private industrialists and the state, with its 
populist support coming from peasants and rural and urban 
workers, were leading a structural transformation of 
Mexican society. It was the first real transformation 
after a long period of more than 30 years of dictatorship 
(the regime of Porfirio Diaz, 1876-1911), 8 years of 
revolution (1919-17) and 12 years of political 
instability and alliances within the state (1917-29).
There are three further factors to note during this 
period in which the nationalist strategy of development
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predominated. Firstly, as a result of the 1910-17 
revolution, the Mexican agrarian reform (27th 
Constitutional Article) gave land to individual peasants 
and peasant communities. This reform broke the economic 
and political power of traditional landowners, removing 
obstacles to an agricultural modernisation led by the 
state. Secondly, the newly organised working class 
started using its constitutional guarantees (123rd 
Constitutional Article), challenging the pre­
revolutionary social hegemony exercised by the landowning 
and export interests connected with foreign trade and 
capital, particularly in the mining sector. Thirdly, the 
nationalisation of the British and US oil companies in 
March 1938 restructured Mexico's relations with foreign 
capital and reinforced the economic role of the state, 
which took control of oil production. Thus, state 
intervention in the economy and import-substitution 
industrialisation were the key characteristics of the 
nationalist strategy of development.
The internationalist strategy of development has 
however been an increasingly important policy since the 
1940's, as agriculture and industry have become 
increasingly dependent on foreign capital, technology and 
markets, particularly those of the USA. There has been a 
clear internationalisation of the production process, or 
to be more precise, an increase in economic dependence on
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the US market, as well as on capital and technology 
supplied from the US. In the case of agriculture, for 
example, small producers and "ejidal" (cooperative) 
communities that originally oriented their production to 
the domestic market, have been supplanted by large-scale 
farms. These large-scale farms rely on finance and 
technology from abroad and sell most of their production 
overseas. The great majority of them are located in the 
north of the country. These large-scale farms have 
gradually made it harder for small producers and "ejidal" 
communities to continue profitably either domestically or 
internationally as they use traditional and relatively 
inefficient low-capital methods and tend to restrict 
themselves to supplying the domestic market. A similar 
process has operated in industry, with on the one hand 
large capital-intensive firms (sometimes partially 
foreign-owned) which receive state aid, capital from 
local private banks as well as foreign loans, and on the 
other hand a large number of small and medium-sized firms 
which are labour-intensive and receive minimal or no 
assistance from outside bodies. The large capital- 
intensive firms are in many cases joint ventures between 
private domestic capital and foreign capital, and they 
produce for high-income groups and for export. The small 
and medium-sized Mexican firms are mainly owned by 
private national capital and produce inefficiently for 
the local market.
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This distinction between large capital-intensive 
firms on the one hand, and small and medium-sized labour- 
intensive firms on the other, has created a major 
division within the Mexican private sector, and has 
developed incompatible economic and political interests 
which constantly put pressure on the Mexican state, 
particularly when economic policy decisions have to be 
taken. The first group has organized itself in a national 
confederation called COPARMEX (Confederacion Patronal de 
la Republica Mexicana), whose power is concentrated in 
the northern industrial city of Monterrey and which is 
opposed to state-interventionist policies. The second 
group (which brings together small and medium firms 
controlled by national capital including a majority of 
manufacturing firms) has created the National Chamber of 
Manufacturing Industry, CANACINTRA (Camara Nacional de la 
Industria y la Transformacion), which has traditionally 
represented nationalist elements within the state, and 
which supports state intervention in the economy.
It is thus clear that, on the whole, the 
internationalist strategy of development is linked to the 
more powerful private economic groups, which benefit from 
direct access to foreign capital and technology. They 
also have close relations with the state financial sector 
and before the nationalisation of the banks, they had 
their own financial institutions.
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The nationalist strategy of development includes 
policies oriented towards protecting national industry, 
increasing employment and state economic intervention, 
including the nationalisation of key industries, as 
happened in Mexico with, the oil industry in 1938 and the 
private bank system in 1982. These policies are promoted 
by small and medium firms (CANACINTRA) and even by some 
elements of the working class, particularly by the major 
labour confederation CTM which, as was seen above, is 
linked to the state through corporate membership in the 
government party. These policies might seem to be likely 
to produce steady growth in the economy and a self- 
reliant development programme, but the nationalist 
strategy of development has to face severe criticism. 
Among the more relevant critiques are that government 
protection of national industries has encouraged 
inefficiency, waste and high costs, and that the 
nationalist model depends too heavily on the state and 
political interests. This dependence might appear to 
indicate a great deal of state autonomy in relation to 
capital and foreign interests, but this is not so due to 
the economic pressures that the state bears, the close 
links between state and private banking sectors, and the 
fact that the Mexican state is largely run by the people 
who have close connections with the owners of industrial 
enterprises.
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To sum up, although the two strategies both persist, 
since the 1940's the internationalist strategy of 
development has become the dominant one politically and 
economically. However, the nationalist one still has 
substantial political support and is an arguable 
alternative economic strategy.
Ill) The Mexican Economy Prior to the 1982 Economic 
Crisis
After the increase in oil prices in 1973, the 
international commercial banks had large sums of money 
which had to be recycled. This money was lent to 
countries with the aim of supporting development 
programmes. Those countries, which in some cases did not 
have the urgent need to channel the money to specific 
programmes, accepted the loans, which in some cases were 
for hurriedly designed development programmes. Once the 
money was available, the "need" was quickly generated. In 
most cases, the amount of money borrowed (or offered) 
was, with hindsight, larger than the real ability to 
repay it. Nevertheless, the offer was a real temptation 
and the interest rates were initially low or even 
negative. So the international commercial private banks
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supported almost any sort of government sponsored 
development project, because they wanted to channel the 
money available to "safe11 areas. The industrialised 
countries did not want to use this money, sometimes 
because they were carrying out anti-inflationary economic 
policies.
The same phenomenon happened in 1978 when oil prices 
were increased for the second time. It is clear that 
there was money available to be lent, while, at the same 
time, the less developed countries were increasing their 
commercial debt, because their exports were not being 
sold in the international market partly as a result of 
the industrialised world's anti-inflationary and 
consequent low-growth economic policies. That was 
particularly the case of many Latin American countries, 
where it is remarkable that the value of exports did not 
increase significantly after 1980. To be more precise, 
the Latin American region's exports were worth US$89,000 
million in 1980, and almost the same amount five years 
later, US$92,000 million in 1985.
Mexico was not an exception. With such an 
international atmosphere, and from 1976, when it was made 
public that Mexico had large oil reserves, the Mexican 
state applied to the international private banks for 
loans destined to finance an expansion of its existing
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oil industry. The answer from international private banks 
was immediately positive, although it is important to say 
that by that time, Mexico had already undergone one 
severe financial crisis in 1976. But that did not stop 
the North American banks from lending Mexico more money; 
in any case the proven oil reserves were there. 
Therefore, in 1977 and 1978 money was lent to Mexico to 
develop its extractive oil industry.
By 1976 Mexico's foreign debt (including private 
banks and multinational financial organizations) was 
US$19,659 million. What is more, exclusively for the 
service of that debt, Mexico had to pay US$11,000 million
I
over a period of five years. Hence, in 1977, Mexico 
already depended on borrowing in order to repay interest 
on debt alone. At that time, it was estimated that by 
1982 the public debt could reach US$30,000 million 
without further borrowing, that is, simply as a result of 
having to service the debt without repaying any capital. 
As will be explained, the Mexican state continued to 
borrow, -not only to develop the oil industry but also to 
keep the government going- and ended up with a much 
larger debt.
Despite gloomy predictions from some observers, 
Mexico's economic future seemed relatively secure in 
1977-78, as its known oil reserves increased rapidly.
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Furthermore, a 1978 IMF report on the country praised its 
economic policies because it had maintained strict 
control of public expenditure, dismantled import
restrictions, and controlled domestic consumption by 
moderating wage demands. Meanwhile, the international 
economic situation became more difficult. The world 
economic recession worsened, and interest rates increased 
rapidly, while at the same time international trade 
became more unfavourable to Third World countries. In the 
particular case of the majority of Latin American 
countries, during this period they found severe 
difficulties in adjusting their economies to the new 
international situation. They continued to borrow more 
money in order to compensate for the loss of foreign 
income derived from exports, and to be able to meet the 
higher rates of interest. From 1978 to 1982 the debt of 
Latin America countries more than doubled: from 
US$150,000 million to US$318,000 million. This money came 
mainly from international private banks.
Once more Mexico was not an exception. In 1979 the 
government had to ask for more credit in order to 
compensate for the loss of foreign income from exports. 
The United States recession badly affected Mexico's trade 
revenues, as at least 60% percent of Mexico's exports 
went straight to the USA. At the same time, the interest 
payments that the state had to meet were over US$20,000
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per year. Mexico chose to borrow more money, which was 
quite easy at that time. Moreover, Mexico's credit rating 
went up with each announced increase in oil reserves. But 
this international attitude was extremely dangerous, 
because the burden of Mexico's external public debt was 
increasing rapidly. Its annual payment liabilities were 
certainly increasing faster than its current income. 
Caught in this debt trap, Mexico took the only avenue 
open to it at that point, which was to boost export 
earnings substantially. The only practical and available 
sources for such an increase were oil and gas. Hence, 
this was the economic policy adopted by the Mexican 
government in spite of the opinion of the more 
nationalist political groups, and in spite of the 
economic awareness that the economy should not become a 
mono-exporting one. This policy, however, led to the 
import of high-technology equipment for the petroleum 
industry. In the 1979 public budget, the petroleum 
industry received 80 per cent of the total government 
investment in industry.
In mid-1979 and at the beginning of 1980, Mexico was 
in the middle of an oil-led boom in industry. At the same 
time, the external debt was US$27,939 million; inflation 
was growing and reached 20 per cent; imports increased 
from US$12,500 million in 1979 to US$19,500 million in 
1980; agricultural production showed no significant
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increase; unemployment was high; and public sector 
companies showed large deficits. Furthermore, and more 
dangerously for the long term viability of the economy, 
the country was turning into a mono-exporter: oil jumped 
from 45 per cent of all exports in 1979 to 74 per cent in 
1980; and there were even attempts to circumvent the oil 
production limit which had been 2.7 million barrels per 
day. This was a politically sensitive point for the 
government, as the opposition accused it of selling the 
country's resources to no avail.
Up to the beginning of the 1980s the Mexican 
government had policies which controlled the economy with 
some difficulty. The international atmosphere was not 
unfavourable for oil-exporting countries, and Mexico was 
receiving loans as well as selling oil abroad. But the 
difficulties began in the spring of 1981, when the 
international oil price fell and the Mexican government 
was forced to announce a reduction in the price of oil of 
US$2 per barrel. In early 1982 a government report 
admitted that oil-spurred growth had been a failure; even 
so, the report also said that the only remedy for the 
nation's ills was to discard the national energy 
programme's limits on exports.
In February 1982, the Mexican peso was devalued by 
30 per cent. In April 1982, Finance Secretary Jesus Silva
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Herzog promised an 8 per cent cut in public spending. In 
the same month, the "Grupo Industrial ALFA", Mexico's 
biggest private sector concern, owing US$2,300 million to 
foreign banks, asked the government for help. In July 
1982, substantial price rises were announced and 
subsidies eliminated; for example, tortillas, a basic 
food, went up by 100 per cent, and petrol (for domestic 
use)by 60 per cent. Further devaluation took place and 
austerity measures were taken. Citizens lost confidence 
in the government and capital flight reached enormous 
proportions; US$30,000 million, well over a third of the 
total foreign debt, left Mexico between August 1980 and 
August 1982.
On 20th August, 1982, with a foreign debt of 
US$78,000 million, the Mexican government unilaterally 
declared a 90-day moratorium on debt payments. Also, 
trying to control the monetary reserves and to avoid 
further capital flight, on 1st September, in the annual 
State of the Nation speach, the outgoing administration 
of Jose Lopez Portillo announced its decision to 
nationalise the banks. These two have been outstanding 
historical decisions.
As soon as the moratorium on external debt payment 
was declared, the IMF sent a mission to Mexico. As it was 
an urgent case, and trying to avoid a worse crisis of
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indebtedness, the IMF asked the private commercial banks 
to lend US$6,500 million to Mexico, in an agreement 
linked to the IMF's US$4,000 million package. This was 
the first-ever such co-financing venture between the IMF 
and private international banks. In this case the IMF 
acted in an emergency, without doubt due to fears of the 
catastrophic consequences that Mexico's moratorium (and 
fears of potential default) might cause in the 
international financial system. Furthermore, the US 
government had a particular interest in solving Mexico's 
debt problem, as Mexico's international debt was mainly 
contracted with North American private banks; so the US 
government used its influence on the IMF to be sure that 
Mexico would receive a new loan-package. Moreover, the US 
government may also have foreseen the threat to Mexico's 
political stability which would have been posed by the 
social unrest which could have arisen in the case of a 
collapse in the Mexican economy.
Consequently, on 10th November 1982 the Mexican 
government wrote a first letter of intent to the IMF. The 
latter's 1982 loan-package to Mexico was made subject to 
conditions which determined the country's internal 
economic policy. It was linked to the new Mexican 
President Miguel De la Madrid's new economic programme, 
which marked a switch to a recognition of the power of 
market forces. In his inaugural speech, De la Madrid
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argued for "realism", as opposed to "populism", which he 
thought had been practised during the last 
administration.
The world economic recession, which started at the 
end of the 1970s, affected the Mexican economy badly, and 
was, together with internal policy choice, responsible 
for the 1982 Mexican financial crisis. One immediate 
consequence of the world economic recession was a decline 
in Mexico's export earnings, which came mainly from oil 
revenues. In addition to this, in the early 1980s, real 
interest rates rose to high levels, making it impossible 
for Mexico to meet its debt repayments. At the same time, 
the world economic recession debilitated Mexico's already 
weak domestic economic structure. Caught in this trap, 
Mexico did not respond early or sensibly and eventually 
had to revert to the IMF and accept its conditions and 
austerity measures.
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Notes.-
(1) For a more detailed analysis of the post-colonial 
state in Third World countries, see: Thomas Skidmore and 
Peter Smith, Modern Latin America;
P. Cammack, Pool, and W. Tordoff, Third World
Politics: A Comparative Introduction;
CT Thomas, The Authoritarian State;
James Petra's, Political and Social Structure in Latin 
America.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Negotiations on Debt Repayment 1982-1988; An Over- 
V iew
As a background to the detailed documentation of the 
political crisis in Mexico between 1982-1988, this 
chapter provides an overall description of the economic 
crisis and the stages of debt negotiation which that 
crisis made necessary.
I) The Phases of the Crisis
In the development of the Mexican debt crisis, 
we can observe different periods or phases. In the first 
part of this chapter, I will indicate briefly and in 
general what those phases are, before (in part 2) 
examining the development of the Mexican debt crisis in 
each period in more detail.
(i) We can recognise a first period of Mexican 
indebtedness in 1940-1970, when the money which was 
borrowed from international institutions helped to 
stimulate economic growth, without causing difficulties 
in covering its servicing. This period is characterised 
by the constant growth of industry and a process of deep 
transformation in the productive system of the whole
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country. During these twenty years, the Mexican
industrial sector grew spectacularly, and the state was 
heavily involved in this process. The money which was 
borrowed came mainly from public international 
organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the 
IDB (the Inter-American Development Bank). This money was 
mainly oriented to public programs and services. Unlike 
other Latin American countries, Mexico did not sign any 
stabilization programme with the IMF during this period.
It is remarkable that during this period the 
country's national product grew at an annual rate of 
between six and seven per cent, and the prices of goods 
also remained stable with a rate of inflation lower than 
three per cent. A fixed rate of foreign exchange was 
also maintained from 1954, when the Government fixed the 
Mexican peso at 12.50 to a dollar. Due to the support of 
the state's central bank, the money and internal capital 
markets grew very quickly, stimulating the formation of 
Mexican private banks, which managed to concentrate and 
centralise capital and to participate in investment in 
the entire Latin American area.
In spite of the dynamism of the domestic 
financial system, the state took on a heavy and growing 
debt to support the public budget. In 1942 12.5 per cent
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of public investment was supported by external financing, 
but by 1970 that figure had risen to 25.3 per cent. 
However, during this first period in which the state's 
budget had a deficit, that deficit remained under 
control. During all this time Mexico never needed to 
sign any stabilisation programme with the IMF, as many 
other Latin American countries had to do.
(ii) The second period in the development of the 
Mexican debt crisis can be detected from the end of the 
sixties to 1982. A series of basic weaknesses in the 
structure of the Mexican economy began to manifest 
themselves between 1968 and 1975. These basic weaknesses 
(which we will discuss in detail later) were both 
agricultural and industrial in character. Productivity in 
the agrarian sector remained low, because both the social 
and technical relations of production in the Mexican 
countryside remained in need of extensive reform. 
Industrial output in key sectors remained heavily 
dependent on the U.S. economy, locked into a relationship 
of dependency both on U.S. technology (for essential 
pieces of capital equipment) and on U.S. markets for its 
industrial output. At the same time, inflation began to 
increase considerably between 1968-75, with annual rates 
well above ten per cent. The value of imports vastly 
exceeded that of exports, the state had a serious
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taxation crisis, and the growth of the internal financial 
market halted.
Because the Mexican government under 
Echeverria's administration (1970-1976) failed to 
introduce tax reforms and to increase exports, the state 
had to seek foreign loans as the only way to maintain 
positive rates of growth, though these rates of growth 
were never as high as previously. The country lived 
through a period of economic recession. The external debt 
quadrupled, from approximately U.S.$5,000 million in 1970 
to U.S.$20,000 million in 1975. The cost of servicing 
this debt also grew significantly, from U.S.$985 million 
per year in 1970, to U.S.$2,525 million per year in 1975. 
The servicing of the debt represented approximately 30 
per cent of the value of exports.
1976-77 were years of economic recession and 
balance of payments deficits, a recession and deficit 
which forced Echeverria’s government to devalue the 
Mexican currency in 1976, and Lopez Portillo's government 
to sign the first agreement with the IMF in 1977. In 
spite of these problems, foreign debt was paid to the 
international creditors under the original conditions. 
Then, in 1978, Mexico began to benefit from its recently 
discovered new huge oil reserves. Between 1978 and 1981,
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the country experienced major economic growth, with the 
oil industry as its basis. Lopez Portillo's government 
expanded the production and export of oil, thinking that 
international oil prices would continue to rise or 
stabilise at a new high level. It was thought that the 
foreign revenue coming into the country from oil exports 
would convert the country into an intermediate industrial 
power, and would help to eliminate the external trade 
deficit and the social conflicts accumulated in the past.
On this basis, Mexico abandoned the guidelines 
imposed by the IMF in its 1977 agreement on the amount of 
money that Mexico could borrow from international 
lenders. It has to be said that this abandonment was not 
just the decision of the Mexican government. Rather, 
senior executives from the IMF and transnational 
financial institutions went to Mexico several times to 
offer loans. This happened at the time when there was a 
surplus of money created by the oil wealth of the Arab 
States, and negative real rates of interest, so to accept 
a loan appeared to make sound economic sense. Between 
1978 and 1981, Mexico acquired a new debt of U.S.$43,600 
million, almost three times more than the U.S.$18,200 
million of the four previous years. A large proportion of 
these new credits were due for repayment within a short 
period of time, and this seriously affected the scale of
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the external debt repayments. The amount of money that 
Mexico borrowed during this four-year period of the oil 
boom (1978-1981), represented 59.8 per cent of the whole 
accumulated debt of U.S.$72,900 million at the end of
1981.
During the oil boom, Mexico recorded higher 
rates of growth than ever before and invested heavily in 
the industrial and energy sectors. The development of 
capital and intermediate goods manufacturing was 
initiated by transnational capital and by large-scale 
private capital groups within Mexico, as well as by the 
State. The oil and energy sector was quickly developed, 
absorbing a large proportion of the public debt. In spite 
of all this successful growth, basic problems in the 
structure of the Mexican economy were not solved by the 
boom; on the contrary, they were exacerbated by it. 
Inflation increased, the balance of payments deficit 
grew, and the internal financial system had a serious 
liquidity problem. So the country's massive economic 
expansion was built on the false foundation of the ever- 
increasing foreign debt, until the servicing of the debt 
became too heavy a burden to carry.
This four-year process of economic growth based 
upon ever-larger foreign loans culminated in recession in
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1982. This time the recession was deeper than the one in 
1976-77, as was clearly shown by the rate of inflation, 
which went to over 100 per cent. During 1982 the Mexican 
currency was devalued by more than 250 per cent, and 
there was a massive flight of capital that contributed 
to the financial crisis, which was announced
internationally in August 1982, when Mexico declared its 
inability to meet its foreign payments.
(iii) The third period in the development of the 
Mexican debt crisis started in 1982 and continues up to 
the present day. This period is distinguished from those 
which preceded it primarily by the neo-liberal economic 
policies adopted by the Mexican state and encouraged by 
the IMF, by the World Bank, and by a number of private 
American and European banks. These economic programmes 
transformed Mexico into a net exporter of capital, 
through the servicing of its debt. During this period, 
Mexico restructured its productive system, orientating it 
towards the production of manufactured goods for export, 
opening its doors to foreign investment, and practising 
more liberal economic policies in internal and external 
spheres. The economic stabilization policies adopted by 
the state in Mexico since 1982 have functioned within an 
increasingly difficult international context,
characterised by reductions in the prices of raw
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materials, the contraction of international trade, and 
stronger protectionist economic policies adopted by the 
First World.
II) The Development of the Crisis: The Four Steps in the 
Renegotiation Process of the Mexican Foreign Debt
As early as the 1950's, the IMF began to recommend 
economic stabilisation programmes to Third World 
countries. Particularly during the 5 0 *s and 6 0 's, 
countries in Latin America received strong advice to 
adjust their economies with specific economic measures. 
Nevertheless, it was not until the 70's that these 
economic programmes included a package of foreign debt 
renegotiation, precisely when fears arose that these 
countries might not be able to pay the debt they had 
contracted with private banks. Before the 1970's the 
foreign debt of the Latin American countries was very 
small compared with the amount of their debt in the 
1980's. At that time, fears of defaulting were actually 
regarded as very small. However, as Latin American debts 
grew, this changed, and the inability of governments to 
service the foreign debt became a general problem for 
Latin American countries and for some other Third World
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countries, to the extent that from 1975 to 1983 there 
were 84 international debt renegotiation programmes.
Mexico was no exception and in its case there 
have been four periods of debt rescheduling: firstly, in 
1977 when the first letter of intent was signed with the 
IMF; secondly, in 1982 after the August crisis, a rescue 
programme and an agreement with the IMF; thirdly, in 
1984 when a long-term rescheduling agreement on debt 
servicing was negotiated with the transnational banks; 
and fourthly, in 1986 with a new rescue programme and a 
new agreement with the IMF.
a) The 1977 Agreement
In 1977 the Mexican government signed its 
first agreement with the IMF. Unlike other Latin American 
countries, the Mexican economy was not subject to any 
economic stabilisation programme during the whole post­
war period. The signs of the crisis built up during the 
7 0 's , and at the end of Echeverrxa's government the rate 
of inflation rose sharply compared with the rate that was 
maintained during the "stable development period". The
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budget and external deficits rose considerably, so at the 
end of this government period, senior state financial 
figures decided to ask for foreign loans for the first 
time. These loans allowed the Mexican economy to maintain 
its capital accumulation process. Although there was no 
shortage of available money, the servicing of the foreign 
debt started to represent a heavy burden. The total 
servicing of the external debt, which in 1970 had 
represented 12.9 per cent of total external remittances, 
in 1977 rose to 26.1 per cent.
In 1976-77 Mexico suffered its first cycle of 
recession since the crisis of the 30's. It was 
accompanied by monetary and financial problems. These 
problems were aggravated by political factors. Three in 
particular are important: the opposition generated among 
the propertied classes to the active and progressive 
foreign policy towards Third World countries practised by 
Echeverria's government; the emergence of rural and urban 
armed movements which, though never posing any serious 
threat to the stability of the government, provoked a 
repressive backlash which discredited the political 
regime; and the government's implementation of land 
reforms which expropriated the latifundia in the rich 
northern federal state of Sonora.
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In 1977, as economic difficulties intensified, and 
as these provoked the first large flight of capital 
during the 19 70s, the government devalued the peso by 
more than 100 per cent against the U.S. dollar. In this 
context and during the time when President Echeverria was 
leaving the government and Lopez Portillo was just about 
to become the new president, an understanding, which was 
never made public in Mexico, was signed with the IMF. Up 
to the present day, very little is known about the 
economic advice given by the IMF to Mexico at that time. 
However, this agreement was soon abandoned as the oil 
boom began. What we do know is that the understanding 
established that Lopez Portillo's government should not 
borrow more than U.S.$3,000 million per year from abroad. 
As a result of this agreement, a wage policy was 
introduced to ensure that the rate of increase of 
salaries would be below the rate of increase in the 
price of commodities. With this policy came a 
deterioration in the real income of workers, peasants, 
professional groups, and marginalised sectors of society. 
Its signing also signalled the beginning of a neo-liberal 
economic policy, although during the golden years of the 
oil boom those signals were hidden from public view by 
the government's pursuit of a more expansionist economic 
policy.
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The 1977 agreement with the IMF was not a debt 
renegotiation agreement, unlike the one later signed in
1982. It was just a conventional stabilisation programme 
consisting of reductions in public spending and attempts 
to increase imports. This stabilisation programme 
resulted from the extreme imbalance in the fiscal and 
external sectors of the economy. This large imbalance 
produced an exchange rate crisis which was solved by 
devaluing the Mexican currency. Since that time, Mexico 
has had no fixed exchange rate. Nevertheless, the 
external debt was serviced according to the original 
conditions, which meant in practice that the cost of 
debt-servicing became more onerous.
b) The 1982 Agreement
During the four years from 1978 to 1981, 
Mexico experienced one of its most rapid periods of 
economic growth, based on the discovery of rich oil 
fields in the south-east part of the country. The 
government pursued an expansionist economic policy, not 
least by allowing by the growth of public expenditure and 
the accumulation of massive external loans. The amount of
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money borrowed during these four years was U.S.$43,600 
million, which constituted more than twice the amount 
that was borrowed in the previous eight years.
It was thought in governmental circles that 
with plentiful supplies of Mexican oil, increasing 
prices on the international oil market, and with the 
scale of credits available from the transnational banks, 
it would be possible to stimulate the industrialisation 
of the country. Senior figures of the Mexican government 
at the time also thought that the oil would bring enough 
foreign currency to meet the debt service payments and 
thus avoid problems in paying the external debt. Hence, 
Mexico was ready to exploit its vast reserves of oil by 
developing its oil industry.
A policy of accepting the revaluation of the 
exchange value of the Mexican peso was adopted during 
these four years by the government, so the national 
currency did not lose its value against strong 
international currencies in the floating exchange rate. 
This monetary policy allowed profit rates to rise as it 
also cheapened the imports of intermediate and capital 
goods needed to continue the expansion of the economy. 
This policy of allowing a high exchange rate for the peso
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also stimulated the import of food (basic grains), and 
allowed the entry of luxury goods into the country.
At the same time, two underlying basic 
weaknesses in the Mexican economy intensified, since both 
were left untreated: namely, its underdeveloped level of 
agricultural productivity, and its heavy dependence on 
imported goods for the development of industry. It was 
thought within government circles that each of these was 
the result of the previous crisis, and that the oil boom 
would be able to solve them. Yet since inflation was high 
and the trade and fiscal deficits steadily increased, it 
was impossible to maintain steady growth. The entire 
economy started to depend on oil exports. Aiming to 
maintain steady growth, the government adopted two 
economic measures: it introduced a new tax system (IVA, 
Value Added Tax) which in practice had regressive 
features, and it adopted a policy of maintaining low 
prices for the services and goods produced by the state. 
These measures, in addition to the high revenue that the 
government received from oil exports, kept the economy 
growing artificially.
So there was a four-year period of economic 
growth based on oil exports at a time when the 
international market was paying high prices for oil.
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However this period came to an abrupt end with the 
significant drop in the international price of oil in the 
middle of 1981. At the first signs of economic 
contraction and of the lack of confidence in the 
profitability of future domestic investment, the 
government reacted by asking for more foreign credits. 
This policy was initially supported by the IMF and the 
transnational banks: short-term credits were seen as the 
solution.
In 1982 in spite of tight economic policies and 
a restrictive wage policy, the government insisted on 
trying to maintain a high rate of growth. Nevertheless, 
confidence had been shaken at all levels. Capital began 
to be moved out of the country, facilitated by a free 
exchange market and an increasingly overvalued rate of 
exchange. Approximately U.S.$17,321 million left the 
country between 1980 and 1982. This represented half of 
the capital flight from the country in the previous ten 
years, and it continued with the massive devaluation of 
the peso in February 1982.
As part of the strong role that the president plays 
in Mexico (the phenomenon of presidentialism which was 
mentioned in chapter one), it has been common practice 
for each president to formulate his own economic policies
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until the very last day of his period of office. Mexican 
presidents act in the way they wish to be remembered by 
history. Accordingly, in facing the debt crisis and the 
lack of confidence in keeping the national currency 
inside the country, in August 1982 the Mexican President 
exercised his presidential power. As a result, on August 
20th 1982, the Mexican government - left without monetary 
reserves, and unable to control the flight of capital - 
declared its incapacity to meet its debt service 
payments, and on 1st September nationalised the private 
banks.
As was described in the previous chapter, to avoid 
what could have been an international financial crisis, 
the IMF came to the rescue. The process of renegotiation 
with the IMF lasted a year, culminating in the signing of 
a new agreement on 20th August 1983. This agreement 
involved the restructuring of the sovereign debt that 
should have been paid between 23rd August 1982 and 31st 
December 1984, and the renegotiation of U.S.$20,000 
million (approximately a quarter) of the accumulated debt 
at the time the crisis was announced. The agreement also 
provided a credit of U.S.$5,000 million from the 
transnational banks, a contingent credit for U.S.$3,800 
million with the IMF for three years, and new credits 
from the multilateral banks (the World Bank and the
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Inter-American Development Bank) of U.S.$2,000 million. 
The conditions of the agreement were very strict for 
Mexico in terms of length, interest rates, and 
commissions.
The 1982 agreement also renegotiated the large 
private external debt, which was in fact one of the 
biggest in Latin America. In 1981 and including the debt 
of the private banks which were later nationalised, it 
reached U.S.$20,000 million. This debt represented 
approximately a third of Mexico's total external debt, a 
high proportion of which was repayable in the short term. 
The interest rates payable on this private debt were 
higher than those on the loans to the public sector. It 
is worth noting that the external private debt had been 
contracted mainly by the big national groups mainly based 
in the northern city of Monterrey, (such as Alfa, Vitro, 
Visa, and Desc.) and by the subsidiaries of transnational 
enterprises. It is also worth noting that this debt was 
owed to the most important North American banks.
Although the Mexican state did not absorb the whole 
of the private debt, it created the appropriate 
conditions to support the enterprises which were having 
difficulties in paying. For example, the state created a 
financial instrument called "Ficorca", through which the
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enterprises registered their debt in foreign currency but 
deposited the money in Mexican currency in the central 
bank. Under this arrangement the central bank became 
responsible for providing the enterprises with sufficient 
foreign currency to repay the enterprises' loans to the 
foreign creditor at the appropriate time. The impact of 
the continuing devaluation due to the floating exchange 
rate was thus eliminated for the enterprises, as the 
central bank sold the foreign currency to the enterprises 
at the controlled exchange rate in effect when the 
enterprises made the deposits in the central bank. These 
deposits could be made in cash as well as through 
credits; so this "Ficorca" financial instrument could 
also give credit in Mexican currency to the enterprises 
for the amount of money that corresponded to their 
foreign debt. When this financial mechanism started 
working, 94 per cent of the debts registered used this 
credit service. At the same time, the large private 
enterprises with a better financial position, 
renegotiated their debts directly with their 
international creditors. This meant, in the more severe 
cases, the capitalisation of part of the enterprises' 
debts , so that the foreign creditors became owners of 
part of the enterprises' shares. This was the case of the 
enterprise called Alfa.
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The 1982 agreement with the IMF obliged the 
Mexican government to follow neo-liberal economic 
policies. This was clearly expressed in the 1982-1988 
government programme created by the newly-elected 
President De la Madrid, called the National Development 
Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo), and in another 
economic instrument called the Immediate Programme of 
Economic Re-ordering (PIRE, Programa Inmediato de 
Reordenacion Economica). The main techniques of the new 
economic policies were: the reduction of public 
expenditure, and the introduction of adjustments to 
prices and tariffs in the public sector; an increase in 
taxes on goods for consumption; tighter wage controls; 
free prices in the internal market; positive rates of 
interest; and a flexible rate of exchange to stimulate 
exports and discourage imports. The main purpose of these 
economic adjustment plans was to end inflation, reduce 
the external and fiscal imbalance, and re-establish the 
economy's capacity for growth.
The economic policies adopted by Mexico after 
signing the 1982 agreement with the IMF slowly altered 
the country's production structure. As time passed, these 
changes restructured the Mexican economy, orientating it 
towards the export of primary and manufactured goods, 
while reducing its trade barriers and opening it to
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foreign capital investments. This restructuring was in 
line with suggestions made by the World Bank, and 
approved by the seven major developed capitalist 
countries at the Tokyo summit in 1986.
At the time the 1982 agreement was signed, the 
Mexican government, as well as its international 
creditors, were convinced of the advantages of the 
arrangement, and of the capacity it would have to re­
establish a healthy economy in Mexico. It was thought 
that this programme would be a very rapid and radical way 
to move out of the crisis and would immediately be 
successful. The general comment from members of the 
international financial community was that the 
restructuring of the foreign debt, and the authorisation 
of more credits according to the conditions and 
programmes agreed with the IMF, were the most prudent and 
effective way for debtor countries to regain a good image 
among the international creditors, thus protecting the 
interests of both parties. In 1982, the general opinion 
in international financial circles was that the Mexican 
government's new economic programme would work well.
In similar terms it was thought in senior 
circles of the Mexican state that Mexico was facing a 
serious but transitory problem, and that the economy's
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recovery would take two years at the most. In fact, in 
the Immediate Programme of Economic Re-ordering (PIRE) 
steps were established to move out of the crisis, and its 
text actually stated that the recovery would take two 
years. The truth was that the 1982 agreement was just the 
beginning of a series of other needed credits and 
agreements. Instead of being a recipe for solving 
Mexico's underlying debt crisis, the agreement simply 
acted as the alarm which told the international 
financial community (and particularly the IMF) that 
Mexico's foreign debt might be unpayable. All that the 
Mexican economy could do was to continue making the 
service payments on its debt, which was very important in 
maintaining the value of the loaned capital, and 
important to the international banks because the money 
would continue bringing very high profits on account of 
the high interest rates and commissions which were 
charged. It was estimated that by 1985 Mexico should have 
repaid U.S.$9,758 million of the capital and about 
U.S.$10,000 million in interest, but - as became clear 
in the exchanges between the Mexican government and the 
IMF Director General -the IMF knew that this would be 
impossible for the country, even allowing for a good 
balance of payments and steady economic growth. Hence, 
for Mexico, the 1982 agreement only represented a
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temporary solution with little benefit for the bulk of 
its population.
c) The 1984 Rescheduling Process
Although the Mexican economy experienced a 
small recovery, it was certainly not enough to pay the 
foreign debt under the conditions established in the 1982 
agreement. A new rescheduling process became the 
alternative for the government at the time. In 1984 the 
Mexican government therefore rescheduled the servicing of 
its foreign debt, in direct negotiations with the IMF and 
the transnational banks involved.
In 1984 the national economy began a slow and 
limited process of recovery which was shown by a 3.7 per 
cent increase in the gross national product. This was due 
to a limited increase in private and also public 
investment. The implementation of the IMF stabilisation 
package which began in 1982 had very severe consequences 
on wages, living standards and the industrial structure. 
Because of the deep recession in 1982-83, and the 
associated reduction in living standards for the majority
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of the Mexican population, it was possible to reduce the 
public deficit. This reduction was 18 per cent in 1982 
and 8.5 per cent in 1983, while at the same time there 
was an accumulated trade surplus of U.S.$33.057 million 
between 1982 and 1984. This turn around in the balance of 
payments was the result of the economic recession which 
reduced the 1981 level of imports by two thirds. This 
surplus was vital to ensure at least the servicing of 
the foreign debt. The rate of inflation fell back to 
only 60 per cent in 1984, a reduction of 40 per cent on 
the 1982 rate of more than 100 per cent. Nevertheless 
this inflation rate was far from the 35 per cent required 
by the IMF, and this caused serious tensions in the 
internal financial system and in the rate of exchange.
Even in the context of a small economic recovery 
and a substantial trade surplus, it was difficult to pay 
the external foreign debt under the conditions 
established by the IMF in 1982. The first 1982-83 
agreements had established short-term repayment dates, 
but these proved impossible to meet given the 
accumulation of debt from earlier years. The need for 
long-term restructuring became clear.
The effects of the foreign debt on the internal 
capital accumulation process became more and more
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negative. The costs of the adjustment programmes were 
very high in political, economic and social terms. As a 
result, the possibility of cancelling the foreign debt 
became the preoccupation of some political, union and 
academic organizations, not only in Mexico but elsewhere 
in Latin America. The governments of the Latin American 
countries that were most affected by the same debt crisis 
started to discuss jointly the economic situation of the 
region. In 1984 there were two regional meetings on the 
foreign debt. The first, held in Quito, Ecuador in 
January, 1984, was attended by the presidents and 
representatives of all Latin American countries. They 
produced the Quito Declaration. The second meeting in 
July 1984 in Cartagena, Colombia brought together the 
twelve most indebted countries of the region. This second 
meeting generated the so-called Cartagena Consensus.
The final statements from both meetings agree 
in their diagnosis of the problem as well as in their 
strategy for dealing with it. Leaving aside the existence 
of specific problems in each country, it is clear that 
all the countries wanted a common response to the 
economic crisis that was affecting them. The 
representatives of each government argued that the 
internal debt crisis in each of their countries was a 
result of external factors, and in particular a result of
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the economic policy followed by the United States in 
recent years. All the countries rejected as a solution 
the adjustment and recession policies suggested by the 
IMF, and proposed instead to renew economic growth.
The Quito Declaration said that economic 
adjustments which produced prolonged recession in 
production, affected the level of employment, and 
impoverished the living standards of the majority of the 
population, were not compatible with the objectives that 
each individual government wanted for its economy. 
Therefore it was necessary for the international 
community to create a common front which would allow the 
countries of the region to re-establish rapidly the 
conditions for internal economic growth and development. 
In both declarations, Quito and Cartagena, the 
governments of the Latin America countries argued that 
there was an intimate relationship between the external 
debts they owed and the trade of the goods they exported. 
Therefore they argued that there would be no solution to 
the foreign debt problem unless the conditions of 
international trade improved for the products sold by the 
countries of the region, and unless protectionist 
barriers were eliminated. They argued that since the debt 
was a political problem of an international magnitude, so
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it was the responsibility of both parties, debtor 
countries and creditors, to solve the problem.
In both meetings, Quito and Cartagena, a set 
of concrete measures was put forward for the 
renegotiation of the debt under different conditions 
from those proposed by the IMF, measures which were more 
favourable to the Latin American countries. Among these 
measures it is important to highlight: the limitation of 
debt service payments to a reasonable proportion of 
export earnings; a substantial reduction in interest, 
commissions and spread; a long-term and more flexible 
agreement for repaying the debt; the renewal and 
maintenance of a constant flow of credit towards the 
region, and the linkage of debt renegotiation to foreign 
trade problems. In spite of their limitations, the 
declarations at Quito and Cartagena represented a 
significant step forward in the effort to try to find a 
different and fairer alternative for the renegotiation of 
the debt of the Latin America countries to the policies 
proposed by the IMF. At the same time, it served to make 
some members of the IMF and the American government more 
aware of the need to find solutions which allowed the 
continuing economic growth of Latin America.
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It was in this international context that in 
1984 Mexico started new negotiations with the IMF and the 
international commercial banks, aiming to reschedule the 
debt over a longer period. The 1982 agreement 
represented an emergency programme that could help only 
the more immediate problem of short term liquidity. Yet 
by making new arrangements in 1984 the Mexican government 
broke ranks with other Latin American countries, choosing 
instead once more to accept bilateral agreements with the 
IMF and the transnational banks, - agreements which 
represented a retreat from the regional Cartagena spirit. 
In this way, the Mexican government accepted conditions 
which were very convenient for the transnational banks, 
even if they were better conditions for Mexico than those 
agreed in 1982. It was better for the transnational banks 
to reschedule Mexico's foreign debt than to find 
themselves in a position where unilateral and more 
radical measures could be taken by the Latin American 
countries as a block and Mexico obtained better terms and 
prospects than by fighting on behalf of others in an 
uncertain campaign.
The 1984 agreement did reschedule the public 
debt over a longer period. It included a reduction of the 
spread and the elimination of the commissions in the case 
of the capital renegotiated. There were also other
84
changes of minor importance such as the substitution of 
the Prime Rate by Libor, and the possibility of changing 
some credits that had originally been fixed in U.S. 
dollars to some other foreign currencies. Nevertheless, 
there were no major changes in the agreement in the 
direction of the Cartagena proposals. In particular, 
there was no reduction in the rate of interest, or in 
the limitation of debt service payments to a proportion 
of exports.
The 1984 agreement covered U.S.$48,500 million, 
which represented the whole of the public debt contracted 
with the commercial banks, and also included a 
rescheduling of the amount of money that was renegotiated 
in 1982, but did not include the debt that was contracted 
with multilateral organizations. With this agreement it 
was also possible to secure a new U.S.$3,800 million loan 
from the international banks.
d) The 1986 Agreement
It was the agreement of 1986 more than any other 
which became the focus of the political debate with which
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the bulk of this thesis is concerned, so for that reason 
we need to preview it here in greater detail than we have 
the preceding three agreements. As was pointed out 
earlier, in 1984 the Mexican economy began a process of 
recovery, after more than two years (1982-1983) of 
recession. In 1984 the economy started to grow again, 
though at a much slower rate than in previous years. In
1984 the gross national product rose by 3.7 per cent. The 
inflationary process slowed down considerably, the 
state's deficit diminished, and the balance of payments 
continued to register a steady surplus (as it had since 
1982). In Mexico senior figures in the economic 
administration of the state, and representatives of the 
chambers of commerce and industry, thought that 1985 
would continue with the same positive pattern of growth 
and recovery. They believed at the time that the 
economic policies and strategy being implemented by the 
government were correct, and that the foreign debt crisis 
was on its way to being solved. In government circles in 
the highly industrialised countries, it was also thought 
that the recovery initiated in the United States and 
Japan in 1983, and extended to Western Europe in 1984, 
would create suitable conditions for the expansion of 
Third World exports, and that the countries of the Third 
World would then be able to service their foreign debts 
through an improvement in their balance of payments.
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Hence the official recommendations from the 
international financial community to Mexico were to keep 
reducing the imports of inessential products, and at a 
suitable time to take the political risk of cutting some 
social and development programmes. The international 
financial agencies argued that the Mexican state should 
adopt austerity measures to reduce the public deficit, 
subsidies, and inflation. Throughout 1984 and the first 
six months of 1985, senior figures in the Mexican 
financial ministry continued to be very optimistic, 
considering that the evolution of the Mexican economy 
since the adjustment programme had been adopted had been 
very satisfactory. These senior State figures declared 
publicly that the balance of payments had improved 
substantially, public finances had been strengthened, the 
rate of inflation had been significantly reduced, and 
the country's economic activity had gradually recovered. 
It was officially accepted that there were unsolved 
problems and targets which had not been reached, but it 
was thought that these problems would be solved by 
strengthening public finances and adjusting monetary 
policy.
However, in the event, this "recovery" in the 
Mexican economy did not turn out to be permanent. Serious 
problems started to be seen again as early as the
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beginning of 1985. Although in 1985 there was a 2.7 per 
cent increase in the gross national product, other 
economic indicators told of a deterioration in the 
economic situation from the second quarter of 1985. As 
had happened in 1976 and 1982, in 1985 problems started 
to appear in the monetary, financial and commercial 
spheres, and were transferred later to the area of 
production. Among the more obvious symptoms present in
1985 were: a sharp increase in the rate of inflation; a 
steady increase in interest rates in the last three- 
quarters of 1985 ; low receipts in the banks; a 
deterioration in the balance of payments; an increase in 
the transfer of money out of the country, and a 
progressive deterioration in the rate of exchange in 
relation to the U.S. dollar. In 1985 the government tried 
to explain these problems away as a consequence of other 
external factors which were beyond the control of the 
Mexican state, such as the decrease in the international 
oil price, and the September 1985 earthquake. However, 
these were just two other factors which intensified the 
crisis in 1985, and made worse a deteriorating economic 
situation which had internal Mexican roots as the 
stabilisation programme faltered.
The behaviour of the foreign rates of exchange 
is a useful indicator of the Mexican economic situation
(the rate of exchange included two different rates: a 
preferential one, used by government and industry, and a 
free one, which was used for all other purposes). Already 
in December 1984, the controlled rate of exchange could 
not be held, and in March 1985 a regular flotation was 
imposed. The annual rate of devaluation moved from 38 per 
cent in 1984, to 116 per cent in 1985, well above the 
rate of inflation. Another reliable indicator of the 
behaviour of the economy is the interest rate, which 
began to rise sharply well before the fall in the 
international price of oil.
The aggravation caused by these financial 
problems was soon reflected in production. During the 
second six months of 1985, economic growth was 
maintained. However, the rate of economic growth was 
significantly less than the levels reached during the 
first six months of the same year. The crisis deepened 
and the economic adjustment policy began to show its 
incapacity to solve the problems which it was supposed to 
solve before the earthquake and the drop of the 
international price of oil. These last two problems 
certainly complicated and aggravated the crisis, but they 
were not its cause.
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During 1985 Mexico did not receive foreign 
credits apart from the few that were lent by the 
multinational financial organisations. As the debt 
crisis worsened at the end of 1985, even some senior 
figures in the Mexican government began to argue for an 
alternative way of paying the foreign debt, by changing 
the system of foreign debt payments. Meanwhile, in the 
IMF meeting held in Seoul, South Korea, in October 1985, 
the US Treasury Secretary, James Baker, through the so- 
called Baker Plan, also proposed a new strategy of 
payments, to ensure that the 15 biggest debtor countries 
(including Mexico) would be able to meet their foreign 
payments. The Mexican government thought that the Baker 
proposal was insufficient for the economic development 
of these countries. In January 1986 the Mexican Financial 
Minister, Jesus Silva Herzog, openly criticised the Baker 
Plan, arguing that the U.S.$40,000 million allocated to 
finance the 15 biggest debtor countries would not be 
enough to stimulate the economic growth of these 
countries, or to pay the heavy servicing of their foreign 
debts. The Baker Plan would certainly help to achieve the 
second objective, but not the first, and without economic 
growth the debt crisis would never be overcome.
Several times during the first six months of 
1986, some other senior members of the Mexican government
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made similar declarations to the one made in January by 
Silva Herzog. In February 1986, President De la Madrid 
himself declared that Mexico should adjust its foreign 
debt service payments to the country's ability to pay. 
In national and international newspapers a moratorium was 
frequently mentioned as a possibility. The option of 
defaulting on the debt was supported by the main national 
workers' union (the CTM, Confederation of Mexican 
Workers), and even by some private industrialists.
By June 1986 it was evident that Mexico would 
not meet even the interest payments due on its debt, and 
that the policy for dealing with the foreign debt was a 
cause of conflict and disagreement among senior members 
of the Mexican government. It was also evident that the 
economic recovery in the highly industrialised countries 
would not resolve the debt crisis in the bigger debtor 
countries; at least this was seen as true in Mexico's 
case, where the drop in the international price of oil 
was making it less possible to pay the country's foreign 
debt. Senior figures in the US government (Treasury and 
Federal Reserve) as well as senior members of the IMF 
were alarmed at the possibility of Mexico declaring a 
moratorium. But in the event, as we will see in detail in 
later chapters, the Mexican government did not default. 
Instead, it made a deal with the international financial
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community within the term of the Baker plan. It signed an 
agreement which maintained the financial solvency of the 
international banks and reduced Mexico's burden 
regardless of the economic growth of the debtor 
countries. For the third time, the Mexican government was 
prepared to accept the conditions of the international 
financial community in bilateral negotiations, instead of 
accepting the risk of acting in concert with the rest of 
the Latin American debtor countries.
The debt negotiations with the IMF in 1986 were 
about the government's financial deficit. In line with 
the new spirit of the negotiations and aiming for the 
minimal growth which could increase the diminished level 
of international trade, the IMF agreed to use the 
"operational deficit" concept, which deflates debt 
service in the State's budget. It also included a 
"relative contingency clause", through which the 
international community committed itself to lending more 
money to Mexico if the international price of oil fell 
below U.S.$9 per barrel, and to reduce this latest loan 
if the price exceeded U.S.$14 per barrel. Both measures 
were recognized as particularly helpful by senior members 
of the Mexican government concerned with financial 
adminis tration.
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Once the IMF agreement was signed, negotiations 
with the commercial banks started. These went on until 
the end of September 1986. It was reported that there 
were basic disagreements between the Mexican government 
and its creditors. There were even rumours that the 
negotiations could fail. The Mexican delegation proposed 
a payments scheme on the servicing of private debts 
which involved a substantial cut in the rate of interest, 
as had been agreed at the Cartagena meeting. 
Nevertheless, the negotiations finished with positive 
results for the international commercial banks. The 
Mexican government received new credits from the 
commercial banks but under orthodox economic policies, 
and withdrew its original proposal to cut interest rates.
The completion of the agreement was regarded as 
important by the U.S. government. During the 1986 annual 
IMF meeting in Washington, President Reagan himself urged 
the commercial banks to give new credits to Mexico, in 
order to support Mexico's new economic programme. The 
official position of the American government was that 
the Mexican government had made great efforts to recover 
economic growth, and that the only way to repay its 
foreign debt was through the adoption of new economic 
development programmes of a conventionally liberal kind. 
There were very special reasons why President Reagan
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urged the commercial banks to give Mexico new credits. 
Apart from the fact that it was vital for the creditor 
banks to ensure the repayment of their previous loans, 
Mexico shares a 3,000 km. border with the U.S., it is 
also the main supplier of oil to the U.S., and was its 
third most important commercial client. For the 
government of the U.S.A., the political stability of 
Mexico was of paramount importance, and might be 
compromised by economic chaos.
Therefore, on 30th September 1986 an agreement 
with the international commercial banks was signed. It 
included the rescheduling of U.S.$52,200 million of the 
public debt previously contracted with these banks, a new 
credit for U.S.$6,000 million which was to be disbursed 
between 1986 and 1987, and U.S.$2,000 million as a 
contingency credit in case the oil market conditions 
worsened. Regarding the U.S.$43,700 million contracted 
before 1983, the term for payment was extended by 20 
years with a 7-year period of grace, and for the debt 
contracted after 1983 and the new credits, the term for 
payment was to be 12 years with a 5-year period of 
grace. The spread on all of them was fixed 13/16 per cent 
over the Libor rate, which was less than the rate agreed 
in 1983, and no commissions would be charged. This meant 
an annual saving of U.S.$200 million. The private debt
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registered in "Ficorca" was also rescheduled. Apart from 
all this, the IMF agreement also involved a contingency 
credit from this organisation for U.S.$1,600 million, 
and credits for U.S.$6,000 million from multilateral 
organisations and the governments of the U.S.A. and 
Japan.
A new element in the 1986 agreement was that 
the World Bank was to play a more active role, as it was 
to verify that the new credits went straight towards 
"structural change", which meant the promotion of 
manufactured goods for export, thus reinforcing the free 
market economy. At the same time, the World Bank was to 
act as a guarantor of the new credits given by the 
transnational banks.
With the 1986 agreement, Mexico followed the 
lines laid down by the Baker Plan. Financiers such as 
William R. Rhodes, Vice-President of Citicorp. and 
director of the committee of advisers to the creditor 
banks, referred to the Mexican package as the first 
successful example of the "steadily growing" programme 
presented by James Baker, as this package linked the new 
loans to projects which reinforced the free market 
economy.
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In 1987 the accumulated Mexican debt reached 
more than U.S.$112,000 million, a figure that exceeded 
the U.S.$106,000 million target suggested in the 1982-83 
agreement. What was worse, there were not enough 
resources to re-establish the rates of economic growth or 
the levels of investment reached in earlier years. The 
concessions obtained in the extension of terms for 
repayment in the 1986 agreement were not really 
significant, as the commercial banks were by then 
convinced that they would never recover their capital. 
They were no longer mainly concerned about the maturity 
dates of the loans they had made. What concerned them was 
ensuring that the debt service payments would continue. 
The interest rates agreed in 1986 were far from those 
suggested by the Cartagena agreement; and the 1986 
agreement still retained the repayment system which had 
proved a failure in 1982 and 1984. Once again, the 
resolution of the problems of Mexican indebtedness was 
postponed, in favour of an agreement which satisfied the 
short term interests of Mexico's international creditors; 
in other words, the agreement reassured the creditors 
that there would be no default on the Mexican debt, and 
enabled Mexico to continue to receive commercial credit 
and additional loans.
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The adjustment policy put into effect by the
1986 agreement left the economy seriously weakened and 
the already alarmingly low standard of living of the 
majority of Mexican population further jeopardised, as 
shown, for example, by the decrease in purchasing power 
of the minimum wage. This policy also failed to get the 
country out of the crisis or to overcome the basic 
structural weaknesses of the Mexican economy. The letter 
of intent given to the IMF in 1986 was full of neo­
liberal economic policies, such as flexible exchange 
rates, and positive interest rates. At the same time, the 
fact that the few credits which were destined for 
production (as was the case with the World Bank's loans) 
had to be orientated towards the so-called "structural 
change" (the Baker Plan proposal), meant a restructuring 
of the domestic productive system towards the production 
of goods orientated to the international market and not 
the national one. This can be illustrated by the growth 
of in-bond plants in the northern cities of the country. 
This process led the Mexican economy towards a still more 
vulnerable and dependent position in the international 
economy, a dependence which had lain at the root of 
Mexico's economic weakness from the very beginning of the 
debt crisis in the view of the "nationalist" opposition. 
However, from the perspective of the "internationalist" 
presidency, the Mexican economy needed precisely such an
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opening and restructuring. The internationalist view was 
to ease the pain of this process and the agreements of 
1984 and 1986 (on debt contracted before 1982) were 
measures to achieve this objective, by deftly playing on 
the strengths of Mexico and the US and international 
interest in coming to agreements.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Reactions of the Political Centre
This chapter is a narrative account of the main 
arguments used by the Mexican government to justify its 
refusal to default on the country's external debt, and 
of the ways it found to reopen the debt negotiations. 
Thus, a selection has been made of the political speeches 
of President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado and of those 
made by the Ministers of Finance, Jesus Silva Herzog 
Flores and Gustavo Petricioli, as representative voices 
of the government's official position during the six-year 
period of government of the President (December 1982- 
November 1988).
It will be argued that although the position of the 
Mexican government towards the external debt payments 
changed during this six-year period, it always recognised 
the country's external financial obligations and tried to 
avoid confrontation with internal creditors. The official 
message was very clear and coherent throughout these six 
years: Mexico would pay; Mexico would not default; Mexico 
would not take unilateral decisions; Mexico wanted to 
avoid counterproductive confrontations; Mexico wanted to 
negotiate with the international financial community. The 
official political speeches constantly reiterated these 
messages. The variation in the message lay in the precise
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reasons why renegotiation was desirable, and why previous 
courses of action did not have the success hoped for 
them.
Thus, although there certainly must have been a 
great deal of internal debate among the members of the 
economic cabinet, the official speeches always presented 
a single coherent voice which accepted Mexico's external 
commitments and its intention to negotiate new terms and 
conditions of payment.
When on 1st December, 1982, de la Madrid took 
power, he announced his economic programme, which was 
called the Immediate Programme of Economic Reconstruction 
(PIRE). The first point of this programme called for an 
austere economic budget to allow the government to meet 
the payments to its international creditors. The sixth 
point of PIRE particularly expressed the intention to 
raise public income to avoid a high government deficit 
and to avoid increases in the already huge external debt. 
So on 11th December 1982 the Minister of Finances, Jesus 
Silva Herzog Flores, had to justify to the Chamber of 
Deputies of the Congress (el Congreso de la Union) an 
initiative for a 1983 tax reform law (leyes de Ingresos 
de la Federacio'n y del Departamento del Distrito Federal 
para 1983). In his speech to the Congress, Silva Herzog
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announced that President de la Madrid's government wanted 
to restructure the external debt payments over a longer 
period of time.
Silva Herzog stated that due to the impossibility 
of meeting the payments of the foreign debt on 20th 
August 1982, Mexico had to ask its international 
creditors for an extension, at the same time that the 
first restructuring of the debt was prepared in 
coordination with the IMF. In fact, this restructuring 
programme was consolidated a year and a half later, 
involving US$48,700 million.
At that time Silva Herzog made explicit the strategy 
of Miguel de la Madrid's government towards foreign debt; 
that is to say, renegotiation and no confrontation. It 
was the intention of the new Mexican government to pay, 
and so it was expressed when on 11th December 1982 the 
Minister of Finance declared to the Chamber of Deputies 
of the Congress that: "If the payment extension had not 
been negotiated with the international financial 
community, Mexico would have had to revert to the less 
desired option, that is, temporarily to stop its 
international payments"(l).
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On 15th December 1982, just four days after this 
declaration, the IMF said that there was a positive 
intention to negotiate with Mexico, and meanwhile the 
debt was restructured. The IMF gave to Mexico a credit 
for US$3,900 million.
It was a matter of not losing face with the 
international community, and that is how the new Mexican 
government understood it. The strategy of negotiation and 
payment was applied from the first year of government in
1983. An evaluation of this strategy was made and 
expressed during his first State of the Nation Speech on 
1st September 1983 by President Miguel de la Madrid. He 
said there: "The arrangements of the external debt were 
indispensable to re-establish commerce, tourism, and 
technology, and generally speaking economic links abroad. 
Our prestige abroad had seriously deteriorated. After a 
complex negotiation with the international financial 
community, it was possible to restructure the public 
sector external debt and there have also been 
improvements in the debt of the private sector"(2).
In his second appearance in the Chamber of 
Deputies at the Congress on 22nd November 1983, Silva 
Herzog said that "Mexico had recovered its international 
prestige and with this it has strengthened its capacity
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to negotiate in the international markets of capital"(3). 
At that time the external public debt accounted for 
US$60,009 million, and the restructuring undertaken was 
only of short-term loans which had fallen due, which 
would allow the postponement of the payment of US$8,000 
million in 1983.
During this second appearance in the Chamber of 
Deputies, Silva Herzog rejected a moratorium. He said: "A 
lot has been said about our country forming part of a 
group of other countries to seek not only a moratorium, 
but also a collective programme of debt renegotiation... 
I want to stress here that our point of view is that the 
moratorium would not be a satisfactory solution'* (4).
The government's position of not seeking a 
moratorium, as expressed by Silva Herzog in November
1983, was ratified by President Miguel de la Madrid 
during his second State of the Nation Speech, on 1st 
September 1984. He then said: "I reiterate Mexico's 
decision to meet our international commitments. An 
irresponsible attitude towards our international 
creditors will bring severe damage to the country, as it 
will affect our economic relationships abroad and 
Mexico's prestige for many years. We will not accept 
adventures that will destabilise the international
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economy, which will damage the poor countries more than 
the rich ones. On the other hand, we are negotiating 
seriously and firmly, with reason and reality as our 
weapons, to change the present conditions of the 
international financial system and of world trade, aiming 
to overcome the deep crisis that is affecting us, so we 
will be able to develop again and re-build our capacity 
to pay and to import necessary goods*' (5).
Meanwhile, as will be seen in later chapters, the 
opposition political parties, trade unions and leaders of 
public opinion were declaring that Mexico should have 
taken a more aggressive position towards the payment of 
the external debt.
The government's strategy of paying and 
renegotiating the debt continued throughout 1984. Mexico 
was regarded by the international financial community as 
a serious country which was making a significant effort 
to pay its external debt. The President and the Finance 
Minister continued with the same line. In fact, on 20th 
September 1984, Silva Herzog was invited as a guest 
speaker to the American Bankers' Association's meeting in 
Washington. There he said: "Mexico will meet all its 
payment commitments" (6). Nevertheless, a new idea 
started to appear in the public statements of the Mexican
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government, which was to seek the further cooperation of 
the international creditors. At this same meeting in 
Washington, Silva Herzog said that "Mexico will pay, but 
more time is needed for the country to be able to meet 
its payments" (7).
It was Silva Herzog himself who began to publicise 
the notion that the debt repayments required the 
creditors' cooperation, in particular a long-term 
rescheduling. On 18th October 1984 he appeared before the 
Chamber of Senators and, referring to the country's 
external debt, he said: "It is everybody's problem, so 
the solution must involve everybody, with shared 
responsibility. As far as the Mexican government is 
concerned, the reality is that we all have a degree of 
obligation in this problem"(8). Nevertheless, even with 
this new notion, the idea of paying the debt and thus 
avoiding confrontation remained a very strong element in 
the Mexican government's official discourse. During his 
same speech to the senators, Silva Herzog said: "It is 
clear that initiatives such as a debtor nations' club, 
which in practice means a regional moratorium or a search 
for a joint renegotiation of the Latin American external 
debt, are impracticable and self-defeating"(9).
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Silva Herzog made this declaration in the Chamber 
of Senators at the same time as the second (10) debt 
restructuring was being negotiated with the international 
financial community. The Minister of Finance stated at 
every available opportunity that Mexico was the first 
country to achieve a satisfactory renegotiation of its 
external debt, and that it was thus able to convince the 
creditors that it was necessary to help the rest of the 
debtor countries. Later in the same month of October 
1984, Silva Herzog went for the third time to the Chamber 
of Deputies to explain the 1985 income law initiatives 
(leyes de ingresos de la Federacion y del Departamento 
del Distrito Federal para 1985). There he said that this 
second restructuring of the debt should end by 1985, and 
although this restructuring process would not solve all 
the troubles, it would certainly bring necessary relief. 
He also rejected out of hand the accusations made by 
opposition deputies that President de la Madrid's 
economic polices were designed in the headquarters of the 
IMF in Washington.
It was during Silva Herzog's third appearance 
before the Deputies that the debt issue began to acquire 
political significance. During his fourth appearance 
before the Deputies, on 21st November 1984, he said: 
"What was obtained with the debt restructuring was just
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an alleviation of the problem, a breathing space. The 
problem is not solved. To be able to solve it, it is 
necessary to eliminate the external debt, and the only 
way to do this is for the country to receive more foreign 
currency income to be able to pay the debt. The problem 
of the external debt now has political overtones" (11). 
In spite of this remark, the original idea of paying the 
debt, not defaulting and not forming a club of debtor 
nations, was still present in Silva Herzog's speech. He 
said: "What the government has said is that a global 
renegotiation is not to be recommended. Thus the 
negotiation should be bilateral, each country with its 
creditors, each debt negotiated individually, with no 
debtor nations' club, no moratorium, no non-payment, no 
creation of a common front" (12).
The Minister of Finance's constant anti-moratorium 
declarations and his remarks about sharing the 
responsibility of debt payments between creditors and 
debtors, had the effect desired by the Mexican financial 
authorities. In 1985 Mexico renegotiated with its 
international creditors the largest-ever external debt 
restructuring in the world's financial history. On 29th 
March 1985 the sum of US$28,600 million, due to mature in 
the short term, was renegotiated, and a period of grace 
of 15 years was obtained. Five months later, on 29th
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August 1985, a second contract was signed for US$20,100 
million due to mature between 1985 and 1990, with another 
extension of 15 years. On 29th August 1985, when Silva 
Herzog signed the second contract in New York, he said to 
the international creditors: "We hope and believe that we 
can continue to find solutions like this, adjusting 
differences and bringing common efforts into line, as we 
have done in the past"(13). Nevertheless the main idea of 
non-confrontation was also present in his speech. Once 
again he stressed that the most productive way to solve 
the debt problem was to avoid confrontation.
Three days later, on 1st September 1985, during his 
third State of the Nation speech, President Miguel de la 
Madrid referred to this 15-year debt renegotiation of 
US$48,700 million saying: "I do not believe that the 
solution to these problems is confrontation or to ignore 
agreed obligations. We will insist on dialogue and 
negotiation, and the search for new forms that will 
satisfy equitatively and pragmatically the real interests 
of the international economic system, making it clear 
that to be able to pay, it is necessary to grow. We will 
not climb down in this effort"(14). It was in this third 
State of the Nation speech that President Miguel de la 
Madrid dedicated a long section to the external debt 
problem. (During his first two State of the Nation
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speeches he had just mentioned the problem briefly. 
Later, during his fourth, fifth and sixth speeches he 
again dedicated a whole section to the debt issue, and 
its importance bacame steadily graver.
Considering the international pressures which were 
bearing upon the Mexican State, it is understandable that 
up to September 1985 the government tried very hard to 
negotiate a solution, asking the international creditors 
for better financial facilities. However, after the 
natural disaster of the September earthquakes, there was 
a moment of international solidarity that could have been 
an opportunity to change positions in the international 
debt negotiating system. After the earthquakes of the
19th and 20th September 1985, the international community 
was prepared to accept a more radical view from the 
Mexican financial authorities. The natural disaster was 
huge and could even have justified a partial moratorium. 
Nevertheless, the Mexican government did not take this 
opportunity. The President himself and some members of 
his cabinet clearly felt that the country should pay. It 
was perhaps for them a moral matter rather than a 
negotiating strategy.
What will be referred to here as the "missed 
opportunity of September 1985", could have shifted the
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balance between debtor and creditor nations. Several 
Latin American countries were expecting Mexico to take 
such an initiative. The natural disaster put Mexico in a 
potential position to change the rules of the game. The 
Mexican authorities did not take this step, in spite of 
the support particularly given by Spanish President 
Felipe Gonz/lez and some Latin American leaders to 
President de la Madrid. Instead, Mexico used the 
earthquakes as an argument to start negotiations for a 
new loan with new terms, but without implying that a 
moratorium was the natural consequence of a failure to 
find acceptable new terms.
During the six months after the earthquakes, Mexico 
did not pay interest due amounting to US$950 million. The 
international creditors did not even argue about this , 
due to the gravity of the state of emergency declared by 
the Mexican government. The earthquakes caused a general 
public outcry about resolving the problem of the external 
debt. This protest included the governmental unions and 
even the Federal State governors, who on 30th September
1985 said to President de la Madrid that it was necessary 
to handle the debt issue with special attention. On that 
day in September, the President replied: "Mexico will act 
to negotiate and reach agreement, not to confront and 
create conflicts"(15). Then he mentioned to the state
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governors that Mexico was seeking a new format for the 
management of the external debt. The President 
emphasised Mexico’s prestige as a good payer, and he said 
that this prestige had been the reason for the 
international support received during the emergency 
caused by the earthquakes. Furthermore, the IMF lent 
Mexico US$300 million for reconstruction after the 
earthquakes.
A month after the 1985 earthquakes, when Mexico 
demonstrated a need for new loans in order to achieve new 
economic growth and thus pay its debt -as had been 
established by the Baker Plan- Mexico started to 
negotiate a new loan for US$7,150 million, which was not 
authorized until 1987. To negotiate this loan, the 
Mexican financial authorities sent a telex to the IMF, 
agreeing on a new internal economic adjustment programme. 
The telex also asked for the creditors’ understanding, 
and support and help from the rich countries. The 
financial authorities convinced the international 
financial community and the negotiating procedure 
started. It was then said that this new loan was to pay 
the debt. Once again, with this application for a new 
loan, there were a number of official declarations 
against a moratorium. The Finance Minister made such a 
declaration before the Workers Congress (el Congreso del
Ill
Trabajo) on 23rd October, three days after the 
application for the new loan. He added that a moratorium 
was not an appropriate course of action, as it would 
bring hyperinflation to the Mexican economy, as well as 
reactions such as the seizure of Mexican aeroplanes and 
oil tankers abroad.
However, 1985 saw potential moratoria in many other 
countries. In August 1985 in Cuba there was a meeting 
about the Latin American and Caribbean external debt. 
1,200 delegates from different countries attended the 
meeting. People from Mexico attended, but none of them 
were official delegates. The meeting agreed to cancel 
the debt payments, as a result of Fidel Castro's 
arguments about the impossibility of paying the debt, 
although few in practice did so. Another element to add 
to the Latin America context, is the inauguration of Alan 
Garcia as President of Peru on 29th July 1985. On the day 
when he took power, he declared that his country would 
only pay 10 percent of the value of his country's exports 
towards the debt. There were continent-wide movements in 
favour of a moratorium and the cancellation of the debt. 
These movements had an impact in Mexico; nevertheless, 
the government's position remained the same: it would 
pay. It should be borne in mind here that by then the
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official position was that Mexico needed new credit to be 
able to grow; it therefore had to pay its external debt.
On 22nd November 1985 during his fourth appearance 
in the Chamber of Deputies, Silva Herzog said once again 
that the moratorium was not an appropriate measure to 
take. He added that: "A country like ours will not be 
able to stand drastic interruptions in its financial, 
commercial, and political relationships abroad because of 
a unilateral decision to stop its external payments. 
Confrontation and isolation are not the best way to 
protect the wealth of the majority of the population. To 
cancel the debt would bring severe repercussions upon the 
economy's capacity to grow" (16). On this occasion Silva 
Herzog spoke of the Baker Plan, saying that it was 
necessary to have more new credits to be able to grow and 
pay. The tone of his speech then became more dramatic: 
"Someone has to surrender, and the debtor countries are 
paying a very high price for a problem, the 
responsibility for which should be shared with the 
creditor nations. To pay the debt cannot be and has never 
been above people's fundamental needs" (17). With this 
last sentence the Finance Minister gave a stronger 
connotation to the political debate. This sentence was 
regularly quoted by the media and gave rise to many 
comments among different political organizations. This
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was the last time Silva Herzog appeared before the 
Chamber of Deputies as Minister of Finance, as he 
resigned on 17th June 1986.
Suddenly, and to the great surprise of the 
international financial community, Mexican public 
statements concerning the debt changed. The international 
price of oil dropped; thus the Mexican government had to 
follow a different strategy to be able to meet its 
external obligations. Indeed, the third oil crisis in
1986 brought a significant change. The price of a barrel 
of oil fell from US$25 to US$12. This happened at the 
same time as the failure of Mexico's international 
creditors to lend Mexico more money. President Miguel de 
la Madrid had to handle this problem himself. So, on 21st 
February 1986, he asked all the political representatives 
of the different social groups and political 
organizations to go to the National Palace. Many of them 
certainly expected a moratorium to be announced. However, 
instead of this, another economic programme was 
presented, based upon the same 10 economic points of the 
original plan of 1st December 1982 (PIRE). Nevertheless, 
the modification in the government's public position was 
evident when President de la Madrid said that in the 
short term Mexico would negotiate again, with the sole 
intention of paying according to the country's real
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capacity, and included in this negotiation would be a 
contingency clause to ensure that the country's payments 
would take account of the behaviour of international oil 
prices. At that time, President de la Madrid said: 
"Mexico has been an exceptionally responsible country 
with its external financial relations. It has not had 
recourse to confrontations which are no good for anyone, 
and it has rejected unilateral solutions. Mexico hopes 
now that this attitude will have been appreciated in the 
international context. We will revise the external debt 
finances, adjusting them to the country's capacity to 
pay. The adjustment will also require sacrifices from our 
international creditors, who have been jointly 
responsible in the process of incurring the debt" (18). 
At this same meeting at the National Palace, President de 
la Madrid explained the three criteria that the Mexican 
government would use to start the third debt 
renegotiation and acquisition of new loans: first, the 
adjustment of debt service payments to the country's 
capacity to pay; second, efficient financial mechanisms 
and the reduction of their cost; third, the opening of 
international markets which would allow Mexico to 
increase its exports, in order to strengthen the 
country's capacity to grow and to pay the debt, this last 
one in an international atmosphere conducive to quick and
115
practicable solutions in the cooperation of different 
areas in the international economy.
After this speech by President Miguel de la Madrid 
on 21st February 1986, there began a period of very 
difficult relations between the Mexican financial 
authorities and the international creditors. The Finance 
Minister, Jesus Silva Herzog, stated that the 
negotiations were very difficult and that Mexico had not 
managed to convince international creditors. At this time 
Silva Herzog started to speak of the possibility of 
unilateral measures aiming towards a moratorium, and the 
impossibility of the country meeting its commitments 
under the conditions demanded by the international 
community. Finally, on 17th June 1986, Silva Herzog 
resigned as Minister of Finance. The reasons for Silva 
Herzog's resignation are a matter of dispute, which in 
the absence of formal statements by either Silva Herzog 
or de la Madrid cannot be resolved. Some argue that Silva 
Herzog's position of considering adopting unilateral 
measures including a moratorium, was far too strong for 
de la Madrid's governmental economic policies. Some 
others - such as Susan George (1988) - argue that there 
were personal power conflicts between them, which were 
the result of Silva Herzog's predominant position as debt 
negotiator with the international bankers. These
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negotiations allowed him to develop close personal ties 
with senior members of the Reagan administration (19). 
Some Mexican press editorials even argue that Silva 
Herzog had a strong possibility of being nominated as a 
presidential candidate of the PRI in the 1988 elections. 
The view of the present writer is that on balance the 
central element involved was a policy dispute on the debt 
problem.
President de la Madrid chose another member of his 
cabinet as Minister of Finance, Gustavo Petricioli. With 
this appointment a new economic programme called 
"Programme of Encouragement and Growth" (Programa de 
Aliento y Crecimiento, PAC) was created. Gustavo 
Petricioli then started economic negotiations with the 
international creditors, stressing the idea of paying 
the external debt according to the country's real 
capacity.
On 16th July 1986, the newly-appointed Minister 
Gustavo Petricioli, sent a telex to the international 
banks to start the negotiations again. In gentle tones, 
he argued that Mexico and the international banking 
community had made considerable joint achievements, and 
he used the opportunity to re-affirm Mexico's intention 
to continue the negotiation process. This telex was
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answered by the advisory group of international banks in 
the same gentle tone; they emphasised the importance of 
reaching a negotiated agreement. So Petricioli went to 
Washington and presented the new Mexican economic 
programme, (PAC), to the international financial 
community. When he came back from the USA, he personally 
declared that the PAC was welcomed by the international 
bankers, adding that the relationship between Mexico and 
its creditors had improved considerably. The talks went 
on for a long period, but the main aim of the Mexican 
government at this stage was to re-establish a dialogue 
with the IMF and the World Bank, to coincide with the 
beginning of the renegotiations with the international 
private financial community.
On 1st September 1986, during his fourth State of 
the Nation speech, President de la Madrid presented a 
brief account of the new negotiation. He dedicated a 
complete, long section to the debt problem; in this he 
gave an account of the previous renegotiation processes, 
and spoke of the dramatic fall in international oil 
prices, stressing that this factor was responsible for a 
decrease of US$8,000 million in national income from oil 
exports. In the speech he said: "We are now at the stage 
of renegotiating with the creditor banks the concessions 
of the debt already contracted and the new debt which we
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will need. It is a difficult stage, but we believe in the 
justice of our arguments, the capacity of our 
negotiators, and Mexico’s seriousness and responsibility, 
which have always been in evidence when we meet our 
international obligations" (20).
Two months later, in November 1986, when Petricioli 
appeared before the Chamber of Deputies, he rejected a 
suspension of payments and said that a moratorium was not 
the solution, as the debt would not disappear. Then he 
informed the deputies that the Mexican government was 
trying to obtain a new credit for US$6,000 million to pay 
the old debt. Later on, in February 1987 when he was 
negotiating this new loan with the international 
financial authorities, he once again emphasised that a 
moratorium was not a solution; nevertheless, 
international cooperation was necessary, as Mexico could 
not continue any longer with deflationary economic 
programmes, due to the high social cost that these 
represented for the Mexican population. Finally, on 20th 
March 1987 - thirteen months after President de la 
Madrid’s speech in the National Palace - Gustavo 
Petricioli signed in New York the agreement for a new 
loan of US$7,000 million. Petricioli said then that this 
loan was just a temporary relief.
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After this last credit, President de la Madrid said 
during his fifth State of the Nation speech on 1st 
September 1987, that the debt crisis was continuing. 
Mexicans were living with it, and there had been no 
satisfactory solutions for it. He pointed out that the 
only long-term solution was the joint responsibility of 
creditors and an international context which would allow 
the Mexican economy to grow. "The vast majority of 
Mexicans do not want to declare economic war against the 
world" (21). He particularly asked for the following: the 
cooperation of the industrialised countries, support from 
the international financial organisations, more 
favourable conditions and time for Mexico to pay the 
debt. He stressed that the process of renegotiating the 
debt had not concluded.
In November 1987 the so-called Group of Eight 
consisting of Mexico, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, 
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, met in Acapulco, Mexico. 
This forum provided an opportunity for President de la 
Madrid to talk once again about the joint responsibility 
of all those involved in the external debt problem. When 
de la Madrid received the seven other Presidents of these 
Latin American countries, he said: "The heavy burden of 
the external debt which obliges us to transfer net 
resources abroad, represents a high social and moral cost
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for our countries. Until there is full acceptance of both 
joint responsibility and the urgency of political 
negotiations in which all those involved take part, a 
satisfactory solution will not be achieved. Today it is 
not possible to defer the adjustment of the debt services 
to Latin America's capacity to pay and need to grow. We 
are not denying our international obligations, but our 
first duty is to our people and their present and future 
welfare" (22). This Mexican position created a consensus 
and the Acapulco Declaration reflected these feelings. 
The Presidents of the eight Latin American countries 
signed a final agreement on 29th November 1987. This 
agreement established that: "The debt service has to be 
adjusted to each country's capacity to pay. There should 
be joint responsibility between creditors and debtor 
nations. It is necessary to establish contingency 
formulae which will diminish the negative effect of 
external factors. So far, the present negotiations have 
not reflected these three principles. If an agreement 
including these points is not reached soon, some 
countries, according to their particular circumstances, 
will be obliged to take unilateral decisions to allow 
them to limit their debt service payments according to 
their need for internal development" (23). This last 
sentence, speaking of unilateral decisions, may not 
necessarily have suited President de la Madrid's speech;
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nevertheless, this was the agreement reached by the Group 
of Eight Latin American countries.
Later, on 19th January 1988, President de la Madrid 
attended the meeting of the Group of Seven (USA, UK, 
France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, and Canada) in 
Stockholm, Sweden. There he demanded an exact, just and 
definitive answer to the external debt problem. He went 
even further, pointing out that the production of arms 
was partly responsible for the imbalance and disorder in 
the international economic system. On 26th March 1988, 
there was another opportunity for President de la Madrid 
to express his point of view towards the external debt 
problem. At that time, President Marco Vinicio Cerezo 
from Guatemala went to Mexico and in Cancun signed a 
joint communique with President de la Madrid. This 
emphasised the urgency of changing the debt service 
payments of both countries according to their real 
capacity to pay, taking into account specific development 
perspectives. The joint communique also agreed to reverse 
the transfer of resources to enable the countries to 
expand their economic growth and social progress and that 
of the other debtor nations. They also gave all their 
support to the Group of Eight's Acapulco Declaration of 
November 1987 and the permanent mechanism of consultation
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and political concertation that was created by these 
eight Latin American countries.
During the celebrations of the international 
workers’ day, 1st May 1988, the Finance Minister Gustavo 
Petricioli announced that Mexico would seek the reduction 
of its debt service payments to no more than 3 per cent 
of its gross national product, that is, approximately 50 
per cent less than what Mexico was paying at the time. 
Three weeks later, during a meeting organised by the 
American Chamber of Commerce, Petricioli said that the 
Mexican government would try to reduce the annual payment 
of the external debt service by between US$3,600 and 
US$4,000 million, through new arrangements that would 
also reduce the amount of capital.
During his trip to the USA on 14th June 1988, 
Gustavo Petricioli explained to the American Treasury 
Minister James Baker, that Mexico needed to reduce its 
high debt service by about 25 per cent, so that it could 
allocate more resources to internal economic development. 
No explanation of the 25 per cent figure was publicly 
given.
On 1st July 1988 Petricioli presented to the 
international financial community a plan for Mexico to
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reduce its debt by US$10,000 million. He proposed a 
guarantee fund in which the contributors would not give 
new money to Mexico, but rather a contingent credit, 
which would be used if Mexico was unable to meet its 
commitments. An alternative solution which he presented 
was a cooperative accord between governments such as 
Japan, the UK, France, Germany and Spain; this would 
permit the exchange of debt for new bonds, taking 
advantage of the secondary market discount to Mexico's 
benefit. Petricioli emphasised that Mexico would not take 
unilateral decisions, and that it would not stop paying, 
nor fix an amount of debt repayment unilaterally, as this 
was not a solution to the problem. Therefore the Mexican 
financial authorities would continue to look for ways of 
reaching agreement, and of achieving international 
cooperation through means such as the bonds. Two weeks 
later, during the 116th anniversary of the death of a 
national hero, Benito Juarez, Petricioli explained the 
same idea: that the negotiation with the international 
financial community, the banks, and the creditor 
governments, would involve a new mechanism of paying the 
debt with discount.
By August 1988 the political speeches of the 
opposition during the new presidential electoral campaign 
spoke increasingly of a unilateral moratorium. As a
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reaction to this, on 4th August 1988 President Miguel de 
la Madrid made a remark during the inauguration of the 
Fourth National Banking Meeting in Monterrey (a large 
industrialized city in the north of the country). He said 
that the Mexican Government would maintain serious and 
firm negotiations to reduce external debt service 
payments, and rejected any possibility of "demagogic acts 
or irresponsible statements in favour of a unilateral 
moratorium which come from the electoral tactics of 
opposition parties and not from any responsible 
person"(24). Moreover, as the editorials of the national 
press started to speculate that the government would 
consider a moratorium if the rates of interest did not 
fall by 50 per cent, the Minister of Finance had to deny 
these speculations during the same national banking 
meeting. He stated once more that Mexico would look for 
ways of reaching agreement through new options of payment 
and if necessary by reducing these payments gradually, 
without going to unnecessary counterproductive 
confrontations.
A month later, on 1st September 1988 and during his 
sixth and last State of the Nation speech, President de 
la Madrid said that "the high external debt service 
represents a dead weight for the economic development of 
the country. The problem of the debt is not solved yet,
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in spite of the great advances already made. It is 
necessary to insist on a greater degree of joint 
responsibility and understanding from the creditors, to
solve the problem they helped to create" (25). President
\
de la Madrid was then asking the international financial 
community for a more flexible attitude towards Mexico’s 
external debt. This remark was wholly in line with all 
that he had argued for over his six years of presidency. 
It does, however, lead to a problem which in the end only 
the president can resolve: why did he not take the 
numerous opportunities for a change of policy, especially 
in September 1985 after the earthquakes? We can
speculate that the factors involved include the 
international economic pressure which the capitalist 
world could have put upon Mexico’s shoulders, such as 
trade isolation and economic boycott; nevertheless, a 
more important factor was the political pressure that 
the Reagan administration could have exerted upon de la 
Madrid's government. One way or another, the fact remains 
that the political centre of the president did not change 
even though a Finance Minister resigned with reservations 
about the policy.
To sum up, the Mexican government effectively agreed 
to continue repaying the debt. However, it insisted on 
the need to reduce capital and interest repayments,
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emphasising the costly devastation caused by the 
earthquake in 1985. In other words, the government agreed 
to meet its obligations while insisting on the need to 
reduce them.
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changing horses in the middle of a dangerous stream, 
Silva is suddenly sacked in June and replaced by civil 
servant Gustavo Petricioli, little-known outside Mexico. 
Petricioli is a friend of the President of Mexico; Silva 
is perhaps too close for his own good to Fed chairman 
Paul Volcker, with whom he is wont to take bone-fishing 
holidays off the Yucatan coast." p.209.
(20) De la Madrid Hurtado, Miguel, Fourth Presidential 
State of the Nation Speech, the Union Congress, Mexico 
City, 1st September 1986.
(21) De la Madrid Hurtado, Miguel, Fifth Presidential 
State of the Nation Speech, the Union Congress, Mexico 
City, 1st September 1987.
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(22) De la Madrid Hurtado, Miguel, Speech given before 
the Latin American Presidents of the Group of Eight, 
Acapulco, Guerrero, Mexico, November 1987.
(23) Agreement signed by the Presidents of Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela about the Deist Problems of the Region, 
Acapulco, Guerrero, Mexico, 29 November 1987.
(24) De la Madrid Hurtado, Miguel, Speech given at the IV 
National Banking Meeting, Monterrey, N.L., Mexico, 4 
August 1988.
(25) De la Madrid Hurtado, Miguel, Sixth Presidential 
State of the Nation Speech, the Union Congress, Mexico 
City, 1st September 1988.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Changing Character of the Political Debate within the 
Union Congress
This chapter aims to demonstrate that in spite of 
the political debate and controversy which took place in 
different political organisations, the government did not 
change its economic policy. This debate, which went on in 
the Union Congress in both the Chambers of Deputies and 
Senators, did not influence the institutional executive 
power. Further, though it is written in the Mexican 
Constitution that the executive power must ask the Union 
Congress for authorisation before signing any 
international economic agreement, in practice, as this 
chapter will demonstrate, this principle made no 
difference to executive action. The remarks made and the 
debate led by the deputies representing the political 
opposition were an indication of discontent with the 
official economic policies. This discontent, by being 
channelled through official institutions, avoided the 
problems of confrontation outside them.
It should be stressed that the debate, though not 
affecting the policy of the government, did have a 
significant effect on government unity. It precipitated, 
inside the official party, different opinions which 
divided the members of the same party, to the extent that
131
a new party was formed after a fraction of the official 
party left it.
Finally, the chapter will also demonstrate that what 
began as a discussion of the debt crisis ended as a 
political crisis. It will be noticed that during the 
first five years of this political regime, the Union 
Congress debated the debt crisis and how to negotiate it 
with the international creditors; however, during the 
last year the deputies and senators were far more 
concerned with the forthcoming elections and in 1989 with 
the legitimacy of the newly-elected government and the 
allegedly fraudulent elections by which it gained power, 
rather than with the external debt payments.
The external debt debate took a particular shape in 
Congress. There, members of both chambers, deputies and 
senators, made individual and group declarations, 
according to particular circumstances. The nature of the 
debate here changed during the six-year period, 
fluctuating between positions which held that Mexico 
could borrow more money because its capacity to pay had 
not been exhausted, and positions which firmly urged a 
moratorium. It is most important to note here that up to 
1988 the Chamber of Senators was exclusively monopolised 
by the ruling party, in other words, all senators
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belonged to the PRI, while the Chamber of Deputies had a 
small representation of other political parties which had 
been reinforced after the political reform of 1979. Here 
follows a chronological account of the most relevant 
positions as published in the national press.
In an attempt to support both the government's 
economic policies set out in the Immediate Programme of 
Economic Reconstruction (PIRE, 1st December 1982) and the 
first external debt agreement with the IMF (which were 
discussed in the previous chapter) on 26th September 
1983, just after President de la Madrid's first State of 
the Nation Speech, the secretary of the Chamber of 
Deputies' financial commission and member of the PRI, 
Ricardo Cavazos, declared that Mexico's debt limit had 
not been reached (1), and suggested that the country 
could borrow more money to implement the government's 
economic plan. Six months later, by 1st April 1984, the 
same deputy recognised that it was necessary to find 
global solutions to the debt problem; however, he 
asserted that those global solutions should not go to 
the extreme of forming a club of debtor countries (2).
Meanwhile, in the Chamber of Senators, members were 
in favour of the renegotiation of Mexico's external debt. 
This viewpoint was expressed by Americo Villarreal
Guerra, Heladio Ramirez Lopez, and Jose^ Socorro Salcido 
in an interview given to the media on 10th April 1984
(3). They argued that it was important to negotiate the 
extension of payments according to Mexico's capacity to 
meet its commitments and without reducing its development 
programme. As the policy of the international financial 
institutions was at the time to raise the rate of 
interest considerably, the senators' observations touched 
on these points. They recommended support for developing 
nations by the international financial institutions, 
because to raise the rate of interest indiscriminately 
and unilaterally could produce an international financial 
collapse which would also affect the creditor nations.
Before going to the extraordinary assembly called by 
the Latin American Parliament Group for 8th July 1984 in 
San Jose*, Costa Rica, the Chamber of Senators discussed 
and agreed on 6th June that the external debt 
negotiations would have to be "bilateral". According to 
the senators, each individual country would have to 
adjust its external debt negotiations to the 
characteristics of its own debt and economy (4).
As a result of the decision of the international 
financial organizations to re-structure and extend the 
external debt payment periods, the Senator Miguel Borge
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Martin and the Deputy Bernardo Batiz Va^zquez, members of 
the PRI, declared in a newspaper interview on 7th June 
1984 (5) that this re-structuring package was a 
recognition of Mexico's responsible behaviour in the 
international context. This debt re-structuring caused 
speculation among some radical political groups that 
there might be a moratorium later. As a reaction to this 
speculation, on 26th June 1984 Senator Renato Sales 
Gasque, another member of the ruling PRI party, stated 
that Mexico should not declare a moratorium; on the 
contrary, the country should try to maintain the 
bilateral and multilateral negotiation process until it 
was understood by international creditors that the 
external debt was a political problem as well as a 
financial one (6), in that the government faced internal 
political risks because of the debt.
Three months later, the nature of the dialogue 
changed. On 12th September 1984 the Secretary of the 
Finance, Currency, Credit and Credit Institutions 
Commission of the Chamber of Senators who was also an ex- 
Minister of Finance and ex-Ambassador of Mexico to the 
USA, Hugo B. Margain, stated that the external public 
debt renegotiations did not give the right to the 
international banks to interfere in Mexico's economic 
decisions; nor should it cause the subordination of
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Mexico to any creditor group (7). A few days later he 
declared in a newspaper interview (25th September 1984) 
that in Mexico the economic readjustment had caused 
social problems, that social discontent was a reality, 
and thus it was important to contain this discontent so 
that it would not explode while the country was in an 
economic crisis (8). The political nature of the crisis, 
especially in terms of political destabilisation, was 
thus being emphasised.
More than six months later, on 17th April 1985, the 
secretary of the Financial Commission of the Chamber of 
Deputies, Ricardo Cavazos, stated that the country should 
base its development on its own resources, and should try 
to improve the industrial sector which had to improve and 
increase its levels of production and efficiency to be 
able to compete abroad (9). Thus an economic 
restructuring was also being encouraged as a response to 
the crisis.
On 23rd July 1985 the Minister of Finance, Jesus 
Silva Herzog, went to the Chamber of Deputies, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter. In a response to his 
message, deputy Ricardo Cavazos said in a newspaper 
interview that in fact the debt restructuring referred to 
by the Finance Minister the previous day was equivalent
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to a partial moratorium, even if the financial 
authorities did not call it by this name. He said what 
was important in the renegotiation was that the country 
would be able to have the necessary economic resources 
for a minimum of economic growth, which would prevent the 
lowering of the standard of living of the Mexican people 
(10).
Deputy Abraham Martinez Rivero, representing the 
labour sector of the PRI said on 14th August 1985 that 
Mexico could not ignore its international commitments, as 
the country had so far shown the capacity, seriousness, 
and traditional prestige to face its external debt (11). 
Deputy Martinez Rivero was responding to the statement 
that Carlos Tello Macias had made in Havana, Cuba, during 
the external debt conference. At the same time Senator 
Patrocinio Gonzalez Blanco, also of the PRI, declared on 
2nd September 1985 that Congress would not approve an 
economic policy which would open the doors to further 
external indebtedness (12). A few days later, on 10th 
September 1985, and during the second day of analysis of 
the Third Presidential State of the Nation Speech in the 
Chamber of Senators, a Senator of the PRI from the 
federal state of Quintana Roo, Miguel Borge Martin, 
stated that the country was seeking international harmony 
by renegotiating its external debt payments (13). He
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added that by renegotiating its external debt, Mexico 
wanted to introduce solid and consistent changes into the 
international financial system which would bring harmony 
to international relations.
Up to September 1985 the declarations made by 
deputies and senators to the media supported President de 
la Madrid's and Silva Herzog's external debt 
renegotiation strategies. In one way or another, deputies 
and senators provided an image through the media that the 
country's economy was prepared to borrow more money and 
pay it back, and that it was far better to renegotiate 
the debt and keep peace with the financial community 
rather than declare even a partial moratorium on 
payments. Nevertheless, the natural disaster of the 
September earthquakes made members of Congress think 
twice about the government's economic strategy, and in 
some cases even promote popular forums to consult the 
people about their feelings towards these external debt 
negotiations. To what extent these consultation forums 
had the support of the Executive, in an attempt to open 
the debate and give it a democratic face, or were an 
authentic outcry from the members of the legislative 
body, remains a matter of dispute, which we have not 
managed to resolve; but it was likely not to have had 
unambiguous executive support, because it opened the way
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to increased criticism of economic policy. This was one 
way in which the debt crisis led to a political crisis. 
What is certain is that one way or another consultation 
forums were organized.
Thus, during the first week of October 1985, the 
Chamber of Deputies launched a convocation to establish a 
large forum for popular consultation about the management 
of the external debt. This convocation was announced by 
the leader of the PRI majority, Deputy Eliseo Mendoza 
Berrueto, on 2nd October 1985 --it should be noted that 
this day has a special meaning for the collective 
conscience of Mexican citizens, as it was the day when in 
1968, just before the inauguration of the International 
Olympic Games in Mexico City, hundreds of students and 
left-wing supporters were killed by the army in 
Tlatelolco Square. This convocation elicited reactions 
among deputies from the different political parties. The 
PAN (Partido Accio'n Nacional) Deputy, Jose" Angel 
Conchello stated that his party was against Mexico 
declaring a suspension of its debt interest payments. The 
PSUM (Partido Socialista Unificado de Mexico) Deputy, 
Demetrio Vallejo, the PMT (Partido Mexicano de los 
Trabajadores) Deputy, Herberto Castillo, and the PRT 
(Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores) Deputy, 
Pedro Penaloza, insisted that due to the particular
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emergency caused by the earthquakes, the financial 
authorities should use the opportunity to declare a 
moratorium (14).
The month of October 1985 was full of declarations 
from members of Congress on similar themes. On 7th 
October an anonymous deputy representing the workers 
sector of the PRI, declared to the media that Mexico was 
not able to ask the international banks for more loans, 
as it did not have sufficient capacity to pay back these 
loans, thus it was the right time to seek new economic 
strategies for recovery rather than new renegotiations
(15). On the same day, the leader of the Chamber of 
Senators, Senator Antonio Riva Palacio Lo'pez, stated that 
Mexico would pay its international debt, but in 
favourable conditions; thus it was determined that new 
negotiations with the international banks would be held
(16). On 16th October members of the Senate, through its 
Commission on Economic Development, made a special 
declaration to support the financial authorities in their 
financial strategies by urging that a moratorium on 
interest payments would allow economic growth (17). At 
the same time, on 20th October the Deputy for the federal 
state of Aguascalientes, Eliseo Mendoza Berrueto, stated 
that it was not possible to talk about a moratorium on
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the external debt as it was the people of Mexico alone 
who would choose the path to follow (18).
So controversial were the external debt 
renegotiations which the government agreed with the 
international community that on 24th October 1985 the 
opposition parties made a joint proposition in Congress 
demanding that the government should not ask the 
international banks for more credits, as it was the right 
of the Legislature and not the Executive to analyse and 
decide on the amount of money that came from abroad as 
loans. Members of the PAN, PSUM, and PRT expressed their 
concern. The PAN's (National Action Party) view was 
expressed through the Deputy Jose^ Angel Conchello. He 
said that the Mexican financial authorities were using 
the September earthquakes as an excuse to borrow more 
money when they knew that the country was not able to pay 
it back. He stated that his party wanted people to 
acquire awareness, during the popular consultation, of 
the unjust origin of the debt, and to learn the economic 
cost of a moratorium, as well as to find new ways of 
achieving economic development not based upon external 
debt (19). The representative of the PSUM (United Mexican 
Socialist Party) Deputy Jorge Alcocer demanded that the 
Government immediately stop any negotiation aiming to 
obtain new external credits. He proposed that a
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moratorium on the debt service payments should be 
declared as soon as possible, as a first step towards the 
elaboration of a new payment settlement (20). Finally, 
the representative of the PRT (Workers' Revolutionary 
Party), Deputy Pedro Penaloza, said that the Government 
should declare a moratorium and use the money that it 
would have paid to solve national problems (21).
Two days later, on 26th October 1985, the Chamber of 
Senators agreed a resolution that if the external debt 
payments involved an economic reverse, massive 
unemployment, the destruction of democracy, and 
widespread sacrifice of the Mexican people, the debt 
should not be paid. The Chamber of Senators added that 
even if Mexico's firm intention was to pay its external 
debt, the economic and social development process should 
not be halted (22). A couple of days later, on 28th 
October 1985, the Financial Commission of the Deputies' 
Chamber stated that a partial moratorium could not be 
ruled out if it was needed to achieve the country's 
recovery. The Commission recognised that it was not 
feasible just to pay the interest on the external debt, 
but it was also necessary for creditor and debtor nations 
to find joint solutions, without causing economic 
stringency which would halt the development of the 
nations involved. The Financial Commission rejected the
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statements made by some parts of the private sector such 
as the declaration that Mexico's economic system was 
exhausted (23).
The first regional forum of popular consultation on 
the management of the external debt, organized by members 
of the Chamber of Deputies, took place in the northern 
city of Tijuana, Baja California Norte, on 8th November
1985. There, the President of the Deputies' Chamber's 
Great Commission, Eliseo Mendoza Berrueto, stated that 
debtor and creditor nations should make some sacrifice in 
an attempt to find a joint and more just solution to the 
debt crisis. In his view, both sorts of countries should 
promote steady economic growth, generate employment, and 
achieve the necessities of social development without 
impairing national sovereignty (24). This forum was 
attended by representatives of the private sector, 
workers, peasants, and federal deputies of the different 
political parties. 278 proposals concerning what might be 
done were received from five of the northwestern federal 
states: 97 from Baja California Norte, 156 from Baja 
California Sur, 56 from Sonora, 36 from Sinaloa, and 33 
from Chihuahua.
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The second regional forum of popular consultation 
was on 10th November 1985 in the city of Toluca, Estado 
de Me'xico. This regional forum included the participation 
of representatives of seven federal states, namely 
Estado de Mexico, Hidalgo, Morelos, Puebla, San Luis 
Potosi, Tlaxcala and Queretaro. All of them presented 
proposals which were put forward by members of the 
different political parties, industrial and merchant 
representatives, professional associations, individual 
academics, and members of the Autonomous University of 
the State of Mexico (UAEM). There, the Deputies Pedro 
Armando Gomez, and Miguel Angel H e r r e n a s  stated that it 
was necessary to meet international commitments, without 
halting national progress (25). They basically supported 
the President's thesis on payment and growth at the same 
time as they declared that by doing this Mexico would act 
with responsibility towards those who believed in it.
On 11th November 1985, the Economic Commission of 
the Chamber of Senators recommended that Mexico should 
not ask the IMF and international banks for more loans , 
and also stated that a moratorium, as the opposition 
political parties wanted, would generate even more 
serious problems. Nevertheless, the commission pointed 
out that it was important to promote a partial and 
negotiated suspension of external debt payments, to avoid
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reprisals from the international banks (26). It was also
said that each country should solve its economic problem
individually, though it was important to achieve
solidarity among all the debtor nations in reaching a
similar renegotiation. To achieve this, it was necessary
to gain the understanding of the international banks and
the developed nations. Meanwhile, the director of the
institute of political, economic, and social studies of
/
the PRI, Senator Angel Accedes Sauced, declared on 12th 
November 1985 in a press conference, that the problem of 
the debt had not yet been overcome, and debt service 
payments represented a huge burden to the country, thus 
the PRI considered that Mexico should still look for a 
negotiated settlement short of a moratorium; in other 
words, the official party was still prepared to go along 
with the internal cost, rather than follow the option of 
declaring a unilateral suspension of payments (27).
Later on, during the month of December (20th 
December 1985), the President of the Foreign Affairs 
Commission of the Chamber of Senators and member of the 
PRI, Senator Alejandro Sobarzo Loaiza, stated in a 
newspaper interview that Mexico's level of debt did not 
represent any risk for the stability of the country. He 
added that the Baker Plan opened new prospects for the 
solution of the external debt problem, as this American
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programme implied that the world powers accepted that the 
world debt problem had to be solved between debtor and 
creditor nations (28). A month later, on 22nd January 
1986, a more critical view came from Senator Patrocinio 
Gonzalez Blanco Garrison (PRI). He said that if the 
international price of oil fell more than the rate of 
interest, the Mexican government would be forced to 
cancel investment programmes and to renegotiate the 
external debt according to the country's ability to pay. 
He added that Mexico was prepared to meet its 
international commitments, but not if they represented 
the sacrifice of the economic development of the country 
and the people's wealth. He suggested that if 
negotiations were needed, these should be bilateral and 
in accordance with the capacity of the Mexican economy, 
not by sacrificing further the Mexican people (29). Later 
on, during the meeting of the Permanent Commission of the 
Union Congress (29th January 1986), on behalf of the 
PRI's majority, Senator Angel Aceves Saucedo from Puebla, 
stated that the country's situation regarding the 
external debt was moving dangerously towards intolerable 
extremes; thus it was not possible to postpone projects 
of high social priority which were indispensable to the 
achievement of economic growth and social development. On 
behalf of the PRI's majority again, he declared that 
Mexico's position was in favour of negotiation, rather
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than confrontation. Mexico had prestige, credit and a 
large negotiating capacity because of the way in which it 
had met its debt payment commitments (30). Senator Aceves 
Saucedo added that he shared the Finance Minister Jesus 
Silva Herzog's declaration that "Mexico's responsibility 
towards its people was the limit of its contract 
obligations".
However, members of other political parties had long 
held a different view. Deputy Alejandro Gascon Mercado 
from the Revolutionary Socialist Party (PRS) was of the 
opinion that Mexico should default and that this was the 
right time to do so. He made this statement on 3rd 
February 1986 before leaving Mexico City for Havana, 
where he was going to take part in the Third 
International Congress of the Cuban Communist Party. He 
emphasised that the solution would be for Mexico to 
default on its debt and not press for a moratorium, as 
this would only prolong the problem and the country's 
suffering. He argued that the financial crisis which most 
countries were suffering was due to an aggressive policy 
imposed by the international financial institutions 
allied to imperialism. He said that a moratorium was an 
option which would allow Mexico to postpone some of its 
financial problems and prevent the rates of unemployment 
and inflation rising further; but it would only be a
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short-term solution, and in the long term the country 
would suffer its negative repercussions (31).
Three days later (6th February 1986), following the 
same line, a member of the ruling party PRI, the leader 
of the Mexican Workers Confederation (CTM) in the federal 
state of Nayarit, and Senator of that federal entity, 
Rigoberto Ochoa Zaragoza stated that it was no longer 
possible to keep sending money to the international 
banks, money which was the product of the effort and work 
of the Mexican people. He suggested the suspension of 
interest payments to avoid greater damage to the already 
damaged national economy. Senator Ochoa Zaragoza made 
clear that the working class could no longer stand major 
sacrifices. Its level of poverty had reached the limit 
and to continue could run the risk of social unrest. He 
added that since Mexico's external debt was unpayable, 
and as Mexico's creditors were intransigent, the country 
should start studying seriously the positive side of 
stopping interest payments, which would avoid major 
damage to the already poor Mexican population (32). Just 
a few days later (14th February 1986) another leader of 
the Mexican Workers Confederation (CTM) in the federal 
state of Guerrero, Senator Filiberto Vigueras Lazaro, 
stated in a newspaper interview that the working class 
was in favour of the moratorium, and that if members of
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the private sector still thought that the external debt 
could be paid, it was because they had enough food to 
eat. He added that the workers' sector was in favour of 
the moratorium because it had been the one which had 
suffered most from the economic crisis. The majority of 
workers just received a minimum salary and could no 
longer stand the economic crisis (33).
As a reaction to President Miguel de la Madrid's 
announcement on 21st February 1986 - mentioned in the 
previous chapter - members of the Chamber of Senators 
gave their opinion on various occasions. President de la 
Madrid made clear that Mexico had been an exceptionally 
responsible country with its external financial 
relations; it had avoided confrontation and rejected 
unilateral solutions; thus he hoped that this attitude 
had been appreciated in the international context, as the 
country had the intention to carry on paying, but only 
according to its capacity. These presidential comments 
were picked up by some senators who individually 
expressed their concern. On 24th February 1986, Senator 
Alejandro Sobarzo Loaiza from the federal state of Sonora 
and member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the 
Chamber of Senators, stated that the answer of the 
international banks to Mexico's external debt did not 
depend on the goodwill of one party, but it had a legal
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base. International law allowed the revision and change 
of previously agreed laws in an international commitment 
(34). A day later (25th February 1986) a group of 
senators from the ruling party (PRI) demanded that 
international creditors should give a positive answer to 
what President de la Madrid proposed. Senator Patrocinio 
Gonzalez Blanco from the federal state of Chiapas, 
Senator Armando Trasvina Taylor from Baja California Sur, 
Senator Ernesto Milla'n Escalante from Sinaloa, Senator 
Hector Va'zquez Paredes from Tlaxcala, and senator Andres 
Valdivia Aguilera from Aguascalientes, indicated that the 
international credit banks should seriously consider 
Mexico's proposal to the international financial 
community; not only because that was the key for Mexico 
to overcome its economic problems, but also to avoid 
negative consequences that could even affect the highly 
developed nations (35). There was also a reaction from 
the deputies to the presidential message. Deputy Rodolfo 
Mene'ndez from the ruling party (PRI) and secretary of the 
Commission for Patrimony and Industrial Promotion of the 
Chamber of Deputies said that in fact President de la 
Madrid's proposal was a moratorium with a negotiable 
character, that is to say, a revision of Mexico's 
international commitments with the international 
financial community. It was a matter of adapting the 
external payments to Mexico's real capacity to pay, but
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not as a unilateral decision (36). Criticism of the 
presidential proposal came from the opposition in the 
form of Deputy Jorge Alcocer from the PSUM (United 
Mexican Socialist Party). He stated on the same 25th 
February that the previous week's presidential proposal 
had a basic defect, namely, it did not say how to solve 
the financial crisis (37). Three days later the president 
of the Financial Commission of the Chamber of Deputies , 
Deputy Luis Orci Gandara (PRI), replied to Deputy 
Rodolfo Menendez that the presidential proposal was not 
equivalent to the announcement of a moratorium, but was 
the result of serious negotiations now involving the 
international creditors (38).
Two weeks later in the Union Congress Permanent 
Commission, the left opposition stated that there was no 
coherence between what the Finance Minister, Jesus Silva 
Herzog, said to some deputies in a closed meeting in 
which he stated that there would be no new credits, and 
the negotiations abroad to find US$2,000 million in 
addition to US$4,000 that the Union Congress had already 
authorized. The opposition voiced its opinion through the 
leader of the PMT (Mexican Workers Party), Deputy 
Herberto Castillo, Deputy Jorge Alcocer member of the 
PSUM (Mexican Socialist United Party), and Deputy Jesus 
Gonz/lez Schmall of the PAN (National Action Party) (39).
151
Meanwhile, on 2nd April 1986, the leader of the 
Chamber of Senators, Antonio Riva Palacio Lopez, said 
that Mexico had not envisaged adopting unilateral 
decisions regarding the debt service payments; 
nevertheless it might have to adopt them if conditions 
forced it to do so (40). A week later, Deputy Luis Orci 
Gandara (President of the Finances Commission of the 
Chamber of Deputies) in a newspaper interview said that 
the federal government did not have the intention of 
declaring a moratorium on the external debt, but would 
choose the best options to promote the economic and 
social development of the country (41). On 11th April, 
deputy Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo (PSUM) said that Mexico, 
like many other debtor nations, should not carry on 
having its scarce economic resources removed to the 
international financial centres. He added that the 
postponement of the capital payments, which were the 
result of the negotiations, would just aggravate the 
economic crisis (42).
From then onwards, there were individual remarks 
made by certain senators during the month of April and 
June 1986. Among these, Senator Humberto Hernandez Haddad 
(PRI) from the federal state of Tabasco, criticised the 
Baker Plan saying that it was insufficient. He said that 
the Baker Plan was a positive step although insufficient
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because its initiatives were oriented towards achieving a
cash flow so that Mexico could pay its external debt, and
this was not the solution. The plan should instead design
options for the country's economic development (43).
Senator Alfonso Zegbe Zanen (PRI) from the federal state
of Puebla, said that the international banks would have
to give up their demands on the debtor countries, or
these would lead to a worldwide financial collapse, in
which the creditor nations would be the most seriously
harmed (44). On 11th June 1986 Senator Gonzalo Martinez
Corbala7 from the federal state of San Luis Potosi",
Senator Heliodoro Herna'ndez Loza from Jalisco, Senator 
/
Angel Aceves Saucedo from Puebla, and Senator Myrna 
Esther Hoyos de Navarrete from Yucatan, declared that 
Mexico was politically prepared to face a unilateral 
decision regarding the external debt, as it was no longer 
possible to divert economic resources which were needed 
to attend to the Mexican people's demands (45). Later on, 
Senators Luis Jose'" Dorantes Segovia from Hidalgo and 
Manuel Ramos Gurrion from Veracruz declared that Mexico 
would not limit itself to the demands made by the 
international banks, and that the government should give 
an answer to the needs and desperation felt by the people 
if it wanted to avoid the economic difficulties leading 
to political unrest (46).
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To sum up, there were clear divergences within the 
PRI, and political opponents were developing a plausible 
alternative strategy. This situation continued later in
1986. After the 23rd June 1986 when the new Minister of 
Finances, Gustavo Petricioli, announced the government's 
new economic programme, the "Programme of Encouragement 
and Growth" (Programa de Aliento y Crecimiento, PAC) - as 
was mentioned in the previous chapter - there were 
reactions from members of both Chambers. Senator 
Rigoberto Ochoa Zaragoza, representing the workers sector 
(CTM) of the PRI, said that if the new economic strategy 
did not bring the results that the population wanted, it 
would be difficult to stop workers, the unemployed, the 
homeless and people without health insurance from 
protesting. He added that it was a pity that the Finance 
Minister's announcement gave more attention to supporting 
the private sector with new fiscal policies, than to 
workers' salaries (47). On the other hand, Senator 
Salvador Neme Castillo, secretary of the Great Commission 
of the Chamber of Senators, said that it was important to 
maintain austerity measures in order to prevent the 
economy from moving into a recession, and that it was 
vital to take all the necessary measures to revitalize 
industrial production (48). Supporting the same line of 
thought, Senator Guillermo Mercado Romero stated that the 
programme of development (PAC) was the path that in the
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medium and long term would save the country's economy 
(49). Senator Armando Trasvina Taylor and Deputy Alfonso 
Reyes Medrano (CTM) supported the government by saying 
that the new economic policy would allow increased 
development and would open important options for meeting 
the external debt payments according to the Mexico's 
possibilities (50).
Meanwhile the opposition parties had a different 
perspective. Members of the Populist Socialist Party 
(PPS) stated that the Minister of Finances' new economic 
programme (PAC) proposed a search for new ways to pay 
what was possible for the country, but made clear that 
the debt was morally, politically and economically 
unpayable; and if the government did not wholly suspend 
interest payments, the external debt would carry on 
growing disproportionately (51). Members of the United 
Mexican Socialist Party (PSUM) declared that the anti­
recession programme announced by the Finance Minister did 
not represent any new alternative for the Mexican 
economy, and that unfortunately it was not on the agenda 
of the Mexican government to declare a suspension of the 
external debt payments (52). Members of the political 
committee of the Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT) said 
that the new economic policies were totally removed from 
the real emergency situation which the country was living
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through; thus they were destined to fail, unless the debt 
was totally cancelled (53).
Later on, once the chambers of senators and deputies 
resumed their activities, the deputies approved on 1st 
October 1986 the issuing of a summons to the financial 
authorities heading the external debt renegotiations 
abroad, to appear before the Union Congress. The 
financial authorities were to appear before deputies of 
the nine political parties to explain the agreement that 
the authorities signed in Washington with the World Bank 
and the IMF. There was a conflict of interest between the 
representatives of the nine political parties. While a 
member of the PRI (Deputy Maria Esther Sherman) presented 
this initiative, members of the opposition (PSUM, PMT, 
PRT, PPS, and PAN) represented by Deputy Jorge Alcocer, 
pointed out that the Chamber of Deputies "...always 
summon (cabinet members in charge of external debt 
negotiations) for an explanation of past events rather 
than future events" (54). The opposition (PAN, PSUM, PMT, 
PRT, and PPS) demanded a discussion of the implications 
of the negotiations held in Washington without the 
authorisation of the Union Congress; nevertheless, this 
demand was denied when Deputy Pablo Pascual Moncayo (PRI) 
proposed that the financial authorities should explain in
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detail the agreements signed with the international banks 
on behalf of Mexico.
Deputies from the official party (PRI) refused to 
summon the Minister of Finance, Gustavo Petricioli, 
directly, while Deputy Jose" Angel Conchello (PAN) said 
that the Union Congress, using its legitimate 
constitutional power and representing a nation which had 
incurred a heavy debt, had to receive explanations not 
only from the team of financial authorities which 
renegotiated the debt in Washington, but also from the 
Minister of Finance himself, Gustavo Petricioli, so as 
to explain what historical responsibilities the Mexican 
people were being forced to face. He added that now an 
extra debt had been contracted behind the Mexican 
people's back without first consulting the Chamber of 
Deputies. Credits had been accepted for the next fiscal 
year, without authorisation from the Union Congress; and 
all this was anti-constitutional (55). After this, Deputy 
Jorge Alcocer (PSUM) asked how the President could 
endanger credits for the next year (1987) if the Union 
Congress had not yet authorised the amount of debt the 
country could afford for that year. The financial 
authorities had already made a pact with the 
international banks, and had left the Union Congress in
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the sad and awkward position of having to endorse this 
decision.
Later on, Deputy Pedro Penaloza (PRT) criticised 
the financial authorities who felt proud of the 
negotiations conducted in Washington, although they had 
damaged national sovereignty and had once more struck a 
blow against the Mexican people. In an attempt to contest 
this view, Deputy Rafael Lopez Zepeda (PRI, 
representative of the Union of Bank Workers) pointed out 
that the tone in which the opposition deputies were 
speaking denoted anger and resentment at the agreement 
signed in Washington, which in his view was innovative, 
would preserve national sovereignty, and recognised 
Mexican interests and the will of the Mexican population 
as heard in various regional popular consultation forums.
During the months of October and November 1986 the 
regional popular consultation forums continued. On 24th 
October social organizations, private business 
organizations, workers' unions, and various political 
sectors of the northern city of Monterrey, gathered to 
meet and discuss their general feeling about the debt 
issue.
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As the Union Congress ended its sessions in 
December, very little was heard before July 1987. During 
this month (llth-14th) there was the celebration of the 
Mexico-Soviet and the Mexico-Austria Interparliamentary 
meetings. On these occasions, Senator Antonio Riva 
Palacio (PRI), President of the Permanent Commission of 
the Union Congress, emphasised that the payment of the 
Mexican external debt had a limit. He said that Mexico 
should pay but not at the cost of reducing its population 
to abject poverty (56).
On 1st December 1987, Senator Hugo B. Margain (PRI, 
Senator from Mexico City District and former Finance 
Minister) in a meeting with American legislators, former 
governors, researchers, lawyers, and politicians stated 
that Mexico was about to negotiate debt payments of up to 
5% of its Gross National Product. He asked why, if 
Germany in 1945 had not been expected to pay more than 
5%, the international financial community should ask 
Mexico for more than this percentage (57). In his opinion 
there was also a second possibility: to imitate President 
Alan Garcia of Peru, in paying to debt repayments only 
10% of the dollars received from the country’s exports.
The Union Congress met again between September and 
December 1987. At the end of this period (28th December
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1987) the political debate still centred on the conflict 
between the PRI, which was attempting to justify payment 
of the debt, and the left-wing opposition, which opposed 
payment. On the one hand, Deputy Jorge Alcocer from the 
PMS (Mexican Socialist Party, the new name for the party 
which resulted from the union of the United Mexican 
Socialist Party (PSUM) and the Mexican Workers' Party 
(PMT)) argued that the Mexican government was not able to 
continue reliably paying its external debt. He criticised 
the government, adding that it was no longer possible to 
make a new adjustment in the public budget without making 
more than 150 thousand civil servants redundant (58). On 
the other hand, the President of the Commission of 
Programming, Budgeting and Public Accounts of the Chamber 
of Deputies, Deputy ScTcrates Rizzo (PRI) suggested that 
the financial authorities should seek better payment 
conditions for the external debt. He mentioned the urgent 
need to renegotiate the debt according to the real value 
of the market, and using the opportunity given by the 
discounts that the international markets were offering at 
the time. Jorge Alcocer answered that the stubbornness of 
the government in carrying on paying would cause a new 
economic recession and make it impossible to attend to 
the people's needs. He continued by mentioning that a 
year and a half previously the President himself, the 
Minister of Finance, and the Budgeting and Planning
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Minister accepted that the country had reached the 
limited regarding an internal adjustment of the economy. 
Thus, in his view, it was impossible to modify the public 
budget and the government should make this clear to its 
international creditors. Mexico had made all possible 
efforts to pay; however it could not continue these 
efforts any longer as its limits had been reached.
In addition to this debate between the deputies of 
the PMS and the PRI, Deputy Gonzalo Altamirano Dimas 
(PAN) and Deputy Pedro Penaloza (PRT) agreed that the 
Government was being unfair to the Mexican people in 
allocating 65 cents of each peso received from the oil 
export revenue to the payment of the external debt (59). 
Penaloza (PRT) added that the debt crisis was only a 
variation of the economic crisis, and that if the 
suspension of payments was not declared, the national 
economy would continue impoverished. Highlighting a 
different perspective, Altamirano Dimas (PAN, the right- 
wing party) said that it was necessary to explore better 
conditions of payments, as it was not possible to burden 
the country with more heavy sacrifices. He added that it 
was impossible to pay the present magnitude of the debt 
either in the short term, nor in a longer one. 
Nevertheless, he said that it was not appropriate to end 
completely the external obligations, as this measure
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would bring negative effects to the country's relations 
with the international financial markets. Therefore, it 
was necessary to use sufficient pressure to adjust the 
external debt payments to the country's economic 
condition.
The discussion during this period of sessions at the 
Chamber of Deputies ended up with a decision taken by the 
majority of the deputies who were members of the official 
party (PRI). They agreed that the Congress should set up 
"a new stage" of negotiating periods of the external 
debt payments, which would highlight the social 
priorities and the basic services of the population (60). 
Deputy Herberto Castillo (PMS) reacted to this by saying 
that the members of his party would not approve the 
Expenditure Budget of the Federal Government for 1988. He 
explained that this budget was just a continuation of the 
same economic policies set out in the Immediate Programme 
of Economic Reconstruction (PIRE, 1st December 1982) 
which had already proved to be a mistake and had 
sacrificed the Mexican people (61).
Meanwhile, in the Chamber of Senators the majority 
(members of the official party, PRI) supported a 
governmental initiative to buy the external debt at 50% 
of its value. Senator Hugo B. Margain considered that the
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transfer of part of the Mexican external debt into bonds 
was a good operation for the country. It was a decision, 
he added, that incorporated the feelings of the Mexican 
people to stop the drain of resources out of the country. 
This solution, he continued, would bring a new 
alternative to carry on with the country's development, 
and it also showed that the creditor nations understood 
that the debt problem had to be solved with the combined 
effort and contribution of both debtors and creditors. 
Following the same path, Senator Humberto Herna'ndez 
Haddad stated that it was fair that the international 
creditors accepted that they were involved in the debt 
problems as much as Mexico was, so they would have to 
contribute to solving the Mexican debt crisis. Senator 
Margain added that he shared the President's thesis that 
in order to be able to pay, growth had to come first, as 
it was not possible to pay the debt by sacrificing the 
development and growth of the country (62).
After the Union Congress finished its sessions, 
individual remarks were made in newspapers. Among those 
there was one made by the President of the Great 
Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, Nibbles Reynes 
Berezaluce (PRI), who stated that the moratorium of the 
external debt payments would be a last resort; thus, for 
the time being, the economic authorities should try to
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maintain a good reputation abroad through negotiations. 
At the same time, Deputy Porfirio Camarena Castro, who 
represented the workers fraction (CTM) of the PRI, stated 
that the workers' movement affiliated to the CTM and PRI 
did not agree on the question of a moratorium. 
Nevertheless, he insisted that the external economic 
policy should be changed so that the country would pay to 
the international banks only 10% of the revenue from 
oil exports (63).
A few months later there was a celebration of the 
XXVIII USA-Mexico Interparliamentary Meeting (5th-llth 
March 1988) held in New Orleans, USA. The deputies and 
senators who represented the Mexican delegation prepared 
in advance a working paper which established that Mexico 
was prepared to pay its external debt through new 
negotiations which extended the period of time when the 
payments fell due. This document also mentioned the 
importance of continuing with the policy which aimed to 
reduce the debt capital by selling this debt on the 
international secondary markets. The Mexican legislators 
made clear to the Americans that Mexico needed enough 
economic resources for its development; thus it was 
necessary to limit the money allocated to the external 
payments. On the other hand, they invited American
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capital to make direct investments in Mexico in areas 
which were allowed by the law (64).
A month later there was the VIII Canada-Mexico 
Interparliamentary Meeting (17th-23th April 1988) held in 
Ottawa, Canada. Senator Humberto Hernandez Haddad (PRI) 
said to the Canadian legislators that Mexico needed to 
reduce the burden of its external debt, so that it could 
recover its internal growth. He added that Mexico's 
position regarding its external debt was to demand the 
joint responsibility of both parties involved in the 
problem, as Mexico had supported the policy of paying its 
external creditors. Senator Hernandez Haddad asked the 
Canadian legislators to cut down the trade protectionist 
measures, otherwise the Mexican people's effort would 
have been in vain (65). During the same month of April 
(13th), the 79th International Interparliamentary 
Conference was held in Guatemala. There, Deputy Javier 
Garduno Perez (PRI) asked for a political negotiation of 
the external debt in which the governments of both 
creditor and debtor nations could express their opinions
(66). A week after that, there was the Cuba-Mexico 
Bilateral Legislators’ Meeting. In this forum Deputy 
Jorge Montufar Araujo (PRI) blamed the protectionist 
attitude of the industrialised countries - which neither 
allowed the free trade of Mexican raw materials, and nor
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paid a fair price for the products that Mexico exported - 
for the greater burden of the debt on Mexico (67).
During the months of April, May, June, and July 1988 
the national political environment was oriented towards 
the presidential electoral campaign. So the debate in the 
newspapers centred on the electoral campaign rather than 
the debt issue. Members of the Union Congress did not 
have a particular activity until they resumed their 
ordinary session on 1st September 1988. By then Mexico 
had a newly-elected President, Carlos Salinas de Gortari. 
During the 1988 sessions of the Union Congress both 
Chambers of Senators and Deputies had lengthy debates on 
the results of the election and the legitimacy of the new 
government. During the year the main focus of attention 
changed from the debt to vote-rigging. Once more the 
credibility of the government in holding clean elections 
failed in spite of a pledge to end the PRI's history of 
fraud.
To sum up, some PRI members were unhappy with the 
debt while others supported the idea of paying it. The 
political opposition was clearly opposed to repaying the 
debt. The result was a real debate between the different 
sides.
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(1) El Dia, 27th September 1983.
(2) Uno mas Uno, 1st April 1984.
(3) El Dia and El Universal, 10th April 1984.
(4) Excei-sior and El Sol, 6th June 1984.
(5) El Universal, 7th June 1984.
(6) Uno mas Uno, 26th June 1984.
(7) Excelsior, El Universal, El Heraldo, 12th September 
1984.
(8) Excelsior, 28th September 1984, and El Dia, 26th 
September 1984.
(9) El Universal, 17th April 1985.
(10) Exce'lsior, 24th July 1985.
(11) El Dia, 14th August 1985.
(12) El Universal, 2nd September 1985.
(13) Excelsior, 10th September 1985.
(14) Uno m/s Uno, 2nd October 1985.
(15) El Universal, 7th October 1985.
(16) El Universal, 7th October 1985.
(17) El Universal, 16th October 1985.
(18) Excelsior, 21st October 1985.
(19) Excelsior, 24th October 1985.
(20) Excelsior, 24th October 1985.
(21) Excelsior, 24th October 1985.
(22) El Universal, 26th October 1985.
(23) El Universal, 28th October 1985.
(24) Excelsior and El Universal, 9th November 1985.
Notes.-
El Dia, 11th November 1985.
El Universal, 11th November 1985 
El Dia, 12th November 1985.
El Universal, 20th December 1985 
Uno mas Uno, 22nd January 1986. 
El Dia, 30th January 1986.
Uno mas Uno, 4th February 1986. 
El Universal, 6th February 1986. 
Excelsior, 15th February 1986. 
Uno mas Uno, 24th February 1986. 
Uno mas Uno, 25th February 1986. 
Uno mas Uno, 25th February 1986. 
Uno mas Uno, 25th February 1986. 
Uno mas Uno, 28th February 1986. 
Uno mas Uno, 13th March 1986.
Uno mas Uno, 2nd April 1986.
El Universal, 11th April 1986. 
Uno mas Uno, 11th April 1986.
Uno mas Uno, 18th April 1986.
El Universal, 4th June 1986.
El Universal, 11th June 1986.
El Universal, 25th June 1986.
El Dfa, 25th June 1986.
El Dia, 25th June 1986.
El Dia, 25th June 1986.
El Universal, 25th June 1986.
El Dia, 25th June 1986.
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(52) El Dia, 25th June 1986.
(53) El Dia, 25th June 1986.
(54) Excelsior, 1st October 1986.
(55) Excelsior, 3rd October 1986.
(56) El Universal, 11th and 14th July 1987.
(57) Excelsior, 2nd December 1987.
(58) Uno mas Uno, 28th December 1987.
(59) Uno m/s Uno, 28th December 1987.
(60) Excelsior, 23th December 1987.
(61) Exce'lsior, 29th December 1987.
(62) Uno mas Uno, 31st December 1987.
(63) Uno mas Uno, 31st December 1987, and Excelsior, 30th 
December 1987.
(64) Uno mas Uno, 6th March 1988.
(65) Uno mas Uno, 18th and 21st April 1988.
(66) Uno mas Uno, 14th April 1988.
(67) El Financiero, 21st April 1988.
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CHAPTER SIX
The Deepening Debate in Civil Society
I) Financial Institutions
Up to 1st September 1982, the Mexican banks were 
private institutions which had their own regulations and 
decided their internal organisation, though they followed 
the national monetary policies dictated by the Bank of 
Mexico (El Banco de Mexico). During his last State of the 
Nation speech, President Lopez Portillo announced the 
nationalisation of the banks after the massive flight of 
capital from the country in August 1982. From that time, 
the banks in Mexico became autonomous governmental 
institutions whose general directors and senior members 
were appointed by the Mexican President. Even so, they 
were able to continue a tradition of in dependent 
observation on financial affairs.
The story of the financial institutions is one of 
growing resistance by Mexican-based banks to the terms 
imposed on Mexico by the international banking community. 
The Bank of Mexico was the slowest to adopt this critical 
stand, and initially none of the key banking institutions 
did. But by 1989 the Mexican banking system was united in 
its condemnation of the way in which the international
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banking system was handling the question of Latin 
American debt.
Throughout 1982 the national financial institutions 
gave total support to the government in its handling of 
the debt crisis. In the first half of the year they 
repeatedly stated that there would not be any default on 
Mexico's debt, and that the external debt was not greater 
than the country's capacity to pay. On 21st April 1982, 
the President of the Administrative Council of the 
National Bank of Mexico said that althoughthe external 
debt amounted to approximately US$80,000 million this was 
not beyond what Mexico could pay. He added that in the 
short term there was no other solution than to 
renegotiate the debt; nevertheless, he thought that the 
payments could be met, as in the short term foreign 
currency would enter the Mexican economy, mainly from the 
tourist sector. In his view there were four things that 
had to be done to alleviate the situation: a) reduce the 
real growth of the economy; b) increase exports; c) 
increase the tourist sector; and d) diminish imports (1). 
Bank spokesmen gave no hint at all of the crisis which 
was to unfold four months later.
After the negotiation of the 1982 agreement with the 
IMF, the banks made very positive remarks about the way 
the financial authorities had managed to reduce the debt.
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For example, on 11th June 1983 the representative of the 
Bank of America in Mexico, Jo s/ Carral, said that it was 
excellent that Mexico had met its external obligations. 
He insisted that the effort made by Mexico was exemplary, 
as during the first six months of 1983 the economic 
indicators showed the success of the Immediate Programme 
of Economic Reconstruction (Programa Inmediato de 
Recuperacion Economica, PIRE), launched at the beginning 
of 1983 (2). The Deputy Director of the National Bank 
of External Trade, Humberto Soto, said that the 
renegotiation of the private external debt with the 
foreign banks had allowed industry to receive the 
supplies of machinery, heavy industrial inputs, and raw 
materials which had been suspended during the first six 
months of 1983 (3).
By 1984 the banking sector was no longer united in 
its public positions on the debt crisis. There were 
people who held a different view of the same problem. On 
the one hand, the General Director of the National Bank 
of Foreign Trade, Alfredo Phillips Olmedo, said that 
although there was a long way to go, Mexico had 
consolidated the path towards sustained growth, based 
upon a firm foundation (4). A month later he also said 
that the restructuring of the external debt would give 
the country a breathing space and the potential to face 
up to its international commitments. He added that the
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debt service payments absorbed a large proportion of the 
national budget; nevertheless, Mexico had decided to 
avoid irresponsible attitudes and fulfil its obligations 
faithfully (5). This was a position supportive of that of 
the government.
During 1984 the kind of statements made by key 
figures from the national banks changed significantly. 
They began to observe that the restructuring of the debt 
had not solved the external debt problem, and they began 
to question the value of economic sacrifice. In 1984 the 
Deputy Director of the Bank of Mexico, said that the 
economic austerity measures adopted by some of the great 
debtor countries (including Mexico), and the 
restructuring of the external debt, which was possible 
due to the cooperation of the international banks, were 
just palliatives. He implied that there would be no 
solution to the debt crisis until there was a major 
reform of the global economy (6). The Director of 
International Policy of the Bank of Mexico, Ariel Buira, 
stated that it was possible to pay and that Mexico would 
pay; nevertheless, the fundamental problem was to decide 
for whom Mexico was working and in benefit of whom the 
country was applying a strict programme of economic 
adjustment. It was time to ask why the solution of 
economic and social problems and the growth of the 
economy should be postponed in an attempt to meet debt
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payments. The country was tired of working with the sole 
target of paying off the international banking system. He 
added that in Mexico there were numerous, multi-faceted 
problems, solutions to which had to be deferred in order 
to send abroad enough foreign currency to pay the debt. 
This was an significant drain of resources which made the 
recovery process more difficult (7).
The mixed comments of the banking institutions 
during 1985 were very similar to those of the previous 
year. The Bank of Mexico's information bulletin suggested 
that the existence of protectionist measures imposed by 
the first world nations and the heavy external debt would 
prevent the debtor countries from overcoming their crises
(8). There were further comments in favour of more 
external loans. For example, the President of the Mexican 
Association of Banks, Jose" Juan de Olloqui, said that it 
was convenient, for the time being, to ask for more 
loans. Mexico should increase its non-oil exports in 
order to attract foreign currency, which was vital to 
finance the import of capital and goods inputs, as well 
as to meet the payments of the foreign debt (9). The 
official position of the Bank of Mexico in 1985 insisted 
that Mexico's external debt represented "only" 3.8% of 
the value of the proven oil reserves of the country (10). 
There were two different responses from the banking 
system: one in favour of borrowing, the other against it.
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By 1986 the bulk of banking sector comment and 
pressure was in favour of a moratorium, although the 
banks still spoke only of a negotiated moratorium. On 
21st February the ex-president (11) of the Bankers’ 
Association of Mexico (Asociacion de Banqueros de 
Mexico), Carlos Abedrop Davila, said that taking into 
account that a moratorium was not about stopping paying 
but about when and how to pay, Mexico should negotiate a 
moratorium with the international financial community. He 
added that Mexico should negotiate a moratorium which 
would not consist of eliminating payments, so the country 
would be able to continue with an adequate rhythm of 
investment and economic growth. Not to go for a 
negotiated moratorium could block the healthy
development that the population required (12). On the 
other hand, there were official opinions which aimed to 
diminish the problem by publicly giving different sorts 
of economic figures. On 13th May the Director of the Bank 
of Mexico (el Banco de Mexico), Miguel Mancera Aguayo, 
affirmed through the media that the ’operational deficit" 
of the public finances was corrected; that the internal 
debt had been reduced, and that more realistic interest 
rates would be introduced to stimulate internal savings
(13).
After this sort of remark made by the Director of 
the Bank of Mexico, which to some of the public appeared
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to contradict the claim of a 'crisis' in the debt 
problem, the criticism made in the editorials of the 
newspapers was the reflection of general feelings of 
discontent in society. The general tone of the criticism 
was that the Bank of Mexico was talking about "real 
rates" rather than "nominal rates"; using the "real 
rates" to prove what the Bank wanted. Thus, by using the 
"real rates" to demonstrate that the internal debt had 
been reduced, the Bank of Mexico made an obvious mistake 
which could be noticed by common sense, as in "nominal 
rates" the debt was bigger than ever before. After all, 
what people experience every day is the "nominal rates" 
and "nominal prices" of single commodities (14).
Thus, during 1984-86 the position of the Bank of 
Mexico continued to be strongly in favour of paying all 
the external debts, while the rest of the banks took up 
different positions.
In 1987 there was a unanimous call from the banks 
asking the financial authorities to adjust the debt 
service payments to the country's real capacity to pay. 
On 13th February the Director of the National Bank of 
Foreign Trade (Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior), 
Alfredo Phillips Olmedo, stated that the debt problem was 
linked with a commercial and a financial problem; he 
suggested that the government should try to solve the two
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aspects together: by expanding international markets for 
Mexican products, by finding more financial resources 
from international banks, and by trying to adjust the 
debt service to the country's real capacity to pay (15). 
At the same time key spokesmen for the Mexican banking 
system were complaining to the international community. 
On 3rd November 1987, the General Director of the Bank of 
Mexico, Miguel Mancera Aguayo, said to international 
financiers and economists in Washington that 
international cooperation was not enough to solve the 
debt problem. He blamed the fact that there were no 
policies to coordinate the behaviour of the 
industrialised countries towards the undeveloped 
countries, and that there was not enough flexibility to 
relieve the burden of the debt (16).
By 1988 the banks were insisting that the policies 
of the government - although valid in 1982 - were no 
longer appropriate to the changed conditions of the late 
19 80's. This position became clear in a report, prepared 
for the Bank of Mexico, which argued that the external 
debt strategies adopted in 1982 saved the international 
financial system from collapse. Nevertheless, the same 
strategies did not make sense in 1988 , as they had not 
managed to improve the country's capacity to pay. In May 
1988 a researcher from the Bank of Mexico said that the 
then current strategy of the external debt had had its
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justification in the first years of the crisis; 
nevertheless, it did not continue to be feasible. It did 
indeed avoid a collapse of the international financial 
system; however, it had not improved the payment capacity 
and the possibility of an economic recovery in the debtor 
countries (17).
Some other bank institutions blamed the 
international system. In May 1988, the Director of "Banca 
Serfin" and ex-president of the Mexican Association of 
Banks, Jose^ Juan de Olloqui, said that Mexico had met its 
obligations to the international financial community, 
probably to an even greater degree than necessary, and in 
return the creditor banks had not responded as required. 
Thus, he pointed out that the next step was to 
renegotiate the external debt, but this time in a less 
cooperative frame of mind, as the creditor nations would 
not change their selfish position. In his view, it was 
important to convince the international banks that for 
their own interest it would be advisable to find a 
definitive solution to the debt problem (18). Thus, one 
of the stronger solutions that the financial authorities 
found in 1988 to renegotiate the external debt was the 
commercial exchange of debt, offered at a discount on the 
international market. Following this line, the General 
Director of "Nacional Financiera" (the institution which 
acted as a financial agent of the federal government
abroad), Ernesto Marcos Giacoman, announced on 25th May 
1988 that, with the aim of reducing the capital and the 
servicing of the external debt, Mexico, Brazil and 
Argentina would soon launch such a new programme of debt 
discounting (19). The banks thus followed, with some 
doubts on details and especially on estimates of Mexico's 
ability to pay, the general approach of the government 
which owned them. The comments of the banks, however, 
indicate diverse internal doubts within the government.
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II) Business Organisations
In this section we will set out the position of the 
private sector towards the debt crisis. From the 
beginning the private sector agreed that the government 
should repay the debt and not declare a moratorium or 
default. But within the private sector there were some 
organisations which pressed the government to ask for 
more money, and others which wanted to see the government 
change its internal economic policies, that is to say, 
make budget adjustments rather than borrow more money 
abroad. The position of the private sector did not change
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significantly after the September 1985 earthquake -it 
continued to support repayment.
The reason why Mexican business in general did not 
want the moratorium was clear. They were afraid of losing 
the international support which they so desperately 
needed for the manufacture of their industrial products. 
Many Mexican businesses depended on the imports of raw 
materials, while others were trying to sell some of their 
products abroad. What is clear is that the infrastructure 
of Mexican industry depended heavily upon American 
industry, either in terms of the supply of raw materials 
or the export of manufactured products. So it is not 
surprising that the private sector wanted the Mexican 
State to face its international commitments.
The position of private enterprise during 1982 was 
of total confidence in the government; their argument was 
that although the external debt was a painful problem, it 
was a necessary one, because the alternative would have 
been for the economy to stagnate, and the country could 
not afford to do so. Leaders of different private 
organisations made this point. For example, in January 
1982, Aurelio Tamez Garcia, Vice-President of the 
National Chamber of Manufacturing Industry (Camara 
Nacional de la Industria de Transformacion, CANACINTRA) 
said as much in a newspaper interview (20). The same
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happened later on when Alejandro Cobian, President of 
International Advisers, on 12th August, made public his 
view that it was the best strategy to renegotiate the 
external debt (21). There were, of course, some leaders 
of the private sector, like Enrique Madero, President of 
the mining enterprise "Ferroaliaciones Autlan", who did 
not hesitate to point out that the government was wrong 
in trying to accelerate the development of the economy 
using only the income from oil (22). But generally 
speaking the government received the support of the 
private sector. It is important to point out that around 
November 1982, - after the first debt renegotiation with 
the international financial community - a group of 
private sector analysts expressed their concern about the 
role of the State in the renegotiation of the private 
debt. They declared to the national newspaper "Excelsior" 
that it was not in the interests of the private sector 
for the state to play a double role: on the one hand 
negotiating the private debt with the international 
banks, on the other guaranteeing the external debt of the 
private sector (23).
In 1983 public expressions of business opinion 
continued along the same lines. In March three of the 
most important private sector corporations issued a 
public declaration. The Business Coordinating Council 
(Consejo Coordinador Empresarial, CCE), the CANACINTRA,
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and the Mexican Republic Employers’ Confederation 
(Confederation Patronal de la Republica Mexicana, 
COPARMEX) declared that the suspension of the external 
payments would have led Mexico to a catastrophe. They 
insisted that in the present economic circumstances 
Mexico did not have any choice but to renegotiate the 
external debt. They emphasised that the international 
institutions trusted Mexico as it had proved to be able 
to met its external payments, and that it was necessary 
therefore to maintain this image by honouring the 
economic agreements (24). On the same day, the President 
of the Confederation of Industrial Chambers 
(Confederacion de Camaras Industriales, CONCAMIN), 
Alfonso Pandal Graf, said that the restructuring of the 
external debt revealed the confidence in which Mexico was 
held by the international banks in spite of the huge 
level of foreign debt that was owed (25).
There were many other statements of that kind made 
by spokespersons for Mexican business throughout 1984; 
and the volume and regularity of business announcements 
is an indication of just how keen Mexican business was to 
retain easy access to foreign credit, industrial inputs, 
and capital. In May 1984, the new President of the
Confederation of Industrial Chambers (Conf ederacio'n de 
Camaras Industriales, CONCAMIN) declared that Mexico was 
on the right path, and it would not form a club of debtor
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nations nor declare the moratorium on its external 
payments (26). In June 1984, the President of the Mexico- 
USA Commerce Chamber (Camara de Comercio Mexico-Estados 
Unidos) and the President of the Mexican Business 
Council for International Affairs (Consejo Empresarial 
Mexicano para Asuntos Internacionales) publicly announced 
that the renegotiation of the Mexican external debt 
agreed by the international banks was a sign of 
confidence in President Miguel De la Madrid’s government. 
This renegotiation would also allow the country to use 
some of the economic resources to attend to the basic 
necessities (27).
In September 1984, CANACINTRA said that the 
extension of the debt payment period would allow the 
private sector to use the foreign currency for imports 
(28). During the same month, the President of CONCAMIN, 
Jacobo Zaidenweber, stated that the Mexican debt 
renegotiation that was taking place in the USA would 
allow the country to have more time to overcome the 
economic crisis and inflation (29).
Holding a different opinion, the ex-President of 
COPARMEX, Jos/ Luis Coindreau, stated that rescheduling 
the external debt did not amount to renegotiating it. In 
real terms, he added, the government was now avoiding a 
responsibility and it was leaving it for the new
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government and the future generations, which was 
shameful. The government was doing well abroad, but was 
not winning anything. To save the government did not mean 
to save the nation (30). He clearly wanted a more radical 
solution to the debt crisis.
The beginning of 1985 continued along the same lines, 
though emphases were divided within the private sector. 
On the one hand, the Confederation of the National 
Chambers of Trade (Confederacio'n de Camaras Nacionales de 
Comercio, C0NCANAC0), argued that although the external 
debt had been restructured on favourable terms, the level 
of internal indebtedness had shown an unprecedented rise 
(31). On the other hand, the President of CONCAMIN, 
Jacobo Zaidenweber, stated that there was no risk that 
the international financial community would buy strategic 
state-owned industries, as the Law of Foreign Investment 
protected Mexican industry. He added that the country had 
the capacity to pay on time, in spite of the sacrifices 
of all sectors of the Mexican population, thus there 
would be no need to find solutions different from the 
restructuring of the debt which was taking place (32).
Broadly speaking, between April and August 1985 the 
public sector opinion lay with the government. The 
moratorium was mentioned only as a "utopian" solution. 
The bulk of Mexican business seems to have agreed that
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the renegotiation of the debt was the only clear 
solution. For example, in April 1985, the President of 
the National Association of Enterprise Directors 
(Asociacio'n Nacional de Directores de Empresas, ANDE), 
Aurelio Tamez, rejected as utopian the idea that Mexico 
could declare a moratorium or default on the debt. On the 
contrary, what was important was to renegotiate fresh 
interest rates and ask for less protectionist trade 
barriers in the industrialised world (33). Four months 
later, at the beginning of August 1985, Tamez emphasised 
again that the private sector agreed that in the case of 
Mexico it was important to fulfil repayment commitments 
(34). Thus the private sector applauded when in August
1985 the governmental financial authorities signed in New 
York the second contract in the largest-ever external 
debt restructuring in the wor ld’s financial history (35). 
After the signing of this contract, the private sector 
gave its opinion through CANACINTRA. Its industrial 
coordinator, Rosendo Sainz-Trapaga, said that the 
restructuring of the external debt had rebuilt the 
confidence of the international banks and represented a 
positive step for the country. Along the same lines, the 
general director of COPARMEX, Gustavo Serrano, stated 
that the debt renegotiation signified a new beginning for 
Mexican public finance (36).
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It is striking too that neither the natural 
disaster of the September earthquakes (19th and 20th 
September 1985), nor the associated rumours that the 
financial authorities might be forced to take more 
drastic action, made the private sector changed its 
mind. Instead it continued to insist that Mexico should 
meet its payment obligations. As if to stiffen government 
resolve, and to build popular support for honouring of 
the debt, declarations to this effect appeared very 
frequently in the newspapers between mid-September and 
November. For example, the President of CCE, stated on 
31st October 1985 that the earthquake had a sociological 
impact, that is to say "professional agitators have 
guided people who did not have information to propose 
extreme measures that only damage the economy of the 
country" (37). With the same sort of reaction, members of 
the private sector such as the President of CONCAMIN 
emphasised that to declare a moratorium would have been 
to the detriment of the national economy and the whole 
country (38). The Vice-presidents of the CANACINTRA and 
of the CONCANACO also said that it was not the right time 
for a moratorium (39). Many other commentators suggested 
that the financial authorities should go for another 
renegotiation and keep to the commitment of paying the 
service of the debt. Among those was the President of 
CANACINTRA, Carlos Mireles Garcia (40), and leaders of
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the regional private sector associations from Monterrey 
and Saltillo.
The private sector held this line into 1986 as well: 
long after the banking system started to take a more 
critical position. During the first week of February, 
the President of CCE, Claudio X Gonzalez said that there 
were enough mechanisms to pay the external debt, and 
that it was urgent to renegotiate the external debt (41). 
This was followed by Carlos Mireles Garcia, who said that 
the chamber that he presided over (CANACINTRA) was not in 
favour of a moratorium and that not paying would damage 
the prestige of the country (42). The President of 
CONCANACO, Nicolas Madahuar c/mara, also said that it was 
not advisable to delay the external debt payments (43); 
later, the President of the National Council for Foreign 
Trade (Consejo Nacional de Comercio Exterior, CONACEX), 
Fernando Gomez, stated that it was very important to be 
realistic and accept new renegotiations, as the present 
conditions for debt payments were not realistic (44).
We have to remember here that in 1986 the 
international price of oil fell once more. This third oil 
crisis brought a critical change. The price of a barrel 
of oil fell from US$25 to US$12. This also happened at 
the time of the failure of Mexico's international 
creditors to lend Mexico more money. The Mexican
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government, through its newly appointed Minister of 
Finance, Gustavo Petricioli, was trying all possible 
means to obtain a new credit for US$6,000 million to pay 
the old debt. In these new conditions the confidence 
that some members of the private sector had in the 
government began at last to evaporate. A few of them 
questioned the way the government was dealing with 
external financial matters and started suggesting 
different alternatives. Support for a moratorium began to 
grow among business leaders who had hither to been among 
the most vocal critics of such a policy. On 28th March
1986 the President of the National Chamber of Trade 
(Ccimara Nacional de Comercio CANACO), Jose^ Gonzalez 
Bailo, stated that "the economy of Mexico has started to 
touch ground, and a moratorium is necessary". He 
clarified this by saying that a moratorium was necessary 
within a new formula, which understood it not as a 
unilateral suspension of payments but as a provisional 
suspension of interest and capital repayments (45). Some 
other members continued to support the idea of further 
renegotiations of the external debt. The President of 
CONCANACO, Nicolas Madahuar Ca'mara, said that it was 
imperative to renegotiate the external debt due to the 
fall in the price of oil (46). The new President of the 
National Chamber of Trade in Mexico City (Camara Nacional 
de Comercio de la Ciudad de Mexico, CANACO,D.F.), Ignacio 
Armida, stated that Mexico was living in an emergency
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situation, thus it would require special treatment to pay 
its external debt (47).
Thereafter the whole tone of public pronouncements 
by the business sector changed: and what had once been a 
gale of support for government policy turned into an 
equally voluble pressure for a tough government stand 
against the international banking community. The Vice- 
president of COPARMEX, Ramon Corral Avila, said that it 
was time to renegotiate the external debt because it was 
necessary to avoid chaos and the general lack of 
confidence (48). The American Chamber of Mexican Trade 
(Camara Americana de Comercio de Mexico, CAMCO) declared 
that it was urgent for Mexico to be able to count on new 
external finance, as the country was now trapped in 
deciding between using its foreign currency to import 
basic goods or paying the debt (49). CANACINTRA said that 
the new proposal to renegotiate the debt would allow the 
country to share the responsibility with the 
international financial community, and that it was not 
out of proportion to ask the international banks to defer 
half of the foreign debt (50).
The centre of gravity of opinion in the private 
sector during 1987 was to ask for a lowering of the 
amounts of interest and capital that Mexico had to pay to 
the international banks, not merely to allow for
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rescheduling. Here it should be recalled that on 20th 
March 1987 the newly appointed Finance Minister, Gustavo 
Petricioli, signed in New York the agreement for a new 
loan of US$7,000 million. At that time Petricioli said 
that this loan was just temporary relief. At another 
level President de la Madrid was saying that the only 
long-term solution to Mexico’s debt crisis was the joint 
responsibility of creditors and debtor nations. It was 
also the time when the Group of Eight Latin American 
countries were gathering to present a common front on the 
debt issue. In this context the private sector began to 
speak of cancelling the interest and reducing the capital 
of the debt. For example, on 21st February 1987, the 
President of the Businessmen's Centre of Leon, 
Guanajuato, Luis Rodrigo Gonzalez Fuentes, said that it 
was necessary to ask the international banks for a 
cancellation of the interest (51). Another strong remark 
came from the President of COPARMEX, Bernardo Ardavin 
Migoni, who on 24th December 1987 said in a newspaper 
interview that it was necessary that the international 
banks erase part of the capital of the external debt
(52).
In fact opinion in the business sector was at this 
time as divided as in the rest of Mexican society. No 
longer did one clear line emerge from the business 
sector. Among these remarks there were many others
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supporting the government in its process of external debt 
renegotiation. The new President of CANACINTRA, Juan Jose" 
Moreno Sada, said that the renegotiation which concluded 
on 20th March 1987 would allow the private sector not to 
cancel its investment projects, and would constitute a 
financial breathing space for the industrial sector
(53). There was also criticism of the government, such as 
that expressed by the American Chamber of Mexican Trade 
(Camara Americana de Comercio de Mexico, CAMCO) to the 
effect that the conversion of the external debt into new 
investment would generate inflation, and that Mexico was 
far from being able to offer the economic security that 
investors required (54). Others went to the extreme of 
suggesting that fifty percent of the external debt could 
be paid by selling the enterprises of private and state 
joint ventures. That was the view, for example, of the 
President of the National Association of the 
Industrialists of Transformation (Asociacion Nacional de 
Industriales de la Transformacion, ANIT), Ignacio Munoz
(55). The President of CCE Agustin F. Legorreta spoke in 
favour of a new negotiation of the Mexican external debt 
which would represent less sacrifices to the people and 
would avoid a long economic recession (56). One of the 
most remarkable statements came from the Director of the 
Chamber of Manufacturing Industry (Camara de la Industria 
de Transformacion, CAINTRA), Jorge Arrambide Garza, who 
declared that President De la Madrid sooner or later
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would be obliged to announce the suspension of payments
(57).
During 1988 some private sector organizations 
continued to support the government in its renegotiation 
plans while others emphasised the need to do more. 
Representatives of CANACO and CANACINTRA stated in 
January 1988 that Mexico should design more mechanisms to 
reduce the interest payments of the external debt (58). 
In the same way CAMCO said that the international banks 
would give a discount to Mexico of up to 40% if the 
Mexican government would exchange part of the debt for 
bonds (certificates) which could be redeemed in a period 
of 20 years (59). A month later, leaders of three private 
sector organizations (CONCAMIN, CONCANACO, and COPARMEX) 
declared unanimously that it was vital to negotiate with 
the international banks for a reduction of the capital 
which was owed (60), although two months later these same 
organisations made it clear that - in their view - a 
moratorium would ruin the economic opening that Mexico 
needed (61).
Later on, with half of the year gone and the new 
presidential elections in sight, members of the private 
sector started to point out that the new political regime 
would have to find new means of renegotiating the 
external debt. In May 1988 the President and the General
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Director of CCE, stated that if the international 
creditors did not cooperate in a renegotiation, Mexico 
would be obliged to adopt a unilateral position; this 
meant limiting external payments to a proportion of the 
growth of the economy and exports (62). Along the same 
lines, the President of a regional chamber in 
Guadalajara, Jalisco, (Regional Chamber of Manufacturing 
Industry, Camara Regional de la Industria de 
Transformacion, CAREINTRA), declared that the Mexican 
government should tailor the external debt payments to 
the Gross National Product (63).
Thus, private organizations, while continuing to 
accept the overall need for repayment, not only supported 
the policy of rescheduling but called also for interest 
and capital reductions.
Ill) Workers1 Organisations
In the case of the workers, the protests against the 
external debt payments started from the beginning of 
President De la Madrid's governmental period, although 
the main workers’ organization which is affiliated to the 
PRI, the Mexican Workers' Confederation (Confederacion de
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Trabajadores Mexicanos, CTM), generally supported the 
presidential economic policy. As it was seen in chapter 
one, the two main workers organisations in Mexico are the 
CTM and the Labour Congress (Congreso del Trabajo, CT). 
As the Labour Congress nationally brings together all the 
workers' unions, it also dictates the policies that all 
the unions should follow. Nevertheless, the CTM only in 
theory follows the Labour Congress, as in practise it 
often finds contradictory positions between the 
independent Labour Congress decisions and its 
corporativist relationship with the PRI, which force it 
to support the PRI and the government policies.
Thus, on 5th October 1983, the President of 
Economic Affairs of the Labour Congress, Mario Suarez, 
pointed out that Mexico should seek new debt 
negotiations, in which the country could obtain a 
reduction in the amount of interest paid. He added that 
it was not possible to sacrifice the Mexican people any 
longer, just because the economic authorities wanted to 
pay. It was true, he continued, that with the present 
policy Mexico was gaining a good reputation abroad; 
nevertheless, the internal social costs were very high. 
He pointed out that the cost of food, basic products, and 
services had increased remarkably, and he gave as 
examples the prices of electricity, water, petrol, and 
tax rates, which had gone up by 50%. These increases, he
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continued, were dramatically reducing the purchasing 
power of the majority of the population, and this could 
eventually lead to social conflict. Mario Suarez was also 
the General Secretary of the Revolutionary Confederation 
of Workers (Confederacion Revolucionaria de Trabajadores, 
CRT) and threatened the governmental authorities that 
workers would demand wage increases, whether the workers' 
leaders wanted it or not, because their patience would 
soon be exhausted. He denied that all the social strata 
in Mexico had suffered an equal drop in their standard of 
living, citing the examples of capitalists and the upper 
bourgeoisie. The workers and peasants had had the worst 
of this economic crisis, he said (64). On the same lines, 
eight months later (27th June 1984), the General 
Secretary of the Revolutionary Labour Confederation 
(Confederacion Obrera Revolucionaria, COR), Angel Olivo 
Solis, stated that the rise of half a point in the 
interest rates imposed by the main American banks on the 
debtor countries, made the Mexican external debt 
practically unpayable (65).
Two days later (10th July 1984), the general 
secretary of the National Union of Professionals in the 
Service of the Workers (Sindicato Nacional de 
Profesionistas al Servicio de los Trabajadores, also 
incorporated in the CTM), Porfirio Camarena Castro, said 
that to pay the external debt with shares in national
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enterprises, was a measure which should not be taken, as 
it ran the risk of surrendering to international capital 
the decision-making power of Mexican enterprises (66).
In a more regional context, in July 1984, union 
leaders of Mexico, Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, and 
Costa Rica gathered to propose a moratorium on the Latin 
American debt. The union leaders of all these countries 
except Mexico, agreed to press for a moratorium. At that 
meeting Fidel Velazquez, national leader of the CTM said 
that in the Mexican case, it was up to the Federal 
Government to take that decision (67). It was clear 
either that the CTM wanted to support the government's 
economic policy, or that it did not feel able to 
challenge the President's decision. On 22nd July 1984, 
the CTM explicitly gave its support to President De la 
Madrid's international policy, and agreed that Mexico 
should not stop its external debt payments. In its view 
it was not advisable for Mexico to join the group of 
Latin American countries which had decided to suspend 
debt service payments, as this measure would have serious 
repercussions on the country's economy. The CTM said that 
the Mexican government had acted with responsibility; it 
had accepted a commitment and was fulfilling it. The 
Mexican workers' movement, the CTM continued, respected 
President De la Madrid's policy and it was acting in 
solidarity with him. The official speaker of the CTM
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added that it was fundamental to strengthen the alliances 
around the President, in order to contribute to the 
solution of the country's economic problems. He warned 
that to act differently would weaken the Mexican state, 
which would only benefit American imperialism (68).
Disagreements about paying the external debt 
continued in 1985 because of its internal consequences. 
The CTM began to be radicalised by the internal social 
costs of the debt. Even CTM leaders were no longer 
inclined to back the government enthusiastically. In 
April 1985 the economic adviser of the CTM said that the 
debt problem had been transformed into a problem of 
financial speculation, which had been promoted by the 
international banks through the high interest rates 
imposed by them (69). This argument continued in July
1985 when Alfonso Sanchez Madariaga, the man in charge of 
the CTM while Fidel Velazquez was absent, said that the 
economic and financial policies adopted by the Mexican 
government should not affect the working class; instead 
they should have an effect on those who had the economic 
resources to bear the crisis. By then the CTM was more in 
tune with other workers' organisations. Also, the 
secretary of the Revolutionary Workers' Confederation 
(Confederacion Obrera Revolucionaria, COR), Jose de Jesus 
Perez, said that the economic policies proposed by the 
IMF and the devaluation that promised to stimulate
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Mexican exports were not the right way to re-orient
Mexico's economic development. The solution, he added,
was for the Mexican state to take full command of the
economy and introduce into the productive apparatus the
necessary structural changes which the economy demanded
(70). A few days later, the economic assistant of the
Labour Congress Silverio R. Alvarado, said that it was
impossible to continue paying the external debt: a
searching revision of the problem was needed. It was as
desirable, he continued, to renegotiate the debt as to
impose a moratorium: in the end the foreign currency
which was coming into the country was not enough to pay
the debt, not even its service, and it was impossible to
postpone indefinitely social conflict in the country. The
same day , the General Secretary of the Revolutionary
Confederation of Workers (Confederacion Revolucionaria de
Trabajadores, CRT), Mario Sua'rez, agreed with Silverio R.
Alvarado, adding that the situation of the country had
been more difficult than it had been before (71). In
August 1985, the Labour Congress expressed its
disagreement with the financial authorities, as the
economic policy of paying the external debt was, in its
view, preventing the development of the nation. Its 
/
President, Angel Olivo Solis, said that in Mexico there 
was an unemployment rate of 10 per cent, and that the 
situation could deteriorate even further. The Labour 
Congress prepared a document (Ante la Crisis, Solidaridad
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y Cambio Social) in which it demanded a policy which 
would support the social sector, regulate the foreign 
exchange market, and establish a new commercial policy 
based upon real administrative factors with a permanent 
and fixed price for all products (72). On the other hand, 
by the end of the month (31st August), the national 
leader of the CTM, Fidel Velasquez, said once again that 
the debt renegotiation was a breathing space for Mexico, 
as the country could then operate without pressure and 
with open doors to external credit to continue its 
growth. He added that he was glad that the Finance 
Minister, Jesus Silva Herzog, had considered that it was 
impossible to ask for more sacrifices from the Mexican 
people, as they were not able to give more (73). It is 
clear that there was an internal division within the 
leaders of the CTM. Some of them push forwards to support 
the Labour Congress propositions, while others were 
backing the government through their CTM national leader.
The disaster of the earthquakes of the 19th and 20th 
September 1985 introduced a new perspective into the 
political sphere. The effect that this natural disaster 
had on the demands from workers1 organisations was of 
mass mobilisation. At the beginning of October, just two 
weeks after the earthquakes, there was a national 
conference of unions on the external debt problem. As a 
result of this conference 75 unions (74) agreed that the
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only solution for the national economy was to declare a 
moratorium and a total suspension of payments. They 
announced this in all the national newspapers and also 
agreed to support the Latin American effort to declare a 
moratorium for the whole region. Thus, these 75 unions, 
in solidarity with unions in other countries in the 
region, declared the 23rd October 1985 the "Day of 
Continental Action Against the External Debt" (23 de 
octubre 1985, Dia de Accion Continental Contra la Deuda 
Externa). As a result, on 23rd there was in Mexico City 
a huge protest march, attended by members of these 75 
workers' unions.
After this mass mobilisation, the country's 
organised workers1 movement gave President De la Madrid 
a "basic plan to face the natural disaster that affected 
Mexico City" ("plan basico para enfrentar la situacion de 
siniestro que afecto^ a la ciudad de Mexico"). In this 
plan it was explained that the earthquakes made the 
Mexican peoples' economic and social problems worse. The
leader of the Labour Congress (Consejo del Trabajo, CT),
/
Angel Olivo Solis, when handing this document to the 
President added that the earthquakes had left thousands 
of Mexicans without work, and the housing problem, which 
was already severe, increased, to the old problems have 
been added new ones. Thus, the organised workers' 
movement demanded from President De la Madrid that Mexico
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should negotiate the external debt on a different basis, 
asking for preferential treatment; even the international 
creditors were lead to expected new and different 
initiatives from Mexico, as after the earthquakes the 
international context was quite favourable to negotiating 
the debt along new lines. Furthermore, the group of 
Latin American countries in debt wanted to see a more 
radical decision from Mexico, the Labour Congress 
continued. Mexico had the solid support of most countries 
in the region for a change in its external debt policy. 
It was said that, as Mexico could count on this support, 
the USA would not be able to take economic sanctions 
against Mexico, if the country pressed for a moratorium 
(75). In other words, the workers' movement was trying to 
suggest that the government should take advantage of the 
international situation, what we have called in chapters 
four and five the "missed opportunity of September 1985".
A number of factors led the financial authorities to 
consider, or at least to speculate on the possibility of 
a partial moratorium or temporary suspension of payments. 
These factors included the workers' mass mobilisation 
against the external payments, the pressures from the 
middle classes who insisted on maintaining their standard 
of living and purchasing power, pressures from the upper 
economic groups which felt the insecurity caused by 
declining resources, the poverty and misery of peasants
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and agrarian workers who had gradually been leaving the 
countryside hoping for a better life in the city, 
aggravated by the natural disaster of September 1985 and 
the anxiety of those who lost their homes during the 
earthquakes.In this context, the national leader of the 
CTM, Fidel Velazquez, said on 1st October 1985 that the 
Mexican government was considering action along the lines 
of a partial suspension of external payments, and that 
the CTM was supporting it. He added that this action 
would relieve the economic pressure and would open the 
door for a Mexican recovery (76). The initial position 
that the CTM and the CROM held, that is to say, in favour 
of paying the debt and not urging a moratorium, was 
abandoned after 28th September 1985, when in a meeting 
the CROM proposed a suspension of debt service payments 
for the following one or two years, due to the natural 
disaster (77).
As was shown in chapter four, during the six months 
after the earthquakes, Mexico did not pay interest, yet 
the international creditors did not argue about this 
situation, due to the gravity of the state of emergency 
declared by the Mexican government. Nevertheless, a month 
after the earthquakes the financial authorities felt 
that they could go ahead with new negotiations, thinking 
of a new internal economic adjustment programme, which is 
the standard IMF condition for renegotiations. Thus, a
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month after the disaster Mexico started to negotiate a 
new loan for US$7,150 million, which was authorized by 
the IMF for 1987. In this context, in which the 
government opted to negotiate rather than suspend the 
debt payments, the position of the CTM was rather 
ambiguous. On 5th October 1985 its national leader, Fidel 
Velazquez, said that the workers' sector rejected the 
IMF's conditions, although at the same time he said that 
"the organised workers' movement will support all 
negotiations on the external debt, provided that they do 
not imply increased costs and sacrifices for the 
majority"(78). On another occasion Fidel Vela^zquez said 
that the government should extend the payment periods of 
the external debt. He added that Mexico required not only 
a pause in its external debt payments, but also another 
type of renegotiation that extended the payment period 
for the time that was necessary to overcome the disaster 
caused by the earthquakes. He denied that the 
postponement of the debt service payments for six months 
was a moratorium; on the contrary, he continued, it was 
done to obtain better facilities for paying (79). It was 
obvious, once more, that the CTM, and Fidel Vela'zquez in 
particular, was not inclined to challenge presidential 
decisions. Nevertheless, on another occasion (16th 
October), after the Baker Plan was presented in Korea, 
Fidel Velazquez said, referring to this plan, that such 
an initiative was a very dangerous one, as it forced the
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debtor countries to impose rigid economic programmes as a 
prerequisite for obtaining new loans (80).
In spite of the official position of the workers’ 
movement expressed through the CTM, unions of different 
sectors continued to express individual positions in 
favour of a moratorium. The reaction of these unions 
after the financial authorities started negotiating the 
new loan, was of anger. A case in point was the National 
Union of University Workers (Sindicato Unico Nacional de 
Trabajadores Universitarios, SUNTU) which on 6th October
1985 held a meeting attended by 50 university union 
organizations. At this meeting, the university unions 
agreed to support the moratorium. Through its leader, 
Nicol/s Olivos Cuellar, the union said that the new loan 
would be given to Mexico just to guarantee that the 
country would continue to pay its external debt (81). 
Moreover, in October for the second time, members of the 
Labour Congress and independent unions, demanded the 
immediate suspension of the external debt payments, with 
the intention that those economic resources should be 
redirected to the reconstruction of the areas damaged by 
the earthquakes, and also to satisfy the primary needs of 
the country (82).
In addition to all this, demonstrations in support 
of the moratorium were organized by a whole list of
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unions: by the Mexican Union of Electricians (Sindicato 
Mexicano de Electricistas, SME); the Authentic Labour 
Front (Frente Aute'ntico del Trabajo, FAT); the Workers' 
Union of the National Autonomous University of Mexico 
(Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Universidad Nacional
Autdnoma de Mexico, STUNAM); the National Union of
/
University Workers (Sindicato Unico Nacional de 
Trabajadores Universitarios, SUNTU); the Independent 
Central of Agrarian Workers and Peasants (Central 
Independiente de Obreros Agricolas y Campesinos, CIOAC); 
the Revolutionary Workers' Confederation (Confederacion 
Obrera Revolucionaria, COR); the Fishermen's Union 
(Sindicato de Pesca), and the National Independent Union 
of Workers of the Baccalaureate Colleges (Sindicato 
Independiente Nacional de Trabajadores del Colegio de 
Bachilleres, SINTCB) (83). All of these had support from 
their members in asking for a moratorium.
1986 saw a more active and radical participation 
from the workers' organisations. As the financial 
authorities decided to ask the international banks for 
more loans, the resentment and anger of the workers 
showed even more. There were more demonstrations in 
support of the moratorium and in opposition to the 
adoption of the Baker Plan. Key spokespersons for 
organised labour regularly described this plan's 
conditions as negative for the country's economy; even
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more, the adoption of the plan was seen as a disaster and 
catastrophic for the development of the whole nation. 
Even the leader of the CTM was very strongly against it. 
Partly forced by the workers' political involvement, 
Fidel Velazquez had to take a more radical attitude.
The first joint public statement came from 
electricians, telephonists, members of the CRT and of 
the CTM. They declared that Mexico should form a debtors' 
club together with other Latin American countries, 
suggesting that the moratorium should be declared by a 
bloc of countries. The leader of the CRT, Mario Sua'rez, 
said that his organization agreed to ask the federal 
government to limit the external debt payments to 30% of 
export earnings. The leader of the Union of Mexican 
Telephonists (Sindicato de Telefonistas de Mexico), 
Francisco Herna'ndez Juairez, said that the workers' 
leaders should adapt to the new critical circumstances 
and fight for their members, otherwise they would be 
overtaken by the masses, who would choose to take justice 
into their own hands (84).
On 5th February 1986 the General Secretary of the 
CTM, Fidel Velasquez, made a statement of a more radical 
kind. He said that Mexico was incapable of paying the 
external debt. Thus, the creditors should understand the 
situation and ask for the money later. In view of this
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problem it was important, he added, first to look after 
the necessities of the majority of the population. 
National circumstances, he continued, did not made 
refusal of a moratorium essential, as it was totally 
impossible for the country to pay interest or the capital 
on the debt. He insisted that it was impossible for 
Mexico to pay the debt with the resources at its disposal 
(85).
Massive demonstrations continued. The first workers1 
demonstration organized in 1986 was on 5th February, the 
day of the commemoration of the Anniversary of the 
Promulgation of the Mexican Constitution. 14,000 people 
from 122 different workers' organizations gathered at the 
Independence Monument (Monumento a la Independencia) to 
protest against the external debt payments and to 
repudiate the Baker Plan (86). A few days later, on 28th 
February, 80 trade union organizations prepared a Forum 
of the Workers' Movement facing the Crisis and made a 
public statement in which they declared that the 
suspension of the external debt payments was an 
unavoidable necessity. They also criticised the Baker 
Plan, saying that it would devastate the national 
productive plan, increase unemployment, and diminish real 
wages (87). Another demonstration of 40,000 workers took 
place on 14th March in front of the National Palace to 
demand a total moratorium on the external debt. They
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protested against the internal and external economic 
policy, and told the government not to ask for new loans 
and instead to redistribute what it had in a more 
equitable way (88). Later the miners expressed their 
discontent to President De la Madrid. In May 1986, 
Napoleo^ Gomez Sada, the miners' leader, said to the 
President that the external debt was acting against 
Mexican sovereignty (89). A month later still the vice- 
president of the Labour Congress, said that the financial 
situation of the country would force it to declare a 
moratorium. He added that the external debt was not just 
Mexico's responsibility but also the creditor nations' 
liability, as the Mexican population could not be 
subjected to more sacrifices due to the external payments
(90).
A trade union round table was organized on 15th June
1986 to demand an immediate moratorium. 100 different 
workers' organisations protested against the debt 
renegotiation. The unions responsible for the 
organisation of this round table were: the SME, the CROC, 
the FAT, the university unions, and the SNTE. In the 
document produced by the round table, the workers 
censured the official economic policy which opted for 
fresh debt to pay the old debt (91). Even the CTM had, by 
July, come to the point at which it was prepared to 
insist that the negotiations in Washington should have
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as a precondition the cancellation of part of the 
principal and a reduction in the interest rate (92).
As had happened the previous year, 23rd October 1986 
saw the declaration of the Second Day of Continental 
Action against the external debt. The Labour Congress, 
the university unions, the electricians, the pensioners, 
and the agrarian workers, supported the continental 
movement in Mexico, striking for 24 hours (93).
In 1987 the workers1 organisations in alliance with 
popular, peasant and left-wing organisations continued to 
protest against the government's economic polices. 
However, the CTM did not clearly support them. Officially 
at least, it refused to back their demands. The biggest 
demonstration was organised on 20th October 1987, when 95 
workers' organisations marched in protest against the 
external debt payments. Prior to this occasion (10th 
October) Fidel Velasquez, President of the Labour 
Congress and national leader of the CTM, warned these 
workers' organisations that it was a risk to Mexico's 
sovereignty to stop paying the debt. He added that if 
Mexico were to stop paying the external debt, as some 
sectors of society wanted, it would be very difficult to 
sell Mexican products in the international market (94). 
Once more, the strategy of the leader of the CTM was to
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mediate workers' demands and not to challenge the 
government's economic policies.
Nonetheless the protests against the external debt 
payments continued. On 4th November 1987 Samuel Ruiz 
Mora, leader of the National Council of Workers (Consejo 
Nacional de Trabajadores, CNT), said that the federal 
authorities had to take the decision to declare a 
moratorium. He added that the cost of five years of 
economic crisis had produced a decrease of 50% in the 
purchasing power of wages and the end of hopes for a 
better life for the majority of people (95). On the same 
day, Raul Moreno Wonchee, Secretary of Political Affairs 
of the Labour Congress, said that the external debt 
payments were an obstacle to the country's modernization
(96). Also Hector San Roman, in charge of the Social 
Security Commission of the Labour Congress, said that the 
peace of the country was endangered by the heavy external 
debt payments (97).
Meanwhile, workers' organisations in different 
regional provinces of Mexico were talking about a 
reduction in the debt payments. For example, in the State 
of Mexico (Estado de Me'xico), the Confederation of 
Workers and Peasants (Confederacion de Trabajadores y 
Campesinos), and the Revolutionary Federation of Mexican 
Workers (Federacion Revolucionaria de Trabajadores
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Mexicanos) said that the interest payments should be 
reduced to an amount that would allow the country to 
recover its economic development path (98).
The same pattern of workers' protest and CTM 
moderation persisted in 1988. On 28th April 1988 the 
National Workers Council said that Mexico could not grow 
if it allocated 50 per cent of its national public funds 
to pay foreign debt. It added that the working class had 
dramatically lost its purchasing power in the last five 
years, and that unemployment had increased tremendously, 
to the extend that every day workers were being made 
redundant (99). In the headquarters of the electricians' 
union, there was a conference of the Federation of 
Electrician Unions' Organisations of Latin America. The 
conference made a final statement in favour of the total 
suspension of the external debt payments. They added that 
the payments represented a scourge for the Latin American 
people, as social programmes in health and education were 
reduced (100).
Yet once again the CTM supported the government's 
position. On 14th June 1988 Fidel Vela'zquez said to the 
media that the federal government had a plan to 
renegotiate with the international banks the external 
debt service payments, aiming to reduce the interest and 
capital of the debt. He added that what was necessary was
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more dialogue, not confrontation. He added that it was 
not possible to continue weighing down the working class 
with the external payments, without risking the survival 
of the institutions of the Mexican state (101). It should 
be noted, however, that the CTM itself was divided on 
this. On 28th May 1988, Gilberto Munoz Mosqueda, leader 
of the CTM, said to President De la Madrid that the 
economic austerity and other effects caused by the 
external debt were leading to the breakdown of the 
democratic system in Mexico. This time the leader of the 
National Confederation of Peasants (Conf ederacio^n 
Nacional Campesina, CNC), Hector Hugo Olivares Ventura, 
supported Munoz Mosqueda's declaration (102).
On 4th July 1988 the president of the Social 
Security Commission of the Labour Congress, and also 
secretary of the same affairs in the CTM, Hector Sanroman 
Arriaga, declared that due to the lack of economic 
resources, 80% of the Mexican population were 
undernourished. He explained that this undernourishment 
was being aggravated by the horrendous drain of economic 
resources leaving the country to pay the external debt. 
The government's economic policies had stopped the 
creation of new jobs for the new generation and the 
allocation of resources to social security (103).
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On 8th August 1988 the leader of the National 
Federation of Union Groupings (Federacion Nacional de 
Agrupaciones Sindicales, FNAS), Samuel Ruiz Mora, said 
that the decision to carry on paying the external debt 
was equivalent to holding up still further the progress 
of the growth and development of the nation. He added 
that it was regrettable to have to reduce by the federal 
budget by 75%, as it represented a neglect of public 
services and social demands that the public were claiming
(104). A month later, on 10th September 1988, the general 
secretary of the Latin American Central Organisation of 
Workers (Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores, CLAT), 
Emilio Maspero, said that the external debt problem was a 
political one, thus it should be politically negotiated 
with the international banks. He added that the Latin 
American workers were creating a common front, as they 
were the ones who most suffered the negative effects of 
the economic crisis (105).
The leader of the telephone workers, Francisco 
Herna'ndez Juarez, proposed on 1st October 1988 to call a 
popular consultation about the external debt issue, which 
would end up as a national referendum. He said that 
finding a solution to the debt problem in this way would 
be acting with democratic legitimacy, which was the basis 
of the Mexican modern state (106).
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Thus, with the workers1 organisations, there was 
considerable discontent with presidential policies, 
though some leaders felt obliged to support their party's 
president in difficult times. The basis of discontent was 
the effects of the repayment strategy on the level of 
economic activity in Mexico, which severely affected the 
labour force, and in particular, the very large workforce 
in the public sector.
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The main peasants' organisation that exists in the 
Mexican Political System is the Peasants' National 
Confederation (Confederacion Nacional Campesina, CNC). 
Due to the peculiarity of the Mexican political system 
previously explained in chapter one, the main peasants' 
organisations are incorporated in the official party, 
the PRI. This fundamental characteristic limits the 
degree of autonomy that the leaders of such organisations 
have when representing the interests of their members. 
These limitations are also reflected in the small number 
of public statements made by these organizations, and the 
lack of autonomous thought. Nevertheless, the fact that 
some statements were made publicly by the peasants' 
organisations, says a good deal about the magnitude of 
the debate going on in society regarding the external 
debt crisis. So too do the opinion of non-official 
peasants' organisations. Although the last group 
represents only a small minority of the agrarian 
population, their points of view are far more radical and 
give some indication of the range of feelings among the 
Mexican peasantry as a whole, although it is not obvious 
whether the individuals speak for the peasants 
organisations or for themselves.
IV) Peasants1 Organisations
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During the first three years of the period analysed 
in this thesis (1982 - 84) there were no public 
statements of what the peasants' organisations thought 
about the debt crisis. It is in 1985 when we first start 
to hear about this debate. On 12th October 1985, the 
leader of the Independent Central of Agricultural Workers 
and Peasants (Central Independiente de Obreros Agricolas 
y Campesinos, CIOAC), Jose Luis Hernandez, said that 
Mexico, like many other countries, had an obstacle to 
development, as it had had to allocate astronomic amounts 
of money to pay its external debt. He added that the 
Mexican workers' task was to save the country and in this 
way to pronounce in favour of the cancellation of the 
foreign debt. In his view, it was an insane thought to 
attempt to pay or for the banks to expect to be paid. In 
strict justice, he added, Mexico did not owe anything to 
anyone, as it has been exploited by imperialism and 
through the transnational companies which plundered 
Mexico's natural resources (107).
On the other hand, and representing the official 
voice of the peasants, the General Secretary of the 
Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants 
(Confederacion Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos, 
CROC), an organization which is affiliated to the ruling 
PRI, supported the government idea of renegotiating the 
debt. The leader of the CROC, Alberto Juarez Blancas,
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said on 1st November 1987 that it was important to 
renegotiate the external debt, to try to obtain fixed 
rather than floating interest rates; to try to reduce the 
principal of the debt to half its value; and to establish 
a limit to the amount of money to be paid, so that the 
popular classes would not have to be sacrificed any 
longer because of the external economic commitments. He 
added that the time had arrived for the debtor countries 
to take a more radical decision towards the debt issue, 
as even the creditor nations knew that debtor countries 
could not pay, particularly when the interest rate was 
not fixed. To carry on paying, he added, would involve 
risking the political and social stability of the Third 
World nations. In the case of Mexico, he continued, 
peasants and workers' standards of living had dropped 
dramatically in recent years, to the extent that Mexicans 
and foreigners were amazed that there was still social 
peace and national unity (108).
On the other hand, supporting the government's 
official position, the speaker of the National 
Confederation of Peasants (Confederacion Nacional 
Campesina, CNC), an organisation which is affiliated to 
the PRI, said on 8th June 1988, that the external debt 
should be restructured. He added that only to pay the 
interest, Mexico was annually paying to the international 
banks the equivalent of the wealth generated by 4,000,000
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agricultural day-labourers. A lot of these workers, he 
added, were in a precarious state of health due to the 
lack of adequate food and physical exhaustion. Many of 
these families migrated for 6 or 8 months every year, 
sleeping under trees, hardly eating, and without 
drinkable water. He declared that the government should 
solve all these problems in the countryside, before 
thinking of paying the external debt (109).
There always were far more radical voices speaking 
for at least part of the Mexican peasantry. On 25th 
February 1986, the General Secretary of the Independent 
Central of Agricultural Workers and Peasants (Central 
Independiente de Obreros Agricolas y Campesinos CIOAC), 
Ramo/n Danzos Palomino, said that the Mexican government 
was making a historic mistake in trying to pay the 
external debt with the limited national resources. In his 
view, there did not seem to be any radical change in the 
economic policy followed by the government, in spite of 
there being a real need for it. He said that change was 
urgent and should have been made to meet the workers1 
salary demands, and to stimulate peasants and their food 
production. He added that the present antidemocratic and 
antipopulist policy followed by the government, was 
favouring national and international capital, allowing 
foreign investment to penetrate the national economy. On 
the other hand, the workers' purchasing power diminished,
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as salaries did not keep pace with inflation. He observed 
that in the countryside the small producers and the 
peasants were going bankrupt, and unemployment was 
growing among agricultural workers, who were left with 
the option of going to the USA to find a job. In his 
view, the government should try to follow a populist and 
democratic policy, which required the declaration of a 
moratorium and total suspension of payments of both 
capital and interest (110).
A year later, on 24th June 1987, the leader of the 
"Zapata Front" (Frente Zapatista), Porfirio Palacios 
declared that his organisation was against the external 
payments. He said that the debt which the Mexican 
government had was with its people rather than with the 
IMF. He added that the resources which the government was 
using to pay the debt could have been used to stimulate 
the agricultural sector and food production (ill).
In 1988 , as in 1986 , the General Secretary of the 
Independent Central of Agricultural Workers and Peasants 
(Central Independiente de Obreros Agricolas y Campesinos 
CIOAC), Ramon Danzos Palomino, called for a declaration 
of the suspension of the debt payments for at least five 
years, in order to get out of the economic crisis and 
therefore to be able to reinvest all that money in the 
industrial and agricultural sector. If Mexico carried on
219
paying its external debt, he added, it would be 
impossible to maintain economic independence, technical 
and industrial sufficiency, and food self-sufficiency 
(112).
By the middle of 1988 the situation was drastic and 
even peasants1 organisations which had a connection with 
the PRI adopted a strong line. On 18th September 1988 the 
General Secretary of the Revolutionary Confederation of 
Workers and Peasants (Confederacion Revolucionaria de 
Obreros y Campesinos, CROC), Alberto Jua'rez Blancas, said 
that Mexico would not sacrifice its popular sectors to an 
even greater extent in order to meet its international 
financial commitments. He added that the country would 
not default, but it now demanded new and better 
conditions of payment. The creditors should recognise 
that the real value of the external debt was not what 
they wanted to charge, particularly when Mexico had paid 
in recent years billions of American dollars to service 
the debt (113).
Thus, even with a group not known for its 
willingness to oppose a PRI president, some pressure for 
change and evident discontent, was apparent.
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V) The Church
Since 1857, after a long civil war, the Mexican 
Roman Catholic Church has kept apart from state matters. 
It is therefore very unusual for members of the Church to 
give their opinion on political and government affairs. 
The fact that this section is included in this chapter is 
due to a small number of significant statements about the 
external debt payments made by members of the Church in 
Mexico. It was as a result of the economic problems and 
their consequences in exacerbating the social conflicts 
that some members of the church expressed their opinions.
It was not until October 1985, that is to say, after 
the September earthquakes, that members of the Mexican 
Church started making official public statements about 
the consequences of paying or not paying the external 
debt. The earthquake incident sharpened the social and 
economic conflicts in the country to the extent that even 
the church had something to say. These open statements 
were of a different nature depending on whether they came 
from members of the senior or the junior clergy. As in 
some other Latin American countries, members of the 
junior clergy have taken a more critical position and 
even supported the Liberation Theology movement.
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It is clear that there was a radical current of 
opinion within the Roman Catholic Church in the debt 
crisis. This manifested itself, for example in September 
1985 and in a meeting organised by bishops of the Latin 
American countries in Madrid, the Mexican ex-bishop of 
Cuernavaca, Sergio Mendez Arceo, said that the most 
critical problem in Latin America, apart from the abuse 
of power by the USA, was the debt, and the best thing to 
do with it was not to pay it at all, but to cancel it 
(114). Me'ndez Arceo was a bishop in Cuernavaca, Mexico, 
up to the time when he resigned from this appointment 
because of conflicts with the Mexican Catholic Church due 
to his support for the Liberation Theology movement in 
Latin America, particularly in Nicaragua. In this meeting 
held in Madrid, Mendez Arceo said that it was Christian 
to do what was possible, but if it was not possible to 
pay, the debt should not be paid. He added that in his 
view the mission of the Church in Latin America should be 
evangelical and liberating (115).
This is perhaps to be expected from a priest of his 
politics. More surprising was that a month later, on 8th 
October 1985, the Mexican Episcopate and the Archbishop 
of Mexico made declarations in favour of discussions on 
the external debt, which could even include a moratorium. 
When they made this declaration, they said that they were 
in agreement with the US bishops; and that all of them
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were based upon the suggestions made by Pope John Paul II
(116).
Then, on 21st February 1986 , as was mentioned in 
chapter four, President de la Madrid presented to the 
political representatives of the different social groups 
and political organisations the new economic programme in 
the National Palace. In his speech President De la Madrid 
said that the Mexican government would negotiate the 
external debt again, but this time with the sole 
intention of paying according to the country’s real 
capacity, and including a contingency clause to ensure 
that the country's payments would take account of the 
behaviour of international oil prices. After this 
presidential declaration, the reaction of Jeronimo 
Prigione, Papal Nuncio sent from the Vatican, was of 
total support for the President. Jero'nimo Prigione said 
on 28th February 1986 that nobody was obliged to do the 
impossible, and Mexico had its right to re-structure its 
external debt payments according to its real economic 
possibilities. The Papal Nuncio said that the position of 
the President was serious, pragmatic and comprehensive. 
The President, Jeronimo Prigione added, had his feet on 
the ground and proposed what the country realistically 
could do. It is obvious, he continued, that the external 
payments have to be made according to the actual capacity 
of the country to pay them. This was also the position of
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the Pope. He added that the Vatican would like to 
improve the dialogue between the Church and the state in 
Mexico, as in his view it was not possible to carry on 
accusing each other because of old, past conflicts (117).
The Church held to a middle position on the debt in 
terms of policy. On 12th June 1986, four of the main 
ecclesiastical leaders of the Mexican Church, Ernesto 
Corripio Ahumada, Carlos Quintero Arce, Jeronimo 
Prigione, and Carlos Francisco Enriquez, made a joint 
public statement against the suspension of external 
payments, although at the same time they recognised that 
it was not advisable to sacrifice the Mexican people, as 
there were risks of social conflict. They recommended 
taking measures to control the inflationary process which 
most affected the lower social classes. They added that 
the Church message to its parishioners was of peace and 
tranquillity, although it also invited them to ask for 
their rights without choosing violent options (118). 
Carlos Quintero Arce, Bishop from Hermosillo, Sonora, 
said that the moratorium was not a good option, as Mexico 
had always been a responsible debtor. "I am not an 
economist", he continued, "nevertheless I realise that 
people cannot suffer any more, as they are losing 
confidence in the government". This lack of confidence, 
he added, is because people are angry to see their 
purchasing power diminishing day by day (119).
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The Church's position shifted all the time. Sixteen 
months later the position of the Mexican clergy was one 
of greater concern. On 15th October 1987, they said that 
the external debt was unpayable, and that the purchasing 
power of the population had been reduced by the 
government's external economic policy. The convenor of 
the Catholic Church in Mexico expressed the collective 
feeling of the Mexican bishops, when saying that one of 
the negative consequences of the economic policy adopted 
by the government was the reduction of the purchasing 
power of the population by a deliberate policy of 
freezing the minimum wage. As a consequence there had 
been an uneven distribution of the nation's wealth and a 
deterioration of the quality of life. Felipe Hernandez, 
the speaker for the Church, said that it was impossible 
to continue the indebtedness, thus the Mexican Church 
supported a moratorium if people's future was at stake. 
Such a recommendation, he continued, was made by the 
Episcopal Commission (Comision Episcopal de Pastoral 
Social) in a publication called An Ethical Consideration 
of the International Debt (Una Consideracion Etica de la 
Deuda Internacional) (120). Father Felipe Hernandez also 
referred to the Continental Working Day on the External 
Debt in which thousands of Mexican workers took part. He 
said that the Mexican Church supported all just struggles 
which aimed to question the severe consequences of the 
international external loans (121).
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This document produced by the Episcopal Commission 
outlined the Mexican economy’s loss of its self- 
sufficiency and the inflationary process as a
consequence of the external debt payments. It pointed out 
the reorientation of the production process towards 
exports of both goods and services. To the contrary of 
the policy traditionally followed by the clergy, which 
would normally suggest austerity in the public budget, 
this document said that one of the negative effects of 
the external debt had been the reduction in public 
spending on the social budget, which had diminished the 
quality and quantity of social and public services. The 
same document argued that the Mexican people should make 
their past and present leaders responsible for what they 
had done, and that society should take steps to demand 
the clarification of this responsibility, in other words, 
to find out who was to blame. The document also pointed 
out that the external debt crisis had nullified the 
social mobility expectations of the middle classes, while 
it had increased taxation of the poor and helped the 
owners of capital to avoid taxation. The document ended 
by saying that the debt crisis had increased violence, 
crime and organised attacks. It had also been observed 
that a large proportion of the rural population had 
migrated to the big cities, particularly Mexico City. 
From the political point of view, the document points out 
that there had been a number of criticisms of the PRI for
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its antidemocratic attitude and determination to remain 
in power (122).
On 8th August 1988, the church proposed a moratorium 
on the external debt payments as an extreme solution to 
this economic problem. In the words of the Bishop of 
Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz, Carlos Talavera, the Episcopal 
Commission considered it unjust that the heaviest burden 
should be borne by the weakest sector of society, without 
demanding greater responsibility from the international 
banks which had been the ones who had benefited from this 
crisis. Thus, the Commission exhorted the international 
banks to assume their co-responsibility, and proposed to 
the government that in any case the servicing of the debt 
would be conditional on internal economic growth. The 
Commission also suggested that an elementary moral 
principle was to restore what had been stolen from the 
nation and its people. It also criticised Mexican 
citizens who had managed to accumulate some money during 
this crisis and who had taken the money abroad, thinking 
more of themselves than of the nation. The Commission 
said that it was inhuman and anti-Christian to put 
private, entrepreneurial interests above the interest of 
survival of the population. The bishops who were members 
of this Commission ended by stating that economic growth 
did not mean development, and that the opportunity
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offered by this crisis should be used to reorientate the 
economy along healthier lines (123).
The significance of this activity by the Church was
two-fold: first, that the Church spoke out at all, and
secondly that it became increasingly hostile to the 
government to which traditionally it had usually given 
tacit support.
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Notes.-
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II) Business Organizations
(20) El Universal, 12th January 1982.
(21) El Dia, 12th August 1982.
(22) Novedades, 31st August 1982.
(23) Excelsior, 12th November 1982.
(24) El Dia, 9th March 1983.
(25) Excelsior, 9th March 1983.
(26) El Universal, 27th May 1984.
(27) El Universal, 7th June 1984.
(28) Uno mas Uno, 9th September 1984.
(29) El Sol de Me'xico, 20th September 1984.
(30) Excelsior, 9th September 1984.
(31) Uno mas Uno, 19th January 1985.
(32) El Universal, 17th March 1985.
(33) Excelsior, 16th April 1985.
(34) El Dia, 1st August 1985.
(35) This second contract was part of the package of debt
restructuring that the Mexican government negotiated with 
its international creditors in 1985. The first part was 
negotiated on 29th March 1985, when the sum of US$28,600 
million, due to mature in the short term was 
renegotiated, and a period of grace of 15 years was 
obtained. Five months later, 29th August 1985, the second 
contract was signed for US$20, 100 million due to mature 
between 1985 and 1990, with another extension of 15 
years.
(36) El Universal, 31st August 1985.
(37) Uno mas Uno, 31st October 1985.
(38) El Universal, 11th and 25th October 1985.
(39) El Dia, 17th October 1985.
(40) Excelsior, 18th October 1985.
(41) Uno mas Uno, 14th February 1986 , and El Universal 
4th February 1986.
(42) El Dia, 5th February 1986, and El Universal 7th and 
8th February 1986.
(43) El Universal, 19th February 1986.
(44) Uno mas Uno, 24th February 1986.
(45) Excelsior, 28th March and 23rd May 1986.
(46) Excelsior, 28th March and 23rd May 1986.
(47) Excelsior, 31st May 1986.
(48) Exc/lsior, 7th June 1986.
(49) El Universal, 22nd May 1986.
(50) El Universal, 2nd July and 23rd September 1986.
(51) Excelsior, 21st February 1987.
(52) Excellsior, 24th December 1987.
(53) El Universal, 31st March 1987.
(54) El Universal, 17th June 1987, and Excelsior 1st July 
1987.
(55) Uno mas Uno, 28th August 1987.
(56) El Universal, 26th December 1987.
(57) Excelsior, 30th December 1987.
(58) Uno mas Uno, 18th January 1988.
(59) El Universal, 15th February 1988.
(60) Uno mas Uno, 14th and 15th March 1988.
(61) El Financiero, 12th May 1988.
(62) El Financiero, 26th May 1988.
(63) El Financiero, 1st June 1988.
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(64) Excelsior, 5th October 1983.
(65) El Dia, 27th June 1984.
(66) Excelsior, 10th July 1984.
(67) El Dia, 8th July 1984.
(68) Uno mas Uno, 22nd July 1984.
(69) El Dia, 1st April 1985.
(70) El Dia, 12th July 1985.
(71) Excelsior, 18th July 1985.
(72) Uno mas Uno, 2nd August 1985, and Excelsior 3rd 
August 1985.
(73) El Dia, 31st August 1985.
(74) As it is quite relevant for this study, the list of 
the 75 unions that took part in the conference mentioned 
is as follows:
1.- Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas (SME)
2.- Sindicato Unico Nacional de Trabajadores 
Universitarios (SUNTU)
3.- Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Industria 
del Hierro y Acero (SNTIHA)
4.- Sindicato Obreros Libres (SOL)
5.- Central Independiente de Obreros Agricolas y 
Campesinos (CIOAC)
6.- Frente Autentico del Trabajo (FAT)
7.- Union General de Obreros y Campesinos de Mexico 
(UGOCEM-Roja)
8.- Coordinadora Nacional del Movimiento Urbano Popular 
(CONAMUP)
.  / /
9.- Sindicato Nacional Unico y Democratico de los
Trabajadores de BANCOMEX (SINUDET)
10.- Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Impulsora 
Mexicana de Telecomunicaciones (SNTIMTEL)
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11.- Sindicato Independiente Nacional de Trabajadores del 
Colegio de Bachilleres (SINTCB)
12.- Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Universidad Nacional 
Autonoma de Me'xico (STUNAM)
13.- Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Secretaria 
de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologia (SNTSDUE Seccion 33)
14.- Frente Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educacion 
Normal
15.- Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Universidad 
Iberoamericana (STUIA)
16.- Sindicato de Trabajadores de Moore Bussines
17.- Sindicato Nacional de Obreros Agricolas (SNDA)
18.- Frente Internacional de Defensa del Empleo y el 
Salario (FIDES)
19.- Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Secretaria de 
Pesca (SUTSP)
20.- Sindicato de Trabajadores Acadelnicos de la 
Universidad Autonoma de Chapingo (STAUACH)
21.- Sindicato de Trabajadores Academicos de la 
Universidad de Sonora (STAUS)
22.- Sindicato de Trabajadores Administrativos y de 
Intendencia de la Universidad Juarez Auto'noma de Tabasco 
(STAIUJAT)
23.- Sindicato de Trabajadores de Harper Wyman
24. Sindicato Unitario de Trabajadores de la Universidad 
Autonoma de Nayarit (SUNTUAN)
25.- Sindicato Autonomo de Trabajadores de Imprenta Nuevo 
Mundo (SATINM)
26.- Seccion Sindical de Academicos del SNTE del 
Instituto Nacional de Antropologia e Historia
27.- Sindicat^ de Trabajadores y Empleados de la 
Universidad Juarez del Estado de Durango (STEUJED)
28.- Sindicatc? de Trabajadores Academicos de la 
Universidad Juarez del Estado de Durango (STAUJED)
29.- Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Universidad Aut^noma 
de Zacatecas (STAUAZ)
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30.- Sindicato Independiente de Trabajadores Academicos 
de la Universidad Autonoma del Estado de Morelos 
(SITAUAEM)
31.- Delegaci^n D-lll-22, Bellas Artes, del SNTE
32.- Sindicato de Trabajadores de "El Anfora"
33.- Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Papelera 
Nacional (STIPN)
/
34.- Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de Fundidora 
Artistica
35.- Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores del Centro de 
Investigaciones y Estudios Avanzados del IPN (SUTCIEA)
36.- Seccion "Ideal" del Sindicato Nacional de 
Trabajadores de la Industria del Hierro y el Acero
3 7 . Sindicato Unitario de Trabajadores de la Universidad 
Autonoma de Sinaloa (SUNTUAS)
38.- Sindicato Independiente de Trabajadores de Editorial 
UNO (SITEUNO)
39.- Movimiento Unificador Nacional de Jubilados y 
Pensionados (MUNJP)
40.- Asociacio^n Unica de Trabajadores Administrativos (y 
Manuales de la Universidad Autonoma de Yucatan 
(AUTAMUADY)
41.- Sindicato Independiente de Trabajadores de 
Trailmobile de Mexico
42.- Sindicato, de Trabajadores Academicos de la 
Universidad Autonoma de Guerrero (STAUAG)
43.- Sindicato de Trabajadores de Montacargas de Mexico
44.- Sindicato de Trabajadores del Campo Emiliano Zapata
/
45.- Sindicato Unico de Empleados de la Universidad 
Michoacana (SUEUM)
46.- Cooperativa de Trabajadores de Refrescos Pascual
47.- Trabajadores de la Fabrica de Costura "Tirole"
48.- Seccion Sindical de Telecomunicaciones, D.F. del 
Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Secretaria de 
Comunicaciones y Transportes (SNTSCP)
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49.- Trabajadores de SICARTSA II Etapa
50.- Coordinadora Nacional de Trabajadores Bancarios
51.- Sindicato de Empleados y Trabajadores al Servicio de 
la Universidad Veracruzana (SETSUV)
52.- Sindicato de Trabajadores de Refrigeradora Tepepan 
(STERT)
53.- Sindicato de Trabajadores de Cerveceria Moctezuma,
S.A.
54.- Coordinadora de Trabajadores de la Secretaria de 
Comunicaciones y Transportes
55.- Sindicato de Trabajadores y Empleados de la 
Universidad Autonoma Benito Jua'rez de Oaxaca (STEUABJO)
56.- Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores del Centro de 
Investigacion y Docencia Econo'mica (SUTCIDE)
57.- Sindicato de Profesores de la Universidad Michoacana 
(SPUM)
58. - Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Universidad 
Autonoma de Puebla (SUNTUAP)
59.- Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Secretaria 
de Salud (Seccion 5)
60.- Seccion Nacional UPN y del SNTE
61.- Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores del Centro de 
Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropologia 
Social (SUTCIESAS)
62.- Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Secretaria 
de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos (SNSARH-Seccion 65)
6 3 . Sindicato de Personal Academico de la Universidad 
Autonoma de Zacatecas (SPAUAZ)
64.- Sindicato de Trabajadores y Empleados de la 
Universidad de Sonora (STEUS)
65.- Sindicato ^de Trabajadores Administrativos de la 
Universidad Autonoma del Estado de Mexico (STAUAEM)
66.- Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Fundidora de Hierro 
y Acero, S.A. (STFHASA)
67.- Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Fabrica de Pinturas 
OPTIMUS
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68.- Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Universidad 
Intercontinental (SUTUIC)
69.- Union Popular de Vendedores Ambulantes de Puebla "28 
de Octubre"
70.- Sindicato de Trabajadores Administrativos y de 
Intendencia al Servicio de la Universidad Autonoma de 
Guerrero (STAISUAG)
71.- Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores del Transporte 
Vertical
72.- Sindicato Independiente de Trabajadores de la 
Escuela Superior de Agricultura Hermanos Escobar 
(SITESAHE)
73.- Intersindical
74.- Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores del Colegio de 
Mexico (SUTCOLMEX)
75.- Federacion Sindical Revolucionaria
(75) Excelsior, 1st October 1985, and Uno mas Uno, 2nd 
October 1985.
(76) El Universal, 1st October 1985.
(77) Uno mas Uno, 2nd October 1985.
(78) Uno mas Uno, 5th October 1985.
(79) El Dia, 3rd October 1985.
(80) Uno mas Uno, 16th October 1985.
(81) Exce'lsior, 6th October 1985, and Uno mas Uno, 11th 
October 1985.
(82) Uno mas Uno, 19th October 1985.
(83) El Universal, 24th October 1985; Excelsior, 4th 
November 1985; Excelsior, 16th November 1985; El Dia, 
17th November 1985, and El Universal, 9th December 1985.
(84) Excel sior, 2nd February 1986, and Uno mas Uno, 4th 
February 1986.
(85) El Dia, 5th February 1986; and Uno mas Uno, 1st 
March 1986.
(86) Excelsior, 6th February 1986.
(87) Uno mas Uno, 28th February 1986.
(88) Uno mas Uno, 13th March 1986.
(89) Excelsior, 3rd May 1986.
(90) El Dia, 11th June 1986.
(91) Excelsior, 15th June 1986, and El Universal, 20th 
July 1986.
(92) Excelsior, 21st July 1986.
(93) Excelsior, 18th September 1986, 8th October 1986, 
17th October 1986, and 23rd October 1986.
(94) Uno mas Uno, 10th October 1987.
(95) Excelsior, 4th November 1987, and El Dia, 1st 
November 1987.
(96) El Dia, 4th November 1987.
(97) Excelsior, 6th November 1987.
(98) Uno mas Uno, 29th December 1987.
(99) El Dia, 28th April 1988.
(100) Uno mas Uno, 30th May 1988.
(101) El Financiero, 14th June 1988.
(102) Excelsior, 28th May 1988.
(103) Uno mas Uno, 4th July 1988.
(104) Uno mas Uno, 8th August 1988.
(105) Excelsior, 10th September 1988.
(106) Excelsior, 1st October 1988.
IV) Peasants' Organizations
(107) El Dia, 12th October 1985.
(108) Excelsior, 1st November 1987.
(109) Excelsior, 8th June 1988.
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(110) Uno mas Uno, 25th February 1986.
(111) Excelsior, 24th June 1987.
(112) Uno mas Uno, 1st February 1988.
(113) Excelsior, 18th September 1988.
V ) The Church
(114) and (115) Excelsior, 9th September 1985.
(116) Uno mas Uno, 8th October 1985.
(117) Uno mas Uno, 28th February 1986.
(118) and (119) El Universal, 12th June 1986.
(120) and (121) Uno mas Uno, 15th October 1987.
(122) La Deuda Externa de Mexico, una consideracion etica 
de la deuda internacional, Comision Episcopal de Pastoral 
Social, Pontificia Comision Justitia et Pax.
(123) Uno mas Uno, 8th August 1988.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
The Rise of the FDN and the 1988 Election
As has been seen in the last four chapters, the 
external debt issue provided the Mexican people with an 
opportunity to express their opinion about what was their 
view of Mexico's future. The different views varied from 
one extreme to another, depending on the political and 
socio-economic background of the political subjects in 
action. No doubt each of these subjects had the best of 
intentions when suggesting the potential options to 
overcome the debt problem.
This range of opinions was shaped into real 
political forces when the presidential political campaign 
began in 1987. The polarisation between those who had 
what we have called a nationalist view and those who had 
an institutionalist perspective increased. Their opinions 
on the debt and the economy developed further, sustaining 
their own views about how Mexico could achieve a more 
democratic society. Responding to this debate, the more 
nationalist sector of the PRI left the official party and 
formed political alliances with other nationalist 
parties. The institutionalist sector remained inside the 
ruling party, certain that the internationalist 
perspective on the economy would ensure, in the long 
term, the healthy economic development of the country and
239
victory in the 1988 presidential elections. The two main 
contenders in launching their campaigns stimulated a very 
intense political debate, a most unusual occurrence in 
the political life of contemporary Mexico.
I) The Break in the Ranks of the PRI and the Formation of 
the FDN
The external debt crisis provided an opportunity for 
a double response: from above and from below. From below, 
as was shown in chapter six, the Mexican people, through 
different forums and organisations, expressed their 
concern about the economic situation of the country, and 
in this way opened the debate about what they thought the 
government should do. From above, as was shown in 
chapters four and five, the external debt crisis provided 
the government with an opportunity to continue with the 
set of policies with which they intended to create a 
modern state, a more acceptable one to the international 
community. This was the view of a new team of politicians 
who gradually won positions in the Mexican government, 
slowly replacing the old team of astute, experienced but 
corporatist and often nationalist politicians. As was 
explained in chapter one, this new group of well-educated 
technocrats had a view of a modern Mexico more in tune 
with the international image of a modern state. This view
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had in several cases been formed in foreign universities 
and certainly enabled the leadership to talk confidently 
about their plans to influential foreigners.
Thus, what has been called here the "missed 
opportunity of September 1985", described in chapter 
four, had the effect, among different sectors of the 
population, of opening a debate and stirring grass root 
forces. Some of these popular groups went out on to the 
streets in protest; others organised internal debates. 
Political parties as well as educational institutions 
organized discussions, seminars and conferences to 
evaluate the magnitude and consequences of the external 
debt problem. All made suggestions concerning what the 
government should do to solve the economic problem.
At the same time, the issue of the debt crisis and 
the impossibility of finding a simple satisfactory 
economic solution to it combined to exacerbate the 
internal contradictions within the official ruling 
political party, the PRI. These contradictions produced a 
division between those members who claimed to be seeking 
toopen democratic channels of discussion, thus leading to 
further institutional reform - following the changes 
brought about by a previous political reform in 1979 - 
and those who were not readily prepared to modify the 
existing structures. This division created a faction
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inside the PRI called the Democratic Tendency (Movimiento 
de Renovacion Democratica, MRD, better known simply as 
Corriente Democra'tica). The two main leaders of the 
Democratic Tendency (Porfirio Munoz Ledo and Cuauhtemoc 
Cardenas) represented national values which, they argued, 
had to be reinstated, as there was a clear danger of 
following economic policies which only suited the 
interests of transnational capital. By September 1987 the 
Democratic Tendency had a platform of policies which 
claimed to seek a more independent, just, free and 
productive nation.
Members of the government, including the President 
himself, strongly believed in a set of liberal 
international economic policies combined with an 
incremental development of Mexican political 
institutions. Thus, the external debt crisis provided 
them with an opportunity to continue their liberal 
international economic policies, through which they 
intended to create a modern Mexican state both in 
internal and external respects. For the government, the 
debt crisis was an opportunity to open channels of 
democratic expression and representation that a modern 
state should have. It was the scene of an open debate in 
which most of the different social sectors could discuss 
and express their views. Individual personalities could 
avoid the personal responsibility of introducing an
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element of change which irritated the most conservative 
elements of the Mexican political system. The discussion 
was open because the external debt was an issue in 
itself. It was a major risk, but the government took the 
gamble.
As was mentioned in chapter one, the process of 
opening the debate and more democratic practice had its 
original roots in 1977, when the Mexican government 
introduced a political reform. For the first time a 
written law (Ley de Organizaciones Politicas y Procesos 
Electorales, LOPPE) was established to regulate the 
behaviour of the political parties and the electoral 
process. It was then that new political parties were 
registered and proportional representation became a 
central issue. The result of new proportional 
representation rules gave more seats to minority parties. 
This phenomenon is important as background to an 
understanding of some of the changes which appeared 
later. As more political parties, particularly from the 
left, gradually won greater representation in the Union 
Congress, the political atmosphere became more critical 
of PRI positions, even before the debt issue arose.
Continuing with this sort of open democratic and 
liberal political approach, the new government presented 
on 30th May 1983 their National Development Plan (Plan
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Nacional de Desarrollo), which contained a section about 
the National System of Democratic Planning (Sistema 
Nacional de Planeacio'n Democratica). This system aimed to 
use "popular consultation" as the main instrument to win 
consensus and restore faith in the political system. 
Thus, when the external debt became an issue, the 
national system of popular consultation was put into 
practice, and had to prove its viability.
Meanwhile, a different sort of political demand 
appeared inside the PRI. By October 1986 the Democratic 
Tendency had emerged as an internal faction determined to 
rescue what was then called the "historic" position of 
the PRI. Its recognised leader was Porfirio Munoz Ledo, 
former President of the PRI, Labour Minister under Luis 
Echeverria, Education Minister under Lopez Portillo, and 
permanent ambassador of Mexico to the UN. It also 
included personalities such as Carlos Tello, former 
director of the Bank of Mexico and architect of the 1982 
nationalisation of the bank system; Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, 
former governor of Michoacan and son of the popular, 
nationalist former President Lazaro Ca’rdenas; and the 
distinguished economist Ifigenia Martinez. All of these 
argued that the liberal economic policies favoured by the 
government were opening the door to financial capital and 
power, destroying the aspirations of the "revolutionary" 
sector to have a free nation.
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On 9th September 1987 the members of the Democratic 
Tendency inside the PRI, presented to the whole party a 
document which proposed policies orientated towards the 
reinstatement of "national" values, threatened in their 
view by domestic financial and transnational capital. 
This document contained a set of economic policies in 
which the external debt payments played an important 
role. The document suggested that the financial 
authorities should suspend external payments until a 
significant reduction was obtained from the creditors. In 
addition, Mexico should establish a limit to the external 
payments so it could release economic resources for 
national development. The debate continued and the 
polarisation of ideas between the nationalist and the 
institutionalist inside the party increased. On another 
front the PRI did not accept a more democratic procedure 
for the nomination of the PRI candidate for the 1988 
presidential elections, as was suggested by the 
Democratic Tendency.
By 15th December 1987 members of the Democratic 
Tendency had left the official party and created the 
Democratic Front. When resigning from the PRI, Porfirio 
Munoz Ledo said that his irrevocable and voluntary 
resignation was the result of his discovery that the 
party had given up its historical task of defending the 
values of a free nation. The PRI, he argued, had
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abandoned the vanguard role that it should assume in the 
face of the crisis. It had taken an opportunist and anti- 
popular role, against which, in the view of the 
Democratic Front, it was important to fight. The PRI had 
lost the genuine loyalty of its members and the trust of 
Mexican citizens; it did not allow for changing 
aspirations, and it had become an obstacle in the way of 
a wholly democratic society. Members of the Democratic 
Tendency tried first to shake the PRl's conscience by 
putting forward a project which recalled the principles 
of the Mexican constitution; mainly trying to recover 
sovereignty. However, they were attacked and 
marginalised. Thus they were forced to shift from a 
critical to a dissident position until they formed the 
progressive opposition. They became determined to form a 
democratic front with an alliance of different forces and 
political parties, which would present the presidential 
electoral campaign of Cuauhtemoc Ca'rdenas.
During the presidential campaign of Cuauhtemoc 
Cardenas the Democratic Front soon formed electoral 
alliances with other political parties and forces, and 
changed its name to National Democratic Front (Frente 
Democratico Nacional, FDN). The first group they made an 
alliance with was the Authentic Party of the Mexican 
Revolution (Partido Autentico de la Revolucio'n Mexicana, 
PARM). Immediately afterwards, the Cardenist Front of
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National Reconstruction Party (Partido Frente Cardenista 
de Recons truccion Nacional, PFCRN) joined them. This 
party had changed its name from the Socialist Workers' 
Party (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores, PST), a 
party originally linked to the PRI's oil workers' union. 
(It has been alleged that former President Echeverria 
(1970-76) had created the PST to defuse left-wing 
discontent). Later on, the National Democratic Front 
made an alliance with the Socialist Populist Party 
(Partido Popular Socialista, PPS). Finally, the Mexican 
Socialist Party (Partido Mexicano Socialista, PMS) joined 
them. They also reached agreements with other political 
groups and parties such as the Social Democratic Party 
(Partido Socialdemocrata), the Mexican Green Party 
(Partido Verde Mexicano), the Liberal Party (Partido 
Liberal), the Democratic Unity (Unidad Democra'tica), the 
Progressive Forces (Fuerzas Progresistas), and the 
National Council of Workers and Peasants of Mexico 
(Consejo Nacional Obrero y Campesino de Mexico). In this 
way the National Democratic Front, the FDN, gave battle 
to the PRI in the 1988 presidential elections. It is 
worth mentioning here that well after the elections were 
over, the FDN and the PMS formed a new single party 
called Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la 
Revolucio'n Democra'tica, PRD).
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II) The Nominations for the Presidential Elections
The procedure for the nomination of the candidate 
for the 1988 presidential elections inside the PRI was 
slightly different from that of previous years. As has 
been shown, the pressure that influential party 
dissidents brought to bear upon senior members of the PRI 
created the Democratic Tendency. As a result of this 
pressure and the demands made by this Tendency, the PRI 
broke with the longstanding tradition of a secret 
nomination. This time it opened the selection process by 
naming, one month before the final decision, six 
potential contenders for the party's nomination. The 
final decision favoured Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the 
Budget and Planning Minister, who played a major role in 
drawing up President de la Madrid government's economic 
strategy. Salinas de Gortari's close association with 
President de la Madrid's structural economic reform, 
which reduced the state's traditionally dominant role in 
the economy, was a major factor in tipping the balance in 
Salinas's favour when the President made his choice. The 
nomination of Harvard-educated Salinas de Gortari was a 
clear decision in favour of the package of liberal 
international economic policies that the de la Madrid 
government originally introduced.
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The conservative National Action Party (Partido 
Accion Nacional, PAN), the traditionally second electoral 
force in the country, presented the candidature of Manuel 
Clouthier, a populist businessman from Sinaloa, an 
agriculturally rich state in the North of Mexico. Also 
the right-wing Mexican Democratic Party (Partido 
Democrata Mexicano, PDM), of far less electoral 
importance, nominated Gumersindo Magana Negrete as its 
candidate.
The Mexican Socialist Party (Partido Mexicano 
Socialista, PMS), formed through the then recent merger 
of five small parties of the left, including the Unified 
Socialist Party of Mexico (Partido Socialista Unificado 
de Mexico, PSUM) and the Mexican Workers' Party (Partido 
Mexicano de los Trabajadores, PMT), presented the 
candidature of Herberto Castillo. Castillo was an 
engineer who gained prominence as a political leader 
during the 1968 student movement. Originally, he founded 
and led the PMT until it merged with the larger PSUM to 
form the PMS.
Members of the National Democratic Front made an 
electoral alliance with the Authentic Party of the 
Mexican Revolution (Partido Autentico de la Revolucion 
Mexicana, PARM), and with the Popular Socialist Party 
(Partido Popular Socialista, PPS) to present the
candidature of Cuauhtelnoc Ca'rdenas, the son of the now 
legendary President Lazzaro Cardenas, who expropriated 
British and American oil companies in Mexico in March 
1938. Cuauhtemoc Ca'rdenas was also the presidential 
candidate of the Cardenist Front of National 
Reconstruction Party (Partido Frente Cardenista de 
Reconstruccio^n Nacional, PFCRN) which was the old PST. 
Some other political organizations made alliances with 
the FDN to support the candidature of Cardenas. Thus, 
Cuauht/noc Cardenas presented himself as the standard- 
bearer of the Ca'rdenas legacy, preaching nationalism, 
anti-imperialism and "progressive" policies.
At the beginning of the political campaign, the PMS 
and the PARM wanted to form a centre-left opposition 
front with a single presidential candidate. But as the 
National Democratic Front was very strong and received a 
lot of support, the PARM decided to nominate Cuauhtemoc 
Cardenas as its presidential candidate. The PMS decided 
to nominate Herberto Castillo for the presidential race. 
However, Herberto Castillo withdrew his candidature in 
favour of Cuauhtemoc Ca'rdenas, so all the left-wing 
parties had just one candidate unifying forces around the 
FDN. The only exception was the extreme left-wing 
Revolutionary Workers' Party (Partido Revolucionario de 
los Trabajadores, PRT), of Trotskyist extraction, which
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nominated Rosario Ibarra de Piedra for the electoral 
race.
Thus, there were five candidates and eight political
parties in the final presidential race. Four of those
parties presented a common front supporting the same 
candidate.
Carlos Salinas de Gortari PRI
Manuel Clouthier PAN
Gumersindo Magana Negrete PDM
Cuauhtemoc Ca'rdenas FDN (PMS, PARM, P PS, PFCRN)
Rosario Ibarra de Piedra PRT
III) The Debt Crisis Issue in the 1988 Presidential 
Campaign
The political campaign started late in 1987 and the 
main issue throughout the whole of the electoral process 
was the external debt crisis and its implications.
In September 1987, before Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari was chosen as the PRI candidate, he said that the 
solution to the external debt problem would be found in
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the continuity of the economic strategy that President de 
la Madrid's government started. He said that "today was 
not the moment for sudden changes. The task was to 
preserve the institutional reforms being implemented, 
without violent modifications, with gradualism advised by 
political prudence" (1).
On 4th October 1987, Carlos Salinas de Gortari was 
selected by President Miguel de la Madrid to be the PRI 
candidate. He was then seen as the man behind the current 
administration's drive to open up the economy and 
streamline the state apparatus (2). Later in October 
1987, Salinas confirmed that he would continue current 
economic policies, particularly regarding the opening of 
the economy and the slimming of the state apparatus. He 
stated explicitly that current policies would be 
maintained. Thus his first announcement of an intended 
cabinet appointment was that of his own successor as 
Minister of Programming and Budget Control. For this job 
Salinas picked Pedro Aspe, one of his close 
collaborators, credited with having had an influence 
second only to Salinas' own in the shaping of the current 
administration's economic strategy (3). In his acceptance 
speech, Salinas made a point of explicitly promising to 
satisfy the demands of workers, peasants and middle 
classes suffering the drastic erosion of real wages and 
the increasing unemployment of recent years (4). Thus he
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was willing to advance a strategy focused on winning an 
election, as well as sustaining existing policies.
At the beginning of 1988, Salinas attempted to 
distance himself from the outgoing administration, as 
economic conditions worsened. The first indication of 
this attitude was when Salinas publicly questioned the 
wisdom of devaluing the peso. He argued that the drastic 
devaluation had wiped out the confidence of Mexican 
people. In particular, on 7th January 1988, Salinas said 
during a political meeting in Tlaxcala: "neither in 
economic matters nor in any other field am I tied to any 
dogma or formula... I have no commitment to any 
continuity, apart from strengthening the fundamental 
principles of the Mexican people" (5).
During his political campaign, Salinas spoke of 
modernising the country's political and economic 
structures. He seemed more inclined to follow the path of 
modernisation, which implied a further liberalisation of 
the economy, and a major democratisation of the PRI 
internal life, including the country's electoral 
contests. He usually talked of a programme of government 
which would focus on non-inflationary economic growth, 
streamlining the public sector, liberalisation of trade, 
and the modernisation of production. The debt problem was
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thus part (though a key part) of a whole reforming 
programme.
On 17th October 1988, during an official ceremony to 
extend the anti-inflationary "pacto de solidaridad 
econo1nican created by de la Madrid's government, 
President-elect Salinas said that one of his first acts 
of government would be to negotiate a reduction of the 
net transfer abroad of resources, in other words, the 
reduction of Mexico's debt payments. This is explained by 
the fact that the outgoing administration had hardened 
its attitude towards Mexico's debt position a few months 
before Salinas was due to take office. De la Madrid 
announced an intention to cut public spending and 
accelerate the privatisation of state enterprises. This 
was designed to meet the approval of Washington, which 
responded with a US$3.5 billion bridging loan. In 
addition the government of Mexico received official 
praise from the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve on 
"the sustained adjustment effort undergone by the Mexican 
economy" (6). This was intended as a signal to other 
creditors.
Salinas kept a low profile in the period before his 
inauguration as President (1st December 1988), although 
there were indications that he would follow moderate 
reforming policies. He campaigned on a promise to
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modernise the economy, but many of the measures open to 
him had already been taken. State enterprises had been 
reduced in number by more than half and government 
spending decreased by 35%, while trade protectionism was 
largely dismantled. Salinas was committed to maintaining 
the exchange rate freeze. In other words, liberal 
economic polices which were started during de la 
Madrid's government were continued and Salinas was there 
to make sure that they would be continued.
At his inauguration ceremony as President of Mexico 
(1st December 1988), Salinas gave a commitment to open up 
Mexico's political life. On foreign debt, he stated: "I 
declare emphatically that above the interests of the 
creditors are the interests of Mexicans" (7). However, he 
was still going to negotiate and try to pay off the debt. 
He consolidated his political position by selecting a 
cabinet including old-guard politicians and new- 
generation technocrats.
On the other hand, for the FDN, its presidential 
candidate and all the political groups which supported 
him, the government was not tackling the problem as it 
should. The FDN therefore proposed a platform of economic 
policies which were expressed in every political meeting. 
After certain economic considerations, prepared mainly by
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the economist Ifigenia Martinez, the FDN made six 
proposals:
a) To suspend immediately the accumulated external debt 
service as it stood at that time, in the understanding 
that it would be paid gradually when the government 
reached an agreement with the creditors.
b) The President, after consulting the Union Congress, 
should prepare a package for the new debt renegotiation, 
taking into account the net productivity of the external 
credits.
c) To adjust the capital, the interest, the terms, and 
the periods of grace, taking into account the real 
capacity of the debtor institutions to pay.'
d) To allocate only 10% of export earnings to the payment 
of the accumulated debt, so that the rest could be 
directed towards reactivating the economy. This measure 
would remain in place at least until a more equitable and 
realistic agreement could be reached with the creditors, 
giving preference in payment to those who were more 
sympathetic towards the new terms.
e) To explore immediately access to new credit lines with 
international institutions, particularly Latin American 
ones, in order to finance exports and investment 
projects. These new credits should only be accepted with 
those institutions which accepted the new Mexican 
position in this debt negotiation.
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f) The political parties which agreed with this position 
should support the new negotiating position of Mexico, 
through a mass demonstration, and encourage a movement to 
gain the support of all social sectors.
During his political campaign, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, 
presidential candidate for the FDN, committed himself to 
championing the spirit of the 1910 Mexican Revolution. 
This involved protecting private property, reducing 
federal control over state and municipal governments, 
implementing land reform and stimulating agriculture. 
Cardenas proposed a return to more left-wing 
nationalistic policies, to reduce oil exports and to 
limit foreign-debt payments.
When Castillo pulled out as presidential candidate 
for the PMS and formed an alliance with the FDN, a new 
12-point manifesto was agreed. This manifesto involved a 
commitment to end presidentialism and corporativism (as 
was shown in chapter one, the two characteristic elements 
of the Mexican political system); to implement a 
proportional representation voting system; to free the 
press and provide the right to information; to end the 
use of the armed forces for domestic repression. It also 
proposed a commitment to a mixed economy but the 
maintenance of state responsibilities for transport, 
communications, petrochemicals, large-scale mining and
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the steel industry, banking, insurance, and foreign 
trade. Particularly on the external debt, the FDN 
proposed the suspension of service payments and the 
negotiation of new terms alongside other debtor nations. 
Castillo in particular had wanted to secure the total 
suspension of debt payments.
Following the 6th July elections and the debated 
victory of Salinas, there was clear evidence of real 
opposition against the external debt payments. The 
opposition was reflected in the creation of a social 
movement of national proportions. Using the debt issue as 
a main platform, in October 1988, Cardenas proposed to 
the left the establishment of a unified mass party. That 
is how the Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de 
la Revolucion Democratica, PRD) was created.
The PRD included in its manifesto the tackling of 
the external debt problem by the six above-mentioned 
proposals which the FDN and Cuauhtemoc Cardenas had used 
during its political campaign.
Thus, the debt crisis issue provided the PRI, the 
FDN, and the PAN with an opportunity to express their 
political views about the nation. For the PRI, this was 
the opportunity to create a respectable image of Mexico 
abroad; the image of a country who everybody would like
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to trade and negotiate with, a country which could meet 
its international responsibilities and face the world 
without shame and dishonour. For the PRI this was also 
the opportunity to introduce substantial economic reforms 
of a liberal and international nature. With this package 
also came domestic economic reforms which put an end to 
the large governmental subsidies, and reformed state 
institutions. All these changes were intended to create a 
modern state which could interact equitably in the global 
context.
For the FDN and even for the PAN, the debt crisis 
issue provided them with an opportunity to reclaim 
national values which had been ignored by the PRI state 
for the Mexican population; stop the immoderate 
intervention of foreign capital in the Mexican economy; 
keep oil export revenue in Mexico, so as to be able to 
grow and protect national industry; stop the drain of 
Mexican natural and monetary resources abroad use them 
internally to expand education and health services for 
the Mexicans; offer justice, democracy and the right of a 
free vote to the people.
The political contest was intense and stimulated the 
active participation of many Mexicans. This was quite 
unusual in contemporary Mexico, as normally people know 
the results of an election before it takes place. This
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was not the case in 1988 and the population took a more 
active and responsible attitude.
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IV) Results of the Election
The elections on 6th July 1988 were for the 
Presidency, 500 federal deputies, 32 senators, several 
state governors, and hundreds of municipal mayors. The
results for the presidency, according to the Federal
Electoral Commission were as follows:
votes percentage
PRI 9,641,329 50.36
PAN 3,267,159 17.07
PDM 199,984 1.04
FDN 5,956,988 31.11
PRT 80,052 0.42
Total 19,145,512 100.00
The proportion of votes gained by each individual
political party was as follows:
percentage
PRI 50.36
PAN 17.07
PDM 1.04
PPS 10.53 "
PARM 6.27 31.11 FDN
PMS 3.77 r
PFCRN 10.54
— ^
PRT 0.42
total 100.00
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M J Clouthier C Salinas C Cardenas
Valid
votes votes
TOTAL 19 ,145 ,512 3,267 ,159
Aguascalientes 168 899 47 997
Baja California Nte 413 953 100 951
Baja California Sur 85 643 16 273Campeche 116 107 14 364Coahuila 328 239 50 349Colima 97 316 14 404
Chiapas 656 195 22 319
Chihuahua 521 995 199 334Distrito Federal 2,904 169 639 081Durango 356 446 60 546
Guanajuato 726 312 217 420Guerrero 510 797 12 450Hidalgo 421 893 24 638Jalisco 1,194 247 367 350Mexico 2,331 579 380 784Michoacan 614 899 63 186Morelos 278 208 20 699Nayarit 205 214 11 731Nuevo Leo'n 704 156 166 915Oaxaca 628 155 29 111Puebla 1,091 658 107 718Queretaro 238 058 46 251Quintana Roo 94 322 9 138San Luis Potosi 380 418 80 473Sinaloa 623 904 200 066Sonora 410 386 85 579Tabasco 268 071 14 078
Tamaulipas 470 309 46 589Tlaxcala 184 000 10 818Veracruz 1,516 257 78 982Yucatan 307 657 95 950Zaca tecas 293 650 31 613
% votes % votes %
17.07 9,641 ,329 50.36 5,956 ,988 31.11
28.42 84 800 50.21 31 541 18.67
24.39 151 739 36.66 153 949 37.19
19.00 46 267 54.02 22 157 25.87
12.37 82 293 70.88 18 920 16.30
15.34 178 147 54.27 98 320 29.95
14.80 46 549 47.83 34 778 35.74
3.39 591 786 89.91 42 482 6.45
38.19 284 896 54.50 35 340 6.77
22.01 791 531 27.25 1,429 312 49.22
16.99 226 822 63.63 67 081 18.82
29.93 319 798 44.03 159 831 22.01
2.44 309 202 60.53 182 864 35.80
5.84 273 041 64.72 119 214 28.26
30.76 508 407 42.57 285 050 23.87
16.33 694 051 29.79 1,202 679 51.58
10.28 142 700 23.21 394 534 64.16
7.44 93 869 33.74 160 379 57.65
5.72 116 079 56.56 75 529 36.80
23.70 507 524 72.08 26 941 3.83
4.63 400 833 63.81 190 029 30.25
9.87 781 085 71.55 193 142 17.69
19.43 150 783 63.34 37 633 15.81
9.69 61 973 65.70 22 772 24.14
21.15 259 625 68.25 33 528 8.81
32.07 317 029 50.81 104 531 16.75
20.85 281 464 68.59 40 937 9.98
5.25 199 166 74.30 53 449 19.94
9.91 279 041 59.33 141 793 30.15
5.88 110 780 60.21 57 034 31.00
5.21 948 971 62.59 470 758 31.05
31.19 206 375 67.08 4 964 1.61
10. 77 194 303 66.17 65 507 22.31
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It is important to point out that 19,145,512 votes 
represent just over fifty percent of the 38,074,926 
registered voters. Even this proportion was higher than 
normal in Mexican presidential elections.
These were the official results according to the 
Federal Electoral Commission. Nevertheless, as was 
explained in chapter one and due to the nature of the 
Mexican political system, the results of the electoral 
process in Mexico have been altered ever since the 
existence of free electoral campaigns. The PRI regularly 
obtains more votes that the number of registered voters 
who actually vote: in other words, non-existent votes are 
added to ensure the PRI’s victory. Thus, as always, it is 
very difficult to say what the real results were this 
time. Considering that Mexico was passing through a 
severe economic and political crisis around July 1988, it 
is very difficult to believe that only 19,145,512 people 
went to vote, when there were 38,074,926 registered 
voters.
There was speculation in the media that a lot of 
votes for the opposition were not counted. The PAN and 
the FDN accused the PRI of electoral fraud. The results 
were issued a full week after the election day. The truth 
is that nobody knows what the ’true’ results of the
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election were. Most Mexicans considered the results only 
an approximation, and most believed that Salinas and 
Ca'rdenas came much closer to each other than the official 
results showed. The fact that Cuauhtemoc Cardenas scored 
a massive victory in the Federal District (Mexico City, 
where he received 1,429,312 votes or 49.22% of the total 
against Salinas's 27.25% and Clouthier's 22.01%), made 
people think that the electoral results were correct only 
where the opposition had enough people to watch over each 
local ballot box, but in places where this did not 
happen, many opposition votes were not counted.
Ca'rdenas was also far ahead in his home state of 
Michoacan (64.16% of the votes cast), and in the state of 
Morelos (57.65%). Ca'rdenas also claimed victory in the 
states of Guerrero and Veracruz where, he said, there was 
widespread fraud against his coalition. Ca'rdenas also won 
in the federal states of Baja California, Federal 
District, Estado de Mexico, Michoacan y Morelos, a total 
of states never attained before in the history of modern 
Mexico.
Clouthier lost in Sinaloa, his home state, which 
was extremely difficult for the local population to 
believe. It was argued that many votes were destroyed. As 
was explained in chapter one, a very strong 
characteristic of the Mexican political system is its
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local character, thus, it is hard to believe that 
Clouthier lost in the federal state of Sinaloa. It is 
relevant to point out here that Clouthier was found dead 
in a car accident a year after the elections. This 
incident is difficult to understand without associating 
it with the protest that he and his supporters made after 
the results of the presidential campaign.
Thus, as has been seen in chapters four, five and 
six, the debt crisis became a matter of conversation 
among most Mexicans, and a crucial and sensitive point 
for all political organizations in Mexico. Gradually from 
1982 onward, the media increasingly covered all shades of 
opinions concerning this problem. It had therefore 
developed into a fundamental issue by the time the 
presidential political campaign began, and particularly 
when Mexicans had to vote on 6th July 1988. A larger 
proportion of the population than ever went to vote, and 
although 19,145,512 votes represented only over fifty 
percent of the total number of registered voters, this 
was a significant proportion by Mexican standards. The 
debt issue together with the polemical discussion about 
the type of government that Mexico should have - more 
nationalist, more internationalist - acted as a powerful 
stimulant to active political participation. This was 
reflected in the results of the 1988 elections.
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In a society such as that of Mexico where the level 
of political consciousness has never been highly 
developed, the experience of having to live in an economy 
where purchasing power diminished year by year, stirred 
some Mexicans from their passive attitude. External debt 
payments and the necessity of meeting them or not - as 
proposed by the institutionalists or the nationalists - 
became the cause of intense discussion and active 
participation. The two possible alternatives presented to 
Mexican society to solve this economic dilemma were 
presented by the senior economic members of the 
government and the PRI during electoral times on the one 
hand, and by the left-wing political organizations and 
the nationalist groups such as the FDN on the other hand. 
Both had an genuine intention to present the most viable 
economic programme to the nation; the difference was in 
the view of the nation that each had. Although the 
external payments were originally an economic issue, it 
became a political and fundamental matter, central to the 
nature of the new state.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusions
I) The Impact of the Debt Crisis
There have been numerous studies of the debt crisis 
from a global perspective, from a Latin American 
perspective, and even from a Mexican one. However, very 
few studies have so far addressed the political dimension 
of the crisis, and have examined the effects of the 
crisis on political stability and democratic practice in 
Mexico. This research has focused on the political 
dimension of the crisis, in order to make good this 
important omission in the existing literature. This 
thesis has explored in particular two closely related 
questions about the practice of politics in Mexico. 
First, it has explored the role which political debates 
and political pressures have played in shaping the 
response of the Mexican state to one of the gravest 
crisis faced by the country. Second, the thesis has, by 
studying these aspects of the crisis, illuminated the 
common political practice of the Mexican state.
This work has analysed the political forces involved 
in the domestic debate surrounding the negotiations 
between the Mexican state and the IMF during this crisis. 
It interpreted the various economic and political 
pressures that different Mexican social groups exercised 
upon the Mexican state. The social actors taken into
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account in this study were people involved in the 
political arena such as politicians, bureaucrats and 
senior members of the state; institutions with socio­
economic interests inside civil society such as workers' 
unions, chambers of private organizations, banks, 
peasants' organizations, the church, the press and civil 
associations.
This new political debate emerged in Mexican society 
after August 1982, and brought some elements of 
compromise. The thesis has shown that slowly but steadily 
from August 1982, different groups in Mexican society 
started giving their opinions about what they considered 
had to be done regarding the external debt negotiations 
between the state and the IMF. Some of them were in 
favour of paying 'peso' by 'peso', including all the 
interest that the international financial community was 
asking for. Others asked for longer and better payment 
conditions, from an intermediate position of not 
repudiating the debt, but not accepting the rules of the 
game proposed by the IMF and the private international 
banks. A third group was in favour of defaulting on the 
debt altogether. In a space of four to five years the 
general opinion moved from paying to defaulting. The 
position of the Mexican government changed too: from 
paying and accepting every condition imposed by the 
international financial community, to paying only to the
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extent of not affecting the growth of the nation's 
economy.
The thesis has demonstrated how public opinion 
concerning what the external debt negotiations between 
the Mexican state and the IMF should have been, generated 
a new political debate through newspapers and other 
media. The voice of different political sectors was 
heard, and although the government did not manage to 
respond directly to those voices when facing the IMF's 
negotiators, the political debate inside Mexican society 
was substantially extended. This political debate went 
further and stimulated the formation of new political 
alternatives. Alternative political organizations 
received popular support, to the extent that the number 
of seats in the Union Congress taken by the opposition in 
the 1988 general elections was almost 50 per cent of the 
number held by the official party. That is to say, 260 
seats won by the official party and 240 seats shared 
among the different opposition parties (including left 
and right).
Interestingly enough, the debt issue has been so 
central to life in contemporary Mexico that it has 
prompted many different political groups to express 
their opinions, and so to create a more participative 
society, where people feel it is their duty to give their
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political opinion and to express their ideas. This is a 
very relevant point because the tradition of Mexican 
society is rather to remain passive towards significant 
changes in public life. But this time, the economic 
contradictions of the repayment of the external debt have 
made the Mexican population express their disagreement 
with the government. The external debt has made some 
sectors of Mexican society take a more critical attitude 
towards matters of public life, and this is a significant 
event in Mexican society. However, the government paid 
very little attention (if any at all) to what the 
population said, particularly at the time when the 
government had to face its international creditors.
The political pressure that public opinion has 
exerted upon the government has forced the latter to 
adopt two strategies: on the one hand, to open the 
public debate to all sectors, but not to follow the 
suggestions made by public opinion; on the other hand, to 
exercise a repressive attitude towards individual people 
who have been more critical of the government's policies 
(that is the case of both a number of strongly critical 
journalists, some of whom have been assassinated, and the 
long list of the 'disappeared' that the U.N. has 
presented to the Mexican government and which has not 
been explained). This repressive attitude towards 
individual people has led to a reaction: discontent has
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increased to the extent that leftist political groups 
unified and formed a single coalition of parties to 
present just one candidate to the latest presidential 
elections on 6th July 1988. This social and political 
discontent has gone so far as to create a radical 
alteration of the political forces in Mexico. It is clear 
now that in Mexico the model of a single dominant party 
(PRI), or even a two-party system (PRI - PAN), no longer 
fits the rich variety of political opinion. The state has 
been forced to accept a new higher level of pluralism 
than before. For the first time since 1968 significant 
sectors of Mexican society expressed their discontent and 
political opinion.
As it was seen in chapter three, the financial 
community was forced to find a negotiating mechanism 
including a financial package of aid and reforms. Thus, 
using the political momentum of the change of 
presidential regime, members of the IMF presented to the 
new incoming presidential cabinet a set of financial 
policies which would ensure Mexico's capacity to pay its 
external debt. This financial plan was not an innovation; 
on the contrary, it followed what the IMF usually 
required as a classic package of adjustment regarding 
domestic economic policies. This package consisted of 
cuts in the public sector expenditure, increases in 
exports, and rescheduling the external debt payments and
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debt service. A national economy was then oriented 
towards the development of exports, and workers' wages, 
especially in the public sector, were reduced. The 
reduction in workers' incomes lowered the family standard 
of living. The gradual deterioration of the family 
standards of living, together with continuous inflation, 
made many Mexicans question the way the government was 
handling the economy, and they started wondering whether 
Mexico should carry on paying its external debt or not.
The awakening of a political consciousness 
contributed to the generation of an important debate that 
shaped the contest of the presidential political 
campaign, as was seen in chapter seven. For the first 
time ever many Mexicans followed their political 
consciousness and challenged the PRI's hegemony. In fact, 
the FDN was created, presenting a serious alternative 
presidential candidate. The outcome of the presidential 
campaign showed the broad support that the FDN had among 
the middle classes of the centre of the country. This 
was particularly enphasised by the electoral results, 
which resulted in a clear win in favour of the FDN in 
five federal states, something never before seen in the 
recent political history of Mexico. In the end, the PRI 
won the presidential elections; nevertheless, many people 
alleged that there was a great "electoral alchemy" 
(fraud). What is true is that many Mexicans gave their
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support to both the FDN and the PAN, instead of to the 
PRI.
In spite of the electoral results, it is certain 
that the debt crisis debate and the alternative electoral 
options generated by the economic crisis contributed 
towards shaping a new political practice in Mexico. The 
pressure put upon the political institutions and 
governmental apparatus contributed to a change in 
democratic practice in Mexico. The way in which politics 
will be conducted in Mexico after this six-year period 
will have to take into account public opinions and their 
natural channels of expression. It may have to open its 
approaches to allow for a greater degree of involvement 
of its population, or find a means of repressing such 
involvement.
II) The Change in Democratic Practice in Mexico
The two political alternatives presented to 
Mexico as a consequence of the external debt crisis 
envisaged a different sort of state. The political
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alliance formed by the FDN with other left-wing political 
organizations originally for electoral reasons, wanted to 
have in Mexico a state that could appeal to national 
values and give priority to national development. On the 
other hand, the project of a state that the government 
and the PRI members had in mind was for a nation that 
could open its doors to foreign capital investment, and 
expand the free market.
Various factors were involved in the Mexican 
government's decision to borrow abroad: the historical 
role of the Mexican state in its connection and relation 
with the private sector; the peculiarity of a 
presidentialist and political patronage system; the 
pattern of capitalist development that Mexico had been 
pursuing, incorporated into and dependent on the USA. 
These factors, in conjunction with the interaction of 
international economic events, forced the Mexican 
government to adopt a conscious economic strategy of 
borrowing money from abroad. In fact, as has been seen in 
this work, the foreign debt was an explicit policy of 
state management during President de la Madrid's 
government, and appears to have been the same in 
President Salinas' government too. Not to have chosen 
this path would have meant taking a political risk which 
would have put in jeopardy much of the state employment 
and social provision on which large sectors of Mexican
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society had come to depend. Thus, it was vital for the 
government to borrow money in order to retain business 
confidence, strengthen popular support, satisfy the 
consumer desires of the high and middle classes, and 
respond to a specific set of state interests.
There were signs that the Mexican political system was 
passing through a political crisis. The old system of 
corruption, patronage and favouritism started to be very 
unpopular with many middle class Mexicans. The structures 
of the state apparatus were not responding to a more 
complex reality, a reality which included a doubling of 
the population in less than 20 years. The old way of 
governing had started to be seen as obsolete.
Parallel to this process a major economic crisis, 
which was not exclusive to Mexico (as was seen in chapter 
two), affected the structures of the whole system. The 
first signs were noticed in the agricultural sector, and 
were later apparent in heavy industry, finance and 
commerce. The consequent political crisis of legitimacy 
found a policy vacuum in which there were no easy 
alternatives to offer to the population. The popular 
answer was to open the channels of discussion and 
democratic practice. Thus, public opinion was encouraged 
and public debate became the fashion of the time. In
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this space the external debt crisis problem became the 
issue for discussion and debate.
The inherent conflicts of the financial crisis 
intensified the problems, causing a real internal 
economic crisis and feeding a political crisis of 
credibility in the institutions of the Mexican state. So 
the antagonism that people felt against inflation soon 
turned into active political discontent, as shown in the 
1988 presidential election. People went to the ballot 
boxes to find an alternative to the PRI. Tired of not 
having an answer from the government, large sectors of 
the population organized themselves and sought change.
Due to the external debt problem, a number of 
sectors of Mexican society expressed their views publicly 
for the first time ever. As seen in chapters five and 
six, many Mexicans, through their trade unions, pointed 
out what they thought was the solution to the external 
debt crisis. Members of the Union Congress representing 
different political parties put pressure upon the 
financial authorities to negotiate the external debt in a 
more flexible way for Mexico. At one time it looked as if 
the general voice of the Congress was against the 
policies followed by the government. Even the banks and 
the private industrial sector were gradually changing 
their minds, from a more optimistic position which
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considered the possibility of paying the total amount of 
the external debt, to a more moderate one in which they 
thought it was better to negotiate lower payments and 
even the suspension of interest. The workers and peasants 
were more radical from the beginning; they called for a 
moratorium from the early days and maintained this 
position throughout the process. Even the Church had 
something to say, which in the Mexican context was a very 
surprising thing; its members thought that it was not 
right to pay money abroad when the majority of the 
population was suffering the drastic consequences of 
these payments.
The pressure that these sectors put upon society 
forced the creation of alternative forms of political 
organization. The birth of the FDN is the best example of 
this. The results in the 1988 presidential election, 
though undoubtedly distorted by the ruling party, were a 
signal of the degree of discontent that the population 
felt with the government and its economic policies. The 
economic problem could not be resolved on its own terms, 
and invaded the space of the political arena. The Mexican 
population reclaimed its own space and made its voice 
heard. Some channels of communications were opened. A 
more democratic context was created, and a more open and 
participative society was interested in the political 
campaign. Among other issues, the Mexican population
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wanted an end to corruption, and it was thought that to 
take an active part in the political campaign would also 
help to prevent a massive distortion of votes in favour 
of the PRI.
As a result of the pressure of these groups, the 
government took the risk of opening up the debate. The 
alternative was either a more democratic practice 
accepted legitimately from inside the state institutions, 
or massive discontent and organised protest that could 
have ended in violence. The Mexican government opted for 
the first alternative, and with it, opened the space for 
a more democratic practice. People became involved in a 
more tangible level of politics at a local level by 
giving their opinions about the external debt problem and 
their personal views of politics. The opening of the 
debate was partly imposed by the need felt by the 
population to express its views, though it could also 
have been an alternative strategy that the government 
followed at the time. This double process, from above and 
below, made the complex reality of this democratic 
process more interesting to study. On the one hand, the 
government adopted the strategy of borrowing more money 
to allow the economic system to continue within the same 
parameters of economic privileges and political 
stability; on the other, the government also encouraged 
political debate to give the society a more democratic
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share of the values of the nation. Thus, the risk was a 
double one, and the government faced it on both fronts: 
the economic one with more foreign loans, and the 
political one with a more open attitude.
This political opening would not have been a reality 
without the solid roots that the 1977 political reforms 
had introduced. The political participation and the 
electoral process in Mexico had had a preliminary 
transformation to meet the demands of a modern state 
after 1977. It was with the LOPPE (Ley de Organizaciones 
Political y Procesos Electorales) that this change first 
appeared. These changes did not stop there. Gradually, 
and through different elections, every three years the 
opposition parties managed to win more and more seats in 
the Union Congress. This process continued until it 
gradually built up a substantial opposition in Congress. 
The deputies and senators representing the different 
sectors of the opposition formed coalitions to pursue 
particular policies. In this way, and for the first time 
ever, the PRI found a real contest and debate within the 
Congress. The opposition has been stronger in pointing 
out what it wanted. This new role played by the 
opposition has sharpened the debates within the Union 
Congress and prepared the scenario for the external debt 
debate in public.
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III) The General Feeling about Changing Democratic 
Practice
Numerous authors have written about the latest 
political changes in Mexico. Most of them coincide in 
recognising that Mexico’s political life has gradually 
been given new life since the mid-1970s. Most of them 
acknowledge that the Federal Law on Political 
Organizations and Electoral Procedures of 1977, written 
by the then Minister of the Interior, Jesus Reyes 
Heroles, was the firt step towards more democratic 
political procedures. Since then, there has been the 
legal framework for a more pluralistic society. However, 
it has been only recently that a more democratic practice 
has been exercised. This thesis has attempted to 
associate this phenomenon to the existence of the 
external debt crisis of the 1980s. This is the position 
taken by a number of other writers, whose relevant work 
is outlined below. However, the research undertaken in 
this thesis extends the work of these writers by 
providing extensive evidence of the political debate in 
Mexico through a detailed analysis of Mexican press 
reportage during the relevant period.
In 1987 Judith Gentleman referred to the crisis from 
1982 onwards in this way: "... the current period may be 
viewed as a period of transition for Mexico's 
authoritarian political system potentially leading to an
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intensification of the authoritarian framework in 
response to crisis, or perhaps shifting to a more liberal 
competitive mode, or perhaps simply leading to an erosion 
of state power and a growing political vacuum in which 
oppositional interests might organize on an independent 
basis."(1) In fact, the second option mentioned by 
Gentleman in this quotation is the one which actually 
took place. This thesis has attempted to illustrate this 
second outcome. A shift to a more liberal competitive 
mode has been the answer for the new government. As was 
explained in the introduction, the current government has 
taken the neo-liberal approach to the economy and 
democratic practice has shown a different result in the 
1988 presidential elections.
This thesis has attempted to prove so far that the 
second option suggested by Gentleman, shifting to a more 
liberal competitive mode, is the one which has been the 
actual outcome, and that the debt crisis issue played an 
important role in shaping it. Gentleman argues that 
"...the actions taken by the Mexican government during 
the mid-1970s were oriented towards the creation of a new 
political democratisation. All this was within an 
authoritarian political system which counted on the 
dominance of a single party, in alliance with a 
protective state, and a not very autonomous 
entrepreneurial class."(2) While the expression
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"authoritarian political system" leaves unanswered 
certain questions, there is in Gentleman's suggestions 
much of value. Her idea of the creation of a new 
political democratic process is indeed what this thesis 
has attempted to demonstrate.
Susan Kaufman Purcell, in the book that she edited 
in 1988 "Mexico in Transition", argues that: "The 
economic crisis, together with the changed economic and 
political environment, sparked an intense debate within 
Mexico over the kinds of policies Mexico should adopt to 
meet its new challenges. Some important changes have 
already been implemented. In some areas, however, there 
is more talk than action. A basic question remains 
unanswered: Can the Mexican government succeed in 
restoring economic growth while maintaining political 
stability?" (3). Kaufman Purcell seems to have a similar 
view to the one presented in this thesis. The politically 
intense debate that Kaufman Purcell mentions has 
carefully been presented in this thesis in chapters four, 
five and six. She agrees that the economic crisis has 
inspired the political debate, and that some changes have 
taken place. Her main question could now be answered by 
saying that the Mexican government-PRI has managed to 
maintain political stability and, as mentioned in the 
introduction, gradually restored economic growth.
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Susan Kaufman Purcell in another article "Crisis But 
No Collapse", 1988, (4) argues that the economic crisis 
of 1982 seem to have been followed by calls for political 
change. She continues saying that the crisis in the 
political scene and the calls of democratisation were 
intensified as the economic growth slowed and stopped. 
Futher the political system lost credability and 
legitimacy through comparison with developments in the 
rest of Latin America. Moreover, the new economic policy 
of the regime is thought by many to require openess and 
democratisation of institutions, reducing the central 
role of the state.
Soledad Loaeza in her chapter "The Impact of 
Economic Crisis on the Mexican Political System", 1988, 
argues that: "The current economic crisis in Mexico has 
had an unquestionable impact on the country's political 
life and institutions. Not only has it submitted the 
system to the strains of constant negotiations between 
the government and business organizations, trade unions, 
opposition parties, and even the Catholic Church, but 
economic deterioration also has injected what seems to be 
a very acute new political awareness into large sectors 
of Mexican society." (5). In other words, Loaeza offers 
the same argument that this thesis has sustained.
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Edgar Butler and Jorge Bustamante in their book 
"Sucesion Presidencial", 1991, argue that: "One of the 
most important foreign policy decisions facing Mexico, 
with implications for United States-Mexican relations, is 
the question of the debt. Since the posture of the FDN 
has been opposed to the present government's position of 
gradual renegotiation, it poses serious limitations on 
Salinas's ability to manoeuver in future debt 
arrangements with the United States and foreign bankers. 
The FDN will maintain constant and public pressure on the 
government to radicalize the PRl's position on a debt 
moratorium."(6). This remark again provides support for 
the main argument in this thesis.
Sol Sanders in an article, "Next to the Volcano", 
1988, (7) argues that Mexico faces a political crisis 
which has its roots not only in the current economic 
crisis but in the character and nature of the political 
system itself. Mexico has not progressed towards 
democracy, it has rather strengthened the powers of the 
presidency. The PRI having the monopoly in power does not 
help further democratization, a factor which is needed if 
Mexico is to overcome the political crisis. Confidence in 
the political as well as the economic future is needed 
for Mexico to overcome the crisis. For this, the regime 
has to abandon the pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric of the 
past, return nationalised industries to private sector,
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allow foreign investors in, and change its protectionist 
policies.
Other writers, in focusing on various specific 
aspects of the political debate, provide support for the 
thesis. Dale Story, in his study of the right-wing PAN, 
1987, (8) argues that in fact, rather than being mainly 
the party of big business, it has increased in strength 
through coming to be seen as a viable option for protest 
voters and dissident citizens, particularly in the north 
of the country. As was seen in chapter seven, Story 
predicted quite well what was the outcome of the 1988 
federal elections, and the support that the PAN received 
in the northern federal states of Mexico. However, Story 
maintains that the PAN will probably remain a minority 
party within Mexico's political system due to its 
inability until now to transcend its role as a mix of 
protest voters, rather than committed PAN supporters. 
Soledad Loaeza disagrees with Story in this last point.
Wayne Cornelius, 1987, (9) points to the growing 
discontented middle-class sectors without political 
affiliations as a serious potential source of trouble for 
the government. In his view the PRI will have great 
difficulty in the future in dealing with Mexico's young 
urban middle class. In fact that was exactly what 
happened when urban citizens joined the PAN and younger
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people joined the FDN in the 1988 presidential elections. 
Sergio Zermeno, 1988, agrees with Wayne Cornelius that 
the government has difficulties in dealing with Mexico’s 
young urban citizens.
Esperanza Duran, 1985, (10) argues that in 1982 
President De la Madrid faced not only an economic crisis 
but political problems as well, in the form of tension 
and disillusionment. She thinks that the austerity 
measures introduced for economic recovery were regarded 
as possible causes for political instability; however, 
the political problem goes much deeper and is of a longer 
term nature. In fact she argues that it is a problem of 
political disbelief in the Mexican political system.
Joseph Klesner, 1987, (11) suggests that the 
political reforms of the 1970s, new party mobilization 
and elections have had much influence on the structure of 
Mexico's party system. Although Klesner does not find 
that the PRI's hegemony has been seriously harmed as a 
result of these developments, he suggests that the PRI 
now faces serious challenges to its support among 
important national sectors, such as working classes and 
peasants. In fact, as was seen in chapter seven, the PRI 
was beaten in the federal elections in 1988 in the 
federal states of: the Federal District, Michoacan, 
Morelos, Baja California, and Estado de Mexico.
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Jorge G. Castaneda, 1986, (12) thinks that the 
economic crisis in Mexico threatens the political 
stability that Mexico enjoyed for decades. He argues that 
the economic crisis which is rooted in the 1982 financial 
crash and the subsequent governmental actions, have 
caused the loss of support of the Mexican middle class. 
Any economic reform will find resistance from the Mexican 
bureaucracy and the state-run trade unions. He argues 
that all the possible economic reforms would be 
politically costly. However, in his view, reforms are 
necessary, as both the economic and the political system 
are at their end. This will cause social as well as 
political problems and more economic hardship. In his 
view, the democratisation of the political institutions 
as well as a highly nationalistic progressive foreign 
policy, are the only answer to strengthen the conditions 
for economic recovery.
Silvia Gomez Tagle, 1987, (13) considers the 
government's ability to maintain its legitimacy. The 
issue of the integrity of Mexico's electoral process has 
increasingly focused international attention as PAN 
supporters have demonstrated against the government not 
only within Mexico but also in the USA. Gomez Tagle 
concludes that fraud alone will not be enough to halt the 
opposition and that the political reforms begun by Reyes 
Heroles in 1977 have led to political expectations which
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it will be difficult for the government to control in the 
future.
James Street, 1986, (14) argues that the 1982 
economic crisis followed a pattern common in other Latin 
American countries as well. In Mexico, he continues, each 
six-year presidential term begins with an emergency 
period to clean up the economic disorder left by the 
previous administration. He thinks that the economic 
crisis has not necesserily affected the political scene. 
Economic and political institutions in Mexico complement 
each other. The Mexican political system has 
deficiencies, and the political deficiencies affects the 
economic policies. He mentions that corruption at the 
political level leads to economic mismanagement.
Miguel Basanez, 1987, (15) attempted to discover to 
what extent the Mexican political regime has suffered a 
loss of legitimacy as a result of the continuing economic 
crisis, and whether any such loss of legitimacy could 
lead to a collapse of the system. Basanez concludes that 
the political system still retains considerable popular 
legitimacy and that the system is not about to break 
down.
There are a few other writers who hold a different 
perspective from that of this thesis. Martin Needier in
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his chapter "The Significance of Recent Events for the 
Mexican Political System", 1987, argues that in Mexico 
the economic crisis did not lead to political change, as 
the economic crisis has weakened business people, who 
have then looked to the PRI-government for help, thus 
strengthening the official party; and also because the 
trade unions in Mexico have been strengthened by the debt 
crisis, as the PRI does not risk strikes. This is an 
interesting argument as it seems to be different from the 
one presented in this thesis as well as by many other 
authors. In Needier's own words: "Normally one expects 
changes in the economic substructure to be reflected in 
the political superstructure. ... In this respect, the 
dynamics of Mexican politics are clearly different, in a 
curious way, from those in other Latin American countries 
where short-term economic crisis is the most reliable 
predictor of the overthrow of the incumbent government. 
Paradoxically, in Mexico economic crisis has had the 
short-term effect of stalling long-term political change. 
This is so because, on the one hand, the crisis has 
weakened substantial business interests that might 
otherwise have been expected to give backing to the PAN 
and instead has forced them to look to the government for 
assistance, thus putting them in no position to side with 
the opposition. On the other hand, the crisis has 
strengthened the role of that constituent of the ruling 
coalition most resistant to political reform, labour
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union leaderships, by making it impossible for the 
government to risk strikes that would interrupt 
production." (16).
Martin Needier thinks that the debt crisis is a new 
experience for Mexico, as in the past it has been able to 
cope with problems and not allow them to become a crisis. 
He considers the character of the current crisis in terms 
of its capacity to bring about certain changes in the 
political system. Needier concludes that the government 
will probably be able to manage successfully the 
difficulties it now faces and that fundamental changes in 
the political structure are not likely in the near 
future. However, the evidence provided in this thesis 
seems to show that a political crisis did in fact arise 
largely as a result of the debt crisis. It would 
therefore appear that Needier's argument lacks substance.
Steven Sanderson (17) does not disagree with this 
overall perspective, but emphasises a different aspect of 
this problem. He has written three articles relevant to 
this topic. Sanderson agrees on the different national 
and international perspectives that we have mentioned 
earlier in this work. According to his view, there has 
been an evolution of the Mexican political system in a 
technical-managerial direction, changing from what he has 
described a "populist-redistributive model" to an "oil-
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patronage model". The difference lies in the composition 
of their elite actors, one which holds a national project 
of development, and the other which does not treat 
national capital differently from international capital. 
These two perspectives and distinctions are of the same 
kind as those mentioned previously in this thesis.
Sanderson says that before the selection of 
President Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) in 1976, 
presidential candidates rose to power through the PRI. 
However, in 1975 President Echeverria (1970-1976) 
rejected the party favourites, instead selecting a 
personal friend with little party experience but with 
significant administrative experience. President Lopez 
Portillo was identified as a "t/cnico" more interested in 
the bureaucratic management of the state. Lopez Portillo 
did not cultivate the party as a strong force in national 
politics, and even sanctioned a "political opening" 
through the political reform of 1977. This political 
opening allowed a restricted but important level of party 
competition for the first time in more than two decades 
(18).
It can be seen from the above outline of the work of 
several writers on this subject that there is a 
considerable body of agreement with the main argument of 
this thesis: that the economic debt crisis was a
292
predominant factor in generating the intensified 
political debate of the late 1980's.
IV) Conclusions
It seems to be clear that the political process in 
Mexico is based upon an old and well-recognised class 
alliance, which varies and accommodates different social 
groups at different times in a given space. Nevertheless, 
the constants remain the same: the affiliation of 
different individuals into unions, confederations, 
leagues, or coalitions to sign treaties, pacts or 
agreements with other individuals of the same social 
class, and the further affiliation of all these 
confederations into a tripartite political machine: the 
PRI-state-President. Only by understanding this 
particular political process can we understand Mexican 
political reality.
The process of negotiation surrounding the debt 
crisis has given us the opportunity to observe all these 
coalitions in practice, exercising their own power to 
project their opinions. These groups and coalitions have 
been formed and existed in Mexico ever since the Mexican
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revolution was institutionalised, as was shown in chapter 
one. However, gradually since the mid-1970s and 
particularly during the debt economic crisis of the 1980s 
described in this thesis, these coalitions have altered 
the pressure that they effectively put upon the state 
institutions. The 1977 political reform gradually opened 
the political arena to alternative groups which were not 
incorporated into the governing revolutionary coalition, 
as some authors like to describe it. The foreign debt 
crisis, as an economic phenomenon and as an issue of 
political concern, continued this process of gradual 
differentiation and democratisation with the emergence of 
growing political pluralism. In this newly expanded 
programme of political liberalization, two opposite 
electoral forces were mainly favoured: the right-wing 
National Action Party (PAN), and the left-wing National 
Democratic Front (FDN). The PAN managed to expand its 
support beyond its traditional industrial-private sector 
and upper middle classes, to lower urban middle-class 
groups. Meanwhile the FDN was created to unify and expand 
the support given to the left-wing political 
organizations, as was seen in chapter seven.
The research carried out in this thesis has helped 
to demonstrate that the foreign debt crisis became an 
issue of common political concern which opened the 
political debate at all levels and influenced democratic
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practice in Mexico, continuing the growth of political 
pluralism initiated in 1977 with the political reform. Up 
to 1986 it could be said that if there was an opposition 
group that enjoyed political advantage, it was clearly 
the PAN. However, the presidential elections in 1988 
showed that this time there was another option for 
protest, the FDN. Indeed, this thesis has attempted to 
prove that with the debt crisis as an economic phenomenon 
and as an issue of political debate, some other political 
groups strengthened their position; this is clearly the 
case of the left coalition represented by the FDN in the
1988 presidential elections, as pointed out in chapter 
seven. The economic policies adopted by the government 
regarding the external debt payments were not necessarily 
altered in the end due to the opinion of all these 
political groups; however, the political influence that 
these opinions had in the process of opening the 
pluralistic representation in Mexico has been a 
determining factor.
The debt crisis also produced anxiety among the 
Mexican population. The economic pressure forced people 
to react. At the same time they gave thought to their 
political options, especially their options for 
democracy. However, the potentially more radical actions 
were suppressed by the opening of the democratic debate. 
Some of the anxiety was channelled through the political
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institutions. Whether or not these actions taken by the 
state were carried out deliberately remains the main 
ques tion.
An alternative way of looking at this outcome is to 
analyse the more astute attitude that the PRI had in 
generating its own strategy of survival. This process of 
political liberalisation could also be interpreted as a 
machiavellian action cleverly designed by the PRI- 
government to channel the sparks of protest into a more 
democratic electoral system, absorbing support from 
across the political spectrum. It is possible to sustain 
this second interpretation and to argue that the foreign 
debt was the issue that brought support to the state 
rather than causing internal fragmentation, as in the end 
the PRI-government managed carefully to work out a 
strategy which help to overcome the signs of political 
protest.
If this political liberalisation process was not 
deliberately designed by the PRI-government in a 
machiavellian manoeuvre, then it could be said that the 
nature of the Mexican political system based upon its 
inherent class alliances and a single party-state has the 
capacity to absorb the class contradiction in a very 
effective way.
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To sum up, what the thesis has proved is that the 
debt crisis as an issue opened the political debate. The 
debt crisis led to a political crisis. The previous 
process of political reform initiated in Mexico in 1977 
opened the space for alternative political parties and 
views. The debt crisis was taken up as an issue by these 
alternative groups which encouraged the debate. The debt 
crisis itself reinforced or continued with the process of 
political transformation. The political transformation 
itself suppressed or redirected more radical changes.
297
Notes.-
(1) Gentleman, Judith, (ed.), 1987. Mexican Politics in 
Transition. Boulder: Westview. p.3.
(2) Gentleman, Judith, ibid.
(3) Purcell, Susan Kaufman, (ed.), 1988. Mexico in 
Transition: Implications for U.S. Policy. New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations, p.4.
(4) Purcell, Susan Kaufman, 1988. "Crisis But No 
Collapse", in Orbis, vol.32:49-68, winter 1988. 
Philadelphia, USA.
(5) Loaeza, Soledad, 1988. "The Impact of Economic Crisis 
on the Mexican Political System", in Purcell, Susan 
Kaufman, (ed.), 1988. Mexico in Transition: Implications 
for U.S. Policy. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
p.43.
(6) Butler, Edgar W. , and Jorge A. Bustamante, (eds.), 
1991. Sucesion Presidencial: The 1988 Mexican 
Presidential Election. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
p .106.
(7) Sanders, Sol W., 1988. "Next to the Volcano: Mexico’s 
Future", in Orbis, vol.32:49-68, winter 1988. 
Philadelphia, USA.
(8) Story, Dale, 1987. "The PAN, the Private Sector, and 
the Future of the Mexican Opposition", in Gentleman, 
Judith, (ed.), 1987. Mexican Politics in Transition. 
Boulder: Westview.
Story, Dale, 1986. The Mexican Ruling Party: 
Stability and Authority. New York: Praeger Publishers.
(9) Cornelius, Wayne A., 1987. "Political Liberalization 
in an Authoritarian Regime: Mexico, 1976-1985", in 
Gentleman, Judith, (ed.), 1987. Mexican Politics in 
Transition. Boulder: Westview.
(10) Dura^, Esperanza, 1985. "Mexico: economic realism 
and political efficiency", in World Today, vol 41:96-9, 
May 1985, Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
London.
(11) Klesner, Joseph L., 1987. "Changing Patterns of 
Electoral Participation and Official Party Support in 
Mexico", in Gentleman, Judith, (ed.), 1987. Mexican 
Politics in Transition. Boulder: Westview.
298
(12) Castaneda, Jorge G., 1985-86. "Mexico at the Brink", 
in Foreign Affairs, vol.64:287-303, winter 1985-86, 
Council on Foreign Relations. New York.
(13) Gomez Tagle, Silvia, 1987. "Democracy and Power in 
Mexico: The Meaning of Conflict in the 1979, 1982, and 
1985 Federal Elections", in Gentleman, Judith, (ed.), 
1987. Mexican Politics in Transition. Boulder: Westview.
(14) Street, James H., 1986. "Can Mexico Break the 
Vicious Circle of Stop-Go Policy? An Institutional 
Overview", in Journal of Economic Issues, vol.20:601-12, 
june 1986, Department of Economics, California State 
University. USA.
(15) BasarTez, Miguel, 1987. "Elections and Political 
Culture in Mexico', in Gentleman, Judith, (ed.), 1987. 
Mexican Politics in Transition. Boulder: Westview.
(16) Needier, Martin C., 1987. "The Significance of 
Recent Events for the Mexican Political System", in 
Gentlemajn, Judith, (ed.), 1987. Mexican Politics in 
Transition. Boulder: Westview. p.210.
Needier, Martin C. , 1982. Mexican Politics: The 
Containment of Conflict. New York: Praeger Publishers.
(17) Sanderson, Steven E. , 1983. "Political Tensions in 
the Mexican Party System", in Current History, 
vol.82:401-5, december 1983. Philadelphia, USA.
Sanderson, Steven E., 1983. "Presidential Succession 
and Political Rationality in Mexico", in World Politics, 
vol.35:315-34, april 1983, (Princeton). New York.
Sanderson, Steven E. , 1984. "Party Politics and 
Economic Crisis in Mexico", in The Journal of the 
Institute for Socioeconomic Studies, vol.9:87-97, spring
1984. New York.
(18) Sanderson, Steven E., 1983. "Political Tensions in 
the Mexican Party System", in Current History, 
vol.82:401-5, december 1983. Philadelphia, USA. p.402.
299
Bibliography:
I) Primary Sources
a) Mexican national newspapers for the years between 
1982-1988:
El Dia
El Financiero 
El Nacional 
El Universal 
Exc/lsior 
La Jornada 
Novedades 
Uno Ma^ s Uno
b) Latin America Weekly Report 1982-1988.
c) Speeches:
(Available from the Ministry of the Interior)
De la Madrid Hurtado, Miguel; the six Presidential State 
of the Nation Speeches.
De la Madrid Hurtado, Miguel; relevant speeches given 
between 1982-1988.
Petricioli, Gustavo; speeches given at the Union Congress 
between 1986-1988.
Silva Herzog, Jesus; speeches given at the Union Congress 
between 1982-1986.
300
d) Interviews:
(Conducted in Mexico City in January - March 1988, March
1989 and August 1990)
Buira, Ariel; Director of International Policy of the 
Bank of Mexico (Banco de Mexico).
Green, Rosario; Researcher at El Colegio de Mexico 
(COLMEX), and Director of the Instituto Matias Romero of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Secretaria de Relaciones 
Exteriores).
Martinez, Ifigenia; economics specialist and active 
member of the National Democratic Front (FDN).
Moreno Sanchez, Manuel; ex-Leader and ex-President of the 
Chamber of Senators (Camara del Senado).
Munoz Ledo, Porfirio; co-founder of the Movement of 
Democratic Renovation (MRD, otherwise known as the 
Democratic Tendency within the PRI)), and later of the 
National Democratic Front (FDN).
Silva Herzog, Jesus; ex-Minister of Finance (Secretaria 
de Hacienda y Cre'dito Publico).
e) Original documents of the FDN (National Democratic 
Front). Seen in their offices in Coyoacan, Mexico City.
f) Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE), and Mexican 
Ministry of Finances (SHCP), relevant internal memoranda 
and briefings seen on a confidential basis through 
previous employment and later personal arrangements.
301
Adelphi Papers, 1989. The Changing Strategic Landscape, 
Number 237, Spring 1989, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies. Oxford.
Alavi,H. and Shanin, T. (eds), 1982. Introduction to the 
Sociology of Developing Societies. London: Macmillan.
Alcocer, Jorge (ed.), 1984-1985. Mexico: Presente y
Futuro, (Pensamiento Social). Mexico City: Ediciones de 
Cultura Popular.
/
Alvarez, Alejandro, 1987. La Crisis Global del 
Capitalismo en Me'xico 1968-1985, (Coleccion Problemas de 
Mexico). Mexico City: Ediciones Era.
Arredondo,E., G.Diaz, J.Paez^ M.Singer, F.Valdes, and 
J.E.Vega, 1982. Sociedad, Politica y Estado, (Ensayos 1, 
Coleccion de Estudios Sociopoliticos). Mexico City: 
Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas (CIDE).
Aschentrupp Toledo, Hermann, 1985. La Dimension Politica 
de la Crisis y Renegociacion de la Deuda Externa Mexicana 
(1982-1984), (Documentos de Trabajo No.^3). Mexico City: 
Centro de Investigacio'n y Docencia Economicas (CIDE).
Barkin, David, 1986. "Mexico's Albatross. The U.S. 
Economy", in Nora Hamilton and Timothy F. Harding (eds), 
Modern Mexico: State, Economy, and Social Conflict. 
California: SAGE Publications, in cooperation with Latin 
America Perspectives.
BasarTez, Miguel, 1981. La lucha por la Hegemonxa en 
Mexico 1968-1980. Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.
---- , 1987. "Elections and Political Culture in Mexico",
in Gentleman, Judith, (ed.), 1987. Mexican Politics in 
Transition. Boulder: Westview.
Basave Benitez, Agustin; Eloy Cantu Segovia, and Jose 
Luis Medina Aguilar, 1982. "The Challenge of Managing 
Mexico: The Priorities of the 1982-1988 Administration", 
in Public Administration Review, vol.42:405-9, september- 
october 1982, The American Society for Public 
Administration. Washington, DC.
Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson, 1984. "The 
Political Culture of Authoritarianism in Mexico: A 
Reexamination", in Latin America Research Review, 
vol.19:106-24, 1984.
II) Published Sources
/
302
Branford, Sue, and Bernardo Kucinski, 1988. The Debt 
Squads, The US, the Banks, and Latin America. London: Zed 
Books.
Brett, E.A., 1985. The World Economy Since the War: The 
Politics of Uneven Development. London: Macmillan.
Brewer, Anthony, 1980. Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A 
Critical Survey. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Burgueno LomeliT, Fausto (ed.), 1987. Economia Mexicana: 
Situacion Actual y Perspectivas. Mexico City: Universidad 
Nacional Autdnoma de Mexico (UNAM), Instituto de 
Investigaciones Economicas (HEc).
Butler, Edgar W., and Jorge A. Bustamante, (eds.), 1991. 
Sucesion Presidencial: The 1988 Mexican Presidential 
Election. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
Calderon, Jose" Maria, 1972. Genesis del Presidencialismo 
en Mexico. Mexico City: Ediciones El Caballito.
Calvert, Peter, 1968. The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914.
(The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict). Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press.
---- , 1973. Mexico. (Nations of the Modern World).
London, England: Ernest Benn Limited.
Camp, Roderic A., (ed), 1986. Mexico's Political 
Stability: The Next Five Years. Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press.
---- , 1989. Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth-
Century Mexico. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cardenas Solorzano, Cuauhtelrioc, 1988. Nuestra Lucha 
Apenas Comienza. Mexico: Editorial Nuestro Tiempo.
Carmona, Fernando (ed.), 1987. Mexico: el Curso de una 
Larga Crisis, (Coleccion, Los Grandes Problemas 
Nacionales). Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autonoma 
de Mexico (UNAM), and Editorial Nuestro Tiempo.
Castaingts Teillery, Juan (ed.), 1985. Posiciones Frente 
a la Crisis, (Economia: Teoria y Practica, nujnero 
extraordinario 1). Mexico City: Universidad Autonoma 
Metropolitana.
Castaneda, Jorge G. , 1985-86. "Mexico at the Brink", in 
Foreign Affairs, vol.64:287-303, winter 1985-86, Council 
on Foreign Relations. New York.
303
Castro, Fidel, 1983. La Crisis Econo'mica y Social del
Mundo. Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1986. "A 
Forum on Mexico's Survival", in Washington Quarterly, 
vol.9:171-84, winter 1986, Georgetown University. 
Washington.
Claudon, M.(ed.), 1986. World Debt Crisis. Cambridge: 
Ballinger.
Cline, Howard F., 1962. Mexico: Revolution to Evolution
1940-1960. Oxford: Oxford University Press and The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs.
Cline, W. R. , 1983. International Debt and the Stability 
of the World Economy. Washington DC: Institute for 
International Economics.
---- , 1987. Mobilizing Bank Lending to Debtor Countries.
Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
Cockcroft, James D., 1983. Mexico: Class Formation, 
Capital Accumulation and the State. Monthly Review.
Cohen, B.J. In Whose Interest? International Banking and 
American Foreign Policy. Washington: Council on Foreign 
Relations.
Comision Episcopal de Pastoral Social. 1987. La Deuda 
Externa de Mexico. Una Consideracion Etica de la Deuda 
Internacional, Pontificia Comision "Iustitia et Pax". 
Mexico City: Comisio'h Episcopal de Pastoral Social, 
Centro de Estudios y Promocio'h Social, A.C.
Cordera, Rolando, and^ Carlos Tello, 1981. Mexico: La 
Disputa por la Nacion. Perspectivas y Opciones del 
Desarrollo. Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editoras.
Cordova, Arnaldo, 1972. La Formacion del Poder Politico 
en Mexico. Mexico City: Serie Popular Era, 15.
Cornelius, Wayne A., 1987. "Political Liberalization in 
an Authoritarian Regime: Mexico, 1976-1985", in 
Gentleman, Judith, (ed.), 1987. Mexican Politics in 
Transition. Boulder: Westview.
Cornia, G.A., R. Jolly, and F. Stewart (eds.), 1987. 
Adjustment with a Human Face: Protecting the Vulnerable 
and Promoting Growth, (A Study by UNICEF). Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Cosio Villegas, Daniel, 1974. El Estilo Personal de 
Gobernar. Mexico City: Cuadernos de Joaquin Mo'rtiz.
304
Cosxo Villegas, Daniel, 1975. El Sistema Politico 
Mexicano. Mexico City: Cuadernos de Joaquin Mortiz.
Cosio Villegas, D.^ , Ignacio Bernal, Alexandra Moreno 
Toscano, Luis Gonzalez, Eduardo Blanquel, and Lorenzo 
Meyer, 1973. A Compact History of Mexico. Mexico City: El 
Colegio de Mexico.
Davila Flores, Alejandro, 1986. La Crisis Financiera en 
Mexico, (Economia). Mexico City: Ediciones de Cultura 
Popular.
De^ la Hidalga, Luis, 1986. El Equilibrio del Poder en 
Me'xico. Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de 
Mexico (UNAM).
Dent, David W., (ed), 1990. Handbook of Political Science 
Research on Latin America: Trends from the 1960s to the 
1990s. New York, USA: Greenwood Press.
D.iaz Redondo, Regino, 1985. Endeudamiento y Subersion: 
America Latina. Entrevista a Fidel Castro. Mexico City: 
Editorial Grijalbo, S.A.
Duran, Esperanza, 1985. Latin America and the World 
Recession. Cambridge: The Royal Institute of Iternational 
Affairs and Cambridge University Press.
---- , 1985. "Mexico: economic realism and political
efficiency", in World Today, vol 41:96-9, May 1985, Royal 
Institute of International Affairs. London.
Echeverria Zuno, Alvaro, 1984. Mexico: Los Laberintos de 
la Crisis. Mexico City: Terra Nova.
Eckstein, Susan, 1977. The Poverty of Revolution: the 
State and the Urban Poor in Mexico. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Feinberg, R., et.al., 1986. Between Two Worlds: the World 
Bank's Next Decade. USA: Transaction Books.
Foweraker, Joe, 1988. Transformism Transformed: The 
Nature of Mexico's Political Crisis, (Essex papers in 
politics and government, number 46), March 1988. Essex: 
University of Essex, Department of Government.
French Davis, R., and R. Feinberg (eds.), 1986. Beyond 
the Debt Crisis. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Gentleman, Judith, (ed), 1987. Mexican Politics in 
Transition. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
305
George, Susan, 1988. A Fate Worse than Debt. A radical 
new analysis of the Third World debt crisis. London: 
Penguin Books.
Giron, Alicia, A.Ortiz, B.Retchkiman, 0.Cornejo, 1986. 
Asj>ectos Comerciales y Financieros ^ de la Crisis en 
Mexico, (Cuadernos de Investigacion). Mexico City: 
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM), Instituto 
de Investigaciones Economicas (HEc).
Gomez Tagle, Silvia, 1987. "Democracy and Power in 
Mexico: The Meaning of Conflict in the 1979, 1982, and 
1985 Federal Elections", in Gentleman, Judith, (ed.),
1987. Mexican Politics in Transition. Boulder: Westview.
Gonzalez Casanova, Pablo, 1965. La Democracia en Mexico. 
Mexico City: Serie Popular Era, 4.
---- , 1970. Democracy in Mexico. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Gonzalez Casanova,Pablo, and Hector Aguilar Camin (eds.),
1985. Mexico ante la Crisis^ Tomo I El Contexto 
Internacional y la Crisis Economica, Tomo II El Impacto 
Social y Cultural/ Las Alternativas. Mexico City: Siglo 
Veintiuno Editores.
Green, Pete, 1983. "Debt, the Banks and Latin America", 
in International Socialism, 21, autumn, quarterly journal 
of the Socialist Workers Party. London.
Green, Rosario, 1981. Estado y Banca Transnacional en
Mexico. Mexico City: Centro de Estudios Economicos y 
Sociales del Tercer Mundo (CEESTEM), and Editorial Nueva 
Imagen.
Griffiths-Jones, Stephany, 1984. International Finance 
and Latin America. Melbourne: Croom Helm.
----  and others, 1987. "Learning to Live with Crisis",
The Banker, September. London.
----  (ed.), 1988. Managing World Debt. Hertfordshire:
Harvester Wheatsheaf Press, and St. Martin's Press.
Griffiths-Jones, Stephany, and 0. Sunkel, 1986. Debt and 
Development Crises in Latin America. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press.
Grindle, M.S., 1977. Bureaucrats, Politicians and 
Peasants in Mexico: A case Study in Public Policy.
California: University of California Press.
306
Guillen Romo, Hector, 1984. Origenes de la Crisis en 
Mexico: Inflacion y Endeudamiento Externo 1940-1982,
(Coleccion Problemas de Mexico). Mexico City: Ediciones 
Era.
Gutierrez Garza, Esthela (ed.), 1985. Testimonies de la 
Crisis. Reestructuracion Productiva y Clase Obrera, Vol. 
1. Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.
Hamilton, Nora, 1982. The Limits of State Autonomy: Post- 
Revolutionary Mexico. California: Princeton University 
Press.
---- , (ed.), 1986. Modern Mexico: State, Economy, and
Social Conflict. USA: Latin American Perspectives 
Readers.
---- , 1986. "State-Class Alliances and Conflicts: Issues
and Actors in the Mexican Economic Crisis", in Nora 
Hamilton and Timothy F. Harding, Modern Mexico: State, 
Economy, and Social Conflict. California: SAGE 
Publications, in cooperation with Latin America 
Perspectives.
Hansen, Roger D. , 1971. The Politics of Mexican
Development. Washington: Johns Hopkins Press.
Heilman, Judith Adler, 1978. Mexico in Crisis. NY: Holmes 
and Meier Publishers.
Hodges, D., and R. Gaudy, 1979. Mexico 1910-1976: Reform 
or Revolution?. Zed Press.
Huerta Gonzalez, Arturo, 1986. Economia Mexicana Mas Alla 
del Milagro. Mexico City: Ediciones de, Cultura Popular, 
and Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas, UNAM.
Investigacion Economica, 1987. Number 182, Octubre- 
Diciembre 1987. Mexico City. Revista de la^Facultad de 
Economia, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM).
Johnson, Kenneth F. , 1984. Mexican Democracy: A Critical 
View. New York: Praeger Publishers.
Johnston,R.J., and P.J.Taylor (eds.), 1986. A World in 
Crisis?: Geographical Perspectives. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell.
Kaletsky, Anatole, et al., 1986. "The Debt Burden" and 
"Third World Futures", in Third World Affairs 1986. 
London: Third World Foundation for Social and Economic 
Studies.
307
Kaletsky, Anatole, 1987. The Costs of Default. A 
Twentieth Century Fund Paper. New York: The Twentieth 
Century Fund in agreement with Scott Meredith Literary 
Agency.
Kettell, Brian, and George A. Magnus, 1986. The 
International Debt Game. London: Graham and Trotman.
Kim, K.S., and D.F. Ruccio, 1985. Debt and Development in 
Latin America. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Klesner, Joseph L., 1987. "Changing Patterns of Electoral 
Participation and Official Party Support in Mexico", in 
Gentleman, Judith, (ed.), 1987. Mexican Politics in 
Transition. Boulder: Westview.
Klochkovski, L., 1978. Economia de los Paises 
Latinoamericanos. Mexico City: Editorial Progreso.
Korner,P., G.Maass, T.Siebald, R.Tetzlaff, 1986. The IMF 
and the Debt Crisis: A Guide to the Third World's 
Dilemma. London: Zed Books.
La Botz, Dan, 1988. The Crisis of Mexican Labor. USA: 
Greenwood Press.
Latin America Economic Report, Issues from 1975-1979. 
London: Latin America News Letters.
Latin America Political Report, Issues from 1975-1979. 
London: Latin America News Letters.
Latin America Weekly Report, Issues from 1980-1988. 
London: Latin America News Letters.
Latin America Bureau, 1983. The Poverty Brokers: The IMF 
and Latin America. London: Latina America Bureau 
(Research and Action).
Leal, Juan Felipe, 1976. Mexico: Estado, Burocracia y 
Sindicatos. Mexico City: Ediciones El Caballito.
Lechuga Montenegro, Jesus (ed.), 1987. El Dilema de la 
Economia Mexicana: Ensayos de Interpretacion. Mexico 
City: Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana, and Ediciones 
de Cultura Popular.
Leeds, Roger S., and Gale Thompson, 1987. The 1982 
Mexican Debt Negotiations, Response to a Financial 
Crisis. Washington, D.C.: The Johns Hopkins University, 
School of Advanced International Studies, Foreign Policy 
Institute, FPI Case Studies No.4.
308
Lessard, D.R., and J. Williamson. Capital Flight and 
Third World Debt. Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics.
Lever, H., and C. Huhne, 1985. Debt and Danger. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Levy, Daniel, and Gabriel Szekely, 1983. Mexico: 
Paradoxes of Stability and Change. Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press.
Lichtensztejn^ Samuel, 1978. "Sobre el Papel y el Enfoque 
de las Politicas de Estabilizacion",in Economia de 
Amelrica Latina, number 1. Mexico City: Centro de 
Investigacion y Docencia Economicas (CIDE).
---- , and Monica Baer, 1986. Fondo Monetario
Internacional y Banco Mundial, Estrategias y Politicas 
del Poder Financiero. Mexico City: Ediciones de Cultura 
Popular.
Loaeza, Soledad, 1988. "The Impact of Economic Crisis on 
the Mexican Political System", in Purcell, Susan Kaufman, 
(ed.), 1988. Mexico in Transition: Implications for U.S. 
Policy. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
Loaeza, Soledad, and Rafael Segovia (eds.), 1987. La Vida 
Politica Mexicana en la Crisis. Mexico City: El Colegio 
de M/xico.
Lowy, Michael, 1981. The Politics of Combined and Uneven
Development. London: Verso Editions and NLB.
Manley, M., 1987. Up the Down Escalator: Development and 
the International Economy. A Jamaica case study. London: 
Andre Deutsch.
Manriques, Irma, Constancia Perez, Arturo Guillen, Arturo 
Ortiz, Saul Osorio Paz, Arturo Bonilla, 1987. Reflexiones 
sobre la Deuda, 1/87, (Lecturas de Economia). Mexico 
City: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM), 
Instituto de Investigaciones Econolnicas (HEc).
Mapa Economico Internacional,^ 1983. Number 2. Mexico 
City: Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas 
(CIDE).
Martinez, Ifigenia, 1986. Deuda Externa y Soberania 
Nacional, (Materiales de Investigacion Economica No. 1). 
Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico 
(UNAM), Facultad de Economia.
309
Martinez Escamilla, Ramon, 1986. Mexico: Revolucion, 
Clase Dominante y Estado. Mexico City: Universidad 
Nacional Autonoma de Me'xico (UNAM).
Melndez V., Sofia, 1984. La Crisis Internacional y la 
America Latina, (Lecturas, 55). Mexico City: Fondo de 
Cultura Econolnica (FCE), and Centro de Investigacion y 
Docencia Economicas (CIDE).
Middlebrook, Kevin J., 1981. "Political change in 
Mexico", in Proceedings of the Academy of Political 
Science, vol.34:55-66, 1981. New York.
Munoz Ledo, Porfirio, 1988. Compromisos. Mexico: 
Editorial Posada.
Navarrete, Jorge Eduardo, 1986. Mexico's Debt Crisis, 
paper presented at the North-South Forum. Bonn, Germany, 
Oct. 1986.
Needier, Martin C., 1982. Mexican Politics: The 
Containment of Conflict. New York: Praeger Publishers.
---- , 1987. "The Significance of Recent Events for the
Mexican Political System", in Gentleman, Judith, (ed.),
1987. Mexican Politics in Transition. Boulder: Westview.
Nexos, 1986. El Desafio Mexicano, Ensayo, Centro de 
Investigacion Cultural y Cientifica, A.C. Mexico City: 
Ediciones Oceano.
Nuncio, Abraham (ed.), 1987. La Sucesion Presidencial en
1988, (Politica y Economia). Mexico City: Enlace, and 
Grijalbo.
Olson, Wayne, 1985. "Crisis and Social Change in Mexico's 
Political Economy", in Latin American Perspectives, Issue 
46, Vol. 12 No.3, Summer. Beverly Hills.
The Open University, 1984. D209 The State and Society, 
Block 6, States and the International System, Unit 26 
Governing the World Economy: Bretton Woods and the IMF. 
London: The Open University Press.
Padoan, P.C., 1986. The Political Economy of 
International Financial Instability. London: Croom Helm.
Paniagua Ruiz, Rafael, 1985. Prolegomenos para una Teorxa 
de los Lxmites Financieros del Estado: Problema de la 
Deuda y Crisis Financiera, (Cuadernos Universitarios, 
30). Mexico City: Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana, 
Iztapalapa.
310
Paoli Bolio, Francisco Jose^ 1986. Estado y Sociedad en 
Mexico 1917-1984. Mexico City: Ediciones Oce'ano.
Parboni, Ricardo, 1981. The Dollar and its Rivals: 
Recession, Inflation and International Finance. London: 
Verso Editions.
Payer, Cheryl, 1974. The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third
World. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Pazos, Luis, 1980. El Gobierno y la Inflacion. Mexico 
City: Editorial Diana.
Perez Ferndridez del Castillo, Germain (ed.),^ 1986. 
Evolucion del Estado Mexicano, Tomo I Formacidn 1810- 
1910, Tomo II Rees tructuracio'n 1910-1940, Tomo III 
Consolidacion 1940-1983. Mexico City: Ediciones El 
Caballito, S.A.
Philips, George (ed), 1985. Politics in Mexico. London: 
Croom Helm.
Politica JFinanciera y Hacendaria, 1982-1988. Mexico City: 
Secretaria de Hacienda y Cre'idito Publico.
Problemas del Desarrollo, 1984, 1985, and 1987. Revista 
Latinoamericana de Economia Problemas del Desarrollo, 
numbers: 60- Vol. XV, November 1984- January 1985;
68- Vol. XVIII, January - March 1987;
69- Vol. XVIII, April - June 1987; and
70- Vol. XVIII, July - September 1987. ^
Mexico City: Universidaad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico 
(UNAM), Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas (iIEc).
Purcell, Susan Kaufman, (ed), 1988. Mexico in Transition: 
Implications for U.S. Policy. New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations.
---- , 1988. ’’Crisis But No Collapse", in Orbis,
vol.32:49-68, winter 1988. Philadelphia, USA.
Purcell, Susan Kaufman, and John F.H. Purcell,  ^1980. 
"State and society in Mexico: Must a stable polity be 
institutionalized ?", in World Politics, vol.32:194-227, 
january 1980, Princeton University Press. USA.
Rangel Frias, Raul, 1979. El Nagual, ^(Sierra Madre, 
Versiones Dos). Monterrey, Nuevo Leon: Universidad 
Autonoma de Nuevo Leon.
311
Revista Mexicana de Sociologia, 1987. Democracia 
Emergente en Me'xico, Year XLIX, Vol. XLIX, Number 4, 
October - December 1987, 4/87. Mexico City: Universidad 
Nacional Auto'noma de Mexico (UNAM), Instituto de 
Investigaciones Sociales (IIS).
Rey Romay, Benito, 1984. La Ofensiva Empresarial contra 
la Intervencion del Estado. Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno 
Editores.
---- , 1987. Mexico 1987: el Pais que Perdiraos. Mexico
City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, and Universidad Nacional 
Auto'noma de Mexico (UNAM).
Reyes Heroles, Jesus, 1974. El Liberalismo Mexicano, I) 
Los Origenes. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Ecohomica.
Reyna, Jose" Luis, and R.S. Weinert (eds.), 1977. 
Authoritarianism in Mexico, (Inter-American Politics 
Series). Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human 
Issues (ISHI).
Reynolds, C.W., and Carlos Tello (eds.), 1983. US-Mexico 
Relations: Economic and Social Aspects. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press.
Rivera Rios, Miguel Angel, 1986. Crisis y Reorganizacion 
del Capitalismo Mexicano 1960-1985, (Coleccion Problemas 
de Mexico). Mexico City: Ediciones Era.
Roddick, Jackie, 1988. The Dance of the Millions, Latin 
America and the Debt Crisis. London: Latin America Bureau 
(Research and Action).
Ronfeldt, David (ed.), 1984. The Modern Mexico Military: 
A Reassessment, (Monograph Series, 15). San Diego: 
University of California, Center for US-Mexican Studies.
Roxborough, Ian, 1979. Theories of Underdevelopment. 
London: Macmillan.
Sanders, Sol W., 1986. Mexico: Chaos On Our Doorstep.
Lanham, USA: Madison Books.
---- , 1988. "Next to the Volcano: Mexico's Future", in
Orbis, vol.32:49-68, winter 1988. Philadelphia, USA.
Sanderson, Steven E., 1983. "Political Tensions in the 
Mexican Party System", in Current History, vol.82:401-5, 
december 1983. Philadelphia, USA.
---- , 1983. "Presidential Succession and Political
Rationality in Mexico", in World Politics, vol.35:315-34, 
april 1983, (Princeton). New York.
312
---- , 1984. "Party Politics and Economic Crisis in
Mexico", in The Journal of the Institute for 
Socioeconomic Studies, vol.9:87-97, spring 1984. New 
York.
Schatan, J., 1987. World Debt: Who is to Pay?. London: 
Zed Books.
Secretaria de Hacienda y Crellito Publico, SHCP, 1982- 
1986. "Cartas de Intencion del Gobierno de Mexico al 
Fondo Monetario Internacional": Ira. 10 noviembre 1982, 
2da. 3 enero 1984, 3ra. 24 marzo 1985, and 4ta. 22 julio
1986, in Comercio Exterior. Mexico City.
SELA (Sistema Economico Latino Americano), 1986. El FMI, 
el Banco Mundial y la Crisis Latinoamericana. Mexico 
City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.
Silva-Herzog F., Jesus, 1986. "Evolucion y Perspectivas 
del Problema de la Deuda Latinoamericana", Comercio 
Exterior, February 1986. Mexico City.
Sloan, John W., 1985. "The Mexican Variant of 
Corporatism", in Inter-America Economic Affairs, 
vol.38:3-18, spring 1985. Washington, DC., USA.
Spalding, Rose J., 1981. "State Power and its Limits: 
Corporatism in Mexico", in Comparative Political Studies, 
vol.14:139-61, april 1981. USA.
Story, Dale, 1986. The Mexican Ruling Party: Stability 
and Authority. New York: Praeger Publishers.
---- , 1987. "The PAN, the Private Sector, and the Future
of the Mexican Opposition", in Gentleman, Judith, (ed.),
1987. Mexican Politics in Transition. Boulder: Westview.
Street, James H., 1986. "Can Mexico Break the Vicious 
Circle of Stop-Go Policy? An Institutional Overview", in 
Journal of Economic Issues, vol.20:601-12, june 1986, 
Department of Economics, California State University, 
USA.
Szeftel, Morris, 1987. "The Crisis in the Third World", 
in Ray Bush, Gordon Johnston, and David Coates (eds), The 
World Order: Socialist Perspectives. Cambridge: Polity 
Press.
Teichman, Judith, 1988. Policy Making in Mexico. London: 
Allen and Unwin.
Tello, Carlos, 1979. La Politica Economica en Mexico
1970-1976. Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.
313
---- , 1984. La Nacionalizacion de la Banca en Mexico.
Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.
Thomas, Clive Y., 1984. The Rise of the Authoritarian 
State in Peripheral Societies. New York: Monthly Review 
Press.
Thorp, R., and L. Whitehead, (eds.), 1987. The Latin 
American Debt Crisis. London: Macmillan.
Trotsky, Leon, 1965. History of the Russian Revolution, 
Capter One. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd.
Valenzuela Feijoo, Jose^ , 1986. El Capitalismo Mexicano^.en 
los Ochenta, Hacia un Nuevo Modelo de Acumulacion?,
(Coleccion Problemas de Mexico). Mexico City: Ediciones 
Era.
Villarreal, Ren/, 1984. La Contrarrevolucion Monetarista. 
Teorxa, Politica Economica e Ideologia del 
Neoliberalismo. Mexico City: Ediciones Oceano.
Violante, Alejandro, and Roberto Da'vila, 1984. Mexico: 
Una Economia en Transicion. Politica Monetaria y Fiscal, 
Vol. 1. Mexico City: Editorial Limusa.
Weeks, John, 1985. "World Liquidity and the Role of 
Multilateral Financial Organizations in the Latin America 
Debt Crisis", a paper presented at a conference in Leeds 
University, November 1985.
Wionczek, Miguel S. (ed.), 1987. La Crisis de la Deuda 
Externa en la America Latina, Vol. I and Vol. II,
(Lecturas, 59). Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economica.
Wyman, Donald L. (ed.), 1983. Mexico's Economic Crisis: 
Challenges and Opportunities, (Monograph Series, 12). San 
Diego: University of California, Center for US-Mexican 
Studies.
Zaid, Gabriel, 1987. La Economia Presidencial. Mexico 
City: Vuelta.
Zermeno, Sergio, 1987. "La Democracia como Identidad 
Restringida", in Revista Mexicana de Sociologia, 
vol.XLIX, october-december 1987. Instituto de 
Investigaciones Sociales, UNAM. Mexico.
Zoghbi, J.A., 1987. Los Limites del Endeudamiento: 
Soberania y Proyecto Historico Nacional, (Economia). 
Mexico City: Ediciones El Caballito.
